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CHAPTER I
Why the capability approach?
I. Introduction.
The capability approach emerged in the intersection o f political and moral philosophy in the 
early 1980s. It integrated the social sciences gradually as a space or metric for individual 
human well-being and advantage. The capability approach, however, is more than a 
measurement metric since it encompasses a constellation o f concepts— including capability, 
functionings, and conversion factors, among others— and was from inception motivated by a 
moral concern. The objective o f this thesis is to explicate the ethical foundations o f the 
capability approach and render their connection to empirical operationalization more explicit. 
Such an objective raises a series o f challenges for the thesis to solve along the way.
For a start, it should be acknowledged, social sciences in general, and economics in 
particular, have a deep and pervasive influence on the well-being o f the human individuals 
and societies they study. Their effect is pervasively felt for their policy implications and 
because they influence individuals’ understanding and interpretation o f reality. W hile these 
effects are not necessarily negative, they offer a sufficient reason for social sciences and 
economics to develop theories o f well-being. There is also another reason, namely, that w ell­
being as such is a theoretical concept that has interested humanity since at least the Greek 
philosophers and which ought to be studied for its own sake.
Current theories o f human well-being in economics are roughly dividable in two 
distinct cam ps.1 The first casts the realization o f individual preferences and desires as 
sufficient for well-being and emphasizes what is valuable privately— and, as it were, not 
imposed from outside. The red flag here is having an external source argue it knows more
1 The two sides are clearly delineated in the writings of Arneson (2006), Griffin (1986), Parfit (1984), Qizilbash 
(2006), Scanlon (1993), and Sumner (1996).
1
about what is in the interest o f individuals than they themselves know. The second camp is 
liberal paternalist and points out individual preferences and desires may be inadequate w ell­
being indicators. The liberal paternalist considers individuals can be misled by irrelevant and 
misleading environmental cues, as well as adaptive, expensive, and sometimes even 
repugnant desires and preferences. For the liberal paternalist it is possible “to go beyond 
actual preferences used in choice act into preferences she could have chosen to have” (Sen, 
2002a:616) to more adequately reflect well-being.
Thus, while more individualist perspectives enshrine preferences, desires, and choices 
to a privileged and protected status, liberal paternalist argue preferences, desires, and choices 
can be misleading. A distinction such as this has, nevertheless, wide ranging implications for 
the evaluation o f social arrangements and well-being realizations. If individuals are 
autonomous and responsible for what happens to them, their current well-being achievements 
are their own. A person’s well-being achievements, however, may be subject to a variety o f 
individual, social, and environmental factors beyond her control. Unless the empirically and 
theoretically implausible hypothesis o f fully autonomous individuals is adopted, and in which 
case well-being achievements are mostly an individual responsibility, evaluations cannot be 
exclusively guided following the individualist perspective.
Under various guises, this tension is found in most well-being theories, including the 
capability approach. In the capability approach, functionings are individual human valuable 
achievements— or ends— the aggregate potentiality o f which forms the capability set. Here, 
the capability set contains all feasible functionings a person can achieve. The former tension 
emerges because functionings in the capability approach are valuable and the source o f value 
can arise from (i) functionings (subjectively) valued by individuals or (ii) functionings 
(objectively) valued from an external “validating” vantage point.
As argued in subsequent chapters, however, combining Sen’s concept o f positional 
objectivity and ethical inquiry weakens the paradox. The novel thesis to be explored here is 
that the combination o f positional objectivity and ethical inquiry offers foundations for the 
capability approach. These foundations are instrumental to synthesize both perspectives and 
view each as reflecting an important concern. Thus, which one is ultimately employed 
requires ethical inquiry over positional parameters, including context and other relevant 
informational considerations, necessary to conduct impartial social evaluations.
2 The requirement has a multitude of theoretical underpinnings and has been articulated in various ways by, 
among others, Arrow (1963:74,81-2,84), Berlin (1958:200-8), Nozick (1974:ix,33-4). See also Friedman and 
Friedman (1980) and Hayek (1960).
3 See Sunstein and Thaler (2006).
2
2
In what follows therefore Chapter 2 describes in further detail what ethical inquiry 
and positional objectivity involve; Chapter 3 reviews various empirical models o f the 
capability approach based on the core components derived from Chapter 2. Chapter 3 also 
discusses the ethical underpinnings o f these models which tend to be ignored. The subsequent 
chapters relate the literature on gender, w om en’s empowerment, and well-being to the 
capability approach. These literatures are instrumental to further operationalize the capability 
approach and contextualize its components to specific geographic, institutional, and historic 
settings. The final chapter o f the thesis synthesizes the results and considers their implications 
for the capability approach and its foundations.
The aim o f this introductory chapter is, however, to set the stage for the material to be 
discussed subsequently. A helpful starting point is to review and compare some human w ell­
being frameworks in social sciences and political philosophy. The focus will be on the 
capability approach and how it can accommodate two alternative competing frameworks. 
These two competing (and prominent) metrics will be further defined shortly and compared 
to the capability approach. They are Rawlsian primary goods (which include resources 
deemed instrumental for well-being such as rights, earnings, education, and wealth) and 
utilitarianism (where metrics such as happiness and life satisfaction are considered final ends 
in themselves).
Capability advocates do not presume their framework reducible to utilitarianism (Sen, 
2006b) or to Rawlsian deontology (Sen, 1980; 2006b; 2009) and— it often goes unnoticed—  
the capability approach can account for both— utility as an important functioning and primary 
goods as a capability input (Sen, 1999:81-5). W hile the inter-linkages and complementarities 
between the capability approach and Raw ls’s theory o f justice are many, there are also areas 
o f tension sustaining an ongoing debate between the advocates o f the different approaches. 
Furthermore, this introductory chapter will also highlight the complementarities and 
distinctions between the utilitarian and the capability literature.
The next section argues that it is not possible to discuss metrics or frameworks such 
as the capability approach without making moral choices. Section III compares Raw ls’s 
theory o f justice to the capability approach and Section IV to utilitarianism. W hile Section V 
explains why well-being and agency are necessary concept to further specify the capability 
approach, it is also pointed out the former has priority over the later. Section VI, finally, 
considers the distinctive features o f the capability approach as Section VII concludes with 
some caveats.
3
II. Metrics as ethical concepts.
W ithin theories o f social justice the choice o f metric literature focuses on the most adequate 
metric according to various criteria and considerations. The capability metric is usually the 
concept which may be equalized among individuals. Theoreticians o f social justice argue for 
different metrics; some defend utility, others capability, and yet others primary goods. 
Nevertheless, various ethically skeptic theorists point out a metric should not be too specific 
about well-being. Accordingly, such theorists prefer high levels o f abstraction and argue 
against the adoption o f thick metrics— which may involve “subjective” moral values— that 
could jeopardize impartiality and neutrality. Ruger (2010:75), for example, considers 
questions such as “what is human flourishing?” or “what is valuable?” metaphysical ones. 
Metaphysical, in this context, implies it is beyond the realm o f rational discussion, as if  
reasonable agreement about them is unachievable. Vallentyne (2005:360-1) pursues a similar 
logic and suggests definitions o f well-being are not necessary to the debate on the choice of 
metric for theories o f social justice. More specifically, for Vallentyne, the problem of choice 
o f metric is distinguished from what well-being is or ought to be. Originally, in fact, Rawls 
(1971) supported a comparable distinction by separating the private from the public sphere. 
For Rawls, individual well-being is a form o f perfectionism, a too specific articulation o f the 
good.
If  some contend Rawls purged from his later work metaphysical elements such as 
“autonomy” because they cause instability (Barclay, 2003:10-1,22-3),4 even Nussbaum 
(2000a:76), though somewhat more contentiously,5 claims her list o f essential capabilities is 
achieved by “overlapping consensus” as “people may sign onto [it], without accepting any 
metaphysical view o f the world, any particular comprehensive ethical, religious view, or even 
any particular view o f the person or human nature” . The notion o f overlapping consensus is 
not the controversial part here but rather the claim that her approach is obtained “without 
accepting any metaphysical view o f the world.” Arguments o f this sort allegedly reflect 
values such as impartiality, neutrality, and symmetry. They also entail the choice o f an
4 Thus, according to Barclay, the principles of free and equal citizens are sufficient for Rawls to stabilize his 
theory of justice.
5 See Barclay (2003), Jaggar (2006), and Robeyns (forthcoming). Nussbaum’s most recent stance may also be 
contrasted to her earlier work (1987:8). For an illuminating discussion on the internal tensions in Nussbaum’s 
work see Qizilbash (2006:101-9).
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abstract metric can be reasonably debated but not the good or what is valuable for 
individuals.
The attempt to exclude “metaphysical questions” or more specific definitions o f w ell­
being from social justice metrics parallels the distinction between political and moral 
philosophy. Thus, if  the latter involves questions on how one should live and the good life, 
the former deals with formal justice and institutions. Since Sen (1992; 2009) also defends the 
distinction between political and moral philosophy, which o f them generates the capability 
approach? If  asymmetrical considerations are permitted only in the domain o f moral 
philosophy, the capability approach is excluded from political philosophy. The paradox may 
be assumed away if  (i) the capability approach is excluded from the domain o f justice and 
political philosophy where “impartiality and equal concern ... provide a shared background 
to all the major ethical and political proposals” (Sen, 1992:18-9). Or (ii) if  the dichotomy 
between moral and political philosophy is rejected.
Nevertheless, personal ethics and political philosophy do not have to be perceived as 
reified and distinct. Continuity, instead, beginning with an articulated theory o f what is 
valuable, can be made. The capability approach can then be used to bridge the gap between 
moral and political philosophy (and undermine the dichotomy). A strategy such as this is also 
consistent with the capability approach as a framework that can integrate various, possibly 
even incommensurable, views about the good life even it is not itself an individualized 
prescriptive theory on how the good life should be lived.
Furthermore, two additional arguments further highlight how the exclusion o f certain 
questions and concepts as metaphysical is inherently ad hoc. First, the same values can be 
theoretically articulated in different ways. Symmetry, for example, can also be articulated in 
terms o f capability equality. Second, the distinction counters N ozik’s (1974:6) contention that 
“moral philosophy sets the background for and boundaries o f political philosophy” . Here, 
continuity between moral and political philosophy is implied as public responsibilities are 
aligned with private responsibilities (Kymlicka, 2002:5). In addition, both Rawls and 
N ussbaum ’s most recent writings are unambiguous about the necessity o f a partial notion of 
the good (Nussbaum, 2000a; Rawls, 2001:60). Arguably, Raw ls’s political liberalism cannot 
be neutral even in its later reincarnation and has to involve a notion o f the good (Berges, 
2007:23; Richardson, 2006a:14; Walsh, 2008:222-3).
There is, at any rate, an alternative perspective that relies on an “open and unashamed 
reference to value judgm ents ... about what a good life involves” (Aldred, 2009:136). As 
Sandel (2009) argues in the Reith Lecture, it is a mistake to separate arguments about justice
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from those about the good life. He argues so because questions o f justice cannot be solved 
without resolving substantive moral questions first. For Sandel, thus, instead o f avoiding “the 
moral and religious convictions o f our fellow citizens, we should attend to them more directly 
sometimes by challenging and contesting them, sometimes by listening and learning from 
them.”6 Disengaging the public from reasoning on moral issues, Sandel concludes, 
undermines the basis for mutual respect.
In summary, this thesis resists the a priori or unjustified belief that some concepts, 
issues, and definitions are metaphysical and cannot be rationally, constructively, discussed by 
whoever is willing to engage in moral reasoning (Brink, 1989:197-209). W hat this 
perspective involves shall be further elaborated in Chapter 2. The next section briefly 
explains the Rawlsian metric and compares it to its closest rival, the capability metric.
III.Primary goods or capability?
The Rawlsian justice metric is an index o f incommensurable (or lexicographically ordered)
n
and instrumental primary goods. These primary goods are the outcome o f deliberation by 
representatives o f citizens situated behind a veil o f ignorance hiding the particular individual 
they represent. In other words, the representatives hold a fiduciary relationship with future 
unknown citizens whose interest and advantage they must protect. Rawls argues deliberating 
from this uncertain environment motivates the representatives to integrate fairness in the 
design o f the basic structure (i.e., formal institutions) o f society. Thus, for Rawls (1971; 
2001), representatives agree behind the veil o f ignorance to form a bundle o f primary goods 
every citizen is entitled to. Since justice is the main virtue o f social institutions, the primary 
goods index is separate from individuals’ private beliefs, preferences, or other characteristic 
unrelated to the basic structure o f society.
The initial Rawlsian indifference to individual diversity— including to privately held 
values, preferences, and desires— and the instrumentality o f the primary goods index are two
6Audio transcript http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/20090616_reith_moralityinpolitics.rtf
7 The primary goods include (a) basic rights and liberties, (b) freedom of movement and choice of occupation 
against a background of diverse opportunities, (c) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of 
responsibility, (d) income and wealth, understood as all purpose means (having an exchange value) generally 
needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever they may be, and (e) the social bases of self-respect (Rawls, 
2001:58-9). Rawls (1971:54; 1982) argues primary goods under (a) and (b) are to be equalized among all 
citizens and cannot be subject to bargaining. Given the difference principle, primary goods under (c), (d), and 
(e) may vary between so long as it is beneficial to the least advantaged.
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important distinctions from a capability index. Accordingly, capability is distinct from 
primary goods because it is a well-being metric, valuable as an end in itself. Primary goods, 
on the other hand, are not well-being indicators but intermediate goods necessary to achieve 
whatever individuals rationally value.
Concerning the initial Rawlsian indifference to individual diversity, it may be noted 
various forms o f discrimination and oppression unrelated to formal institutions— and so to 
speak independent o f the basic political structure o f society— are as harmful to capabilities as 
overt institutional discrimination (Powers and Faden, 2006:31-2). Justice as fairness, 
however, is an ideal theory only applicable to a well ordered society where inequality in 
primary goods is for the benefit o f the least well-off. W hen current inequalities cannot be 
justified according to the benefit o f the least well-off, Rawlsians contend, it is because a well 
ordered society has not yet been established.
Nevertheless, girls in rural Turkey may not be sent to nearby, good, and cheap schools 
because o f a local parochial mode o f living. Consequently, in simply asking whether “the 
child is getting what we regard as a fair amount o f educational resources” (Berges, 2007:19), 
little can be done to improve girl’s literacy. But for theorists such as Rawls, these problems 
cannot be adequately engaged because fairness in education requires a well ordered society 
(Robeyns, 2004b:16; Nussbaum, 2002/3:477; Sen, 1992:76-9; 1995a:266). Inadequate 
education for girls in Turkey is therefore an institutional failure for Rawlsians that requires 
expansion and enforcement o f compulsory education. Capability advocates reject this 
conclusion arguing where (as in Turkey) girls are deprived from school a (policy 
implemented) change targeting informal gender norms may be more adequate. From their 
perspective, therefore, the domain o f justice is not limited to political institutions or the basic 
structure o f society.
Even though the relationship between institutions and individual well-being is, in part,
o
accounted for by the conversion factors in the capability approach, Rawlsians (Browne and 
Stears, 2005; Pogge, 2002:62) respond the capability approach cannot distinguish between 
relevant and irrelevant capabilities for justice. In other words, Rawlsian inspired thinkers 
argue the capability approach has no mechanism to identify which capability (or functioning) 
discrepancies between individuals are ju st or unjust. Rawlsians argue so because Sen 
(1992:87) noted the contraction o f the capability set o f two persons caused by the violation of 
an external liberty or an internal debilitation are indistinguishable. Sen therefore considers the
8 For example, institutions and culture may determine which functionings are necessities and which are luxuries.
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conversion factors— which affect and shape capability— cannot be interpolated from 
capability information even if  theories o f justice require this information to identify what 
caused the contraction. The capability approach, accordingly, is fundamentally incomplete as 
a theory o f justice and needs “the demand o f [Rawlsian] liberty as an additional principle” 
(Sen, 1992:87; see also 2009).
One source o f confusion with Rawlsian thinkers is that the capability set is 
distinguished from the capability approach. A capability set incorporates information on 
potentially achievable functionings whereas the capability approach includes capability sets, 
functionings, and conversion factors, among other things. Sen’s (1995a; 1995b:284) 
exclusion o f external liberty from the capability set still allows the capability approach to 
account for the narrowing o f w om en’s capabilities by internalization o f gender norms. If  the 
harmful norms were caused by formal institutions then an index o f primary goods suffices. 
However, Sen (1995a:265) argues, “social influences appear in most complex forms and may 
be hard to formalize into some component o f primary goods” . Thus, internalized harmful 
gender norms, according to Sen, influence capability without showing up in the space of 
primary goods which regulate the political and public sphere— not the private one where the 
norms are reproduced and instantiated. Though the answer to this debate is empirical in part, 
the contentious elements bring to bear issues that lie outside the broad ethical foundations o f 
the capability approach (to be introduced in Chapter 2) and therefore require more theoretical 
debate.
In summary, the two approaches are most likely complementary. For instance, a 
capability metric may substitute Raw ls’s primary goods without fundamentally revising 
“justice as fairness” (Blythe, 2008; Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi, 2004; Nussbaum, 
2002/3; Richardson, 2006b; Robeyns, 2004b; Sen, 2009:299). Sen (1992; 2009), in fact, also 
suggests the under-specification o f the capability approach can complement Rawlsian 
constitutionally protected primary goods and the capability approach can fill a gap in Raw ls’s 
theory o f justice. The gap in Raw ls’s theory is related to the alleged ubiquity in diversity 
between individuals’ capability to function or whenever two individuals with the same basket 
o f primary goods have very different capabilities.9
9 Rawls’s theory also excludes from the domain of justice cases o f extreme bad luck because the primary goods 
overlook individual diversity as suggested earlier. Rawls, however, counter-argues justice as fairness is only 
initially indifferent to those who suffer from unusual disadvantages and extreme bad luck which the primary 
goods do not cover (Rawls, 1971:441-3; Pogge, 1989:188-9; Richardson, 2006a:17). In subsequent stages, for 
Rawls, the veil of ignorance gradually withers and state institutions begin engaging more specific individual 
circumstances and conditions (Rawls, 1971:171-6; 2001:48). In addition, Rawlsians contend, justice is not a 
universal insurance scheme for all individuals independently of resources, efforts, responsibility, or rare but
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In short, the capability approach will remain incomplete as a theory o f justice if  it is 
limited to the broad ethical foundations to be elaborated upon. Still, the foundations to be 
suggested in Chapter 2 are meant to be built upon to further specify the open moral-empirical 
structure o f the capability approach. Only when this is achieved it may be possible to study 
what caused the capability set to contract. In a similar way, more specific ethical frameworks, 
including Rawlsian theories, can be appended to expand the capability approach. In Chapter 
2, these issues will be further elaborated upon. In the next section, however, utilitarianism—  
the most popular well-being approach in economics— is contrasted to the capability approach.
IV. Subjectivity, objectivity, and positional objectivity.
The notion o f objectivity and subjectivity enter the capability approach in two distinct forms. 
First, both subjective and objective functionings exist. Subjective functionings are based on 
feelings (Des Gasper, 2005) or individual preferences (Scanlon, 1993). Accordingly, how 
happy I feel now or my passion for wine, are both individual subjective states. Objective 
functionings are functionings that do not depend on feelings or preferences as such and 
include, for example, physiological health (heart rate, blood tension, body mass index) and 
literacy (Gasper, 2005; Sen, 2002b; 2008). There is, however, another understanding o f 
objectivity, namely that o f objectivity as impartiality. The latter is briefly discussed here and 
more thoroughly in Chapter 2.
In this thesis, the concept o f positional— not absolute— objectivity is used to support 
broad foundations for the capability approach. Positional objectivity has some resemblance to 
M cCloskey’s (1994) defense o f small truth t contra big truth T (which is God like and 
unattainable). According to McCloskey, small truth t is human made and pragmatic, not 
ideal. M ost importantly, positional objective evaluations do not strive for neutrality or 
Thomas N agel’s Archimedean “view from nowhere” (Williams, 1985). In contrast, 
positionally objective evaluation is the “view from everywhere” as Ruger (2010) puts it; it is 
in fact necessary for impartial evaluation and supports ethical inquiry in identifying local 
parochialisms and adaptive preferences (Anderson, 2003; Kraut, 2006:65; Sen, 1993 a; 2002a;
sever disability (Pogge, 1989:193). And that “the least advantaged ... are not identifiable apart from, or 
independently of, their income and wealth ... They are not individuals identified by natural or other features 
(race, gender, nationality, and the like)” (Rawls, 2001:59). This reasoning path, for capability advocates, is 
conducive to unjust, morally repugnant, outcomes.
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2006a; 2009). To adopt a positionally objective stance in the various human domains of 
inquiry, furthermore, all characteristics which may influence deliberation need to be 
accounted for. Adam Smith’s impartial spectator— an external observer able to sympathize 
with those concerned with and involved in social evaluation— may be one way to 
operationalize positional objective evaluation (Sen, 2006a). Here, for example, pain— an 
individual subjective feeling— can be validated as a felt experience from an objective, 
impartial, vantage point.
According to the above, mental evaluations are subjective when they involve 
unscrutinized individual preferences and feelings. Thus, more sophisticated utilitarians can 
overcome subjectivity by excluding harmful desires and preferences from their theories of 
well-being (as capability theorists do) (Sumner, 1996). Compare this to the subjective 
utilitarian school which reduces well-being to the satisfaction o f raw individual preferences 
and desires (Scanlon, 1993). Subjective utilitarianism faces only one challenge, namely, how 
to adequately measure preference and desire satisfaction.
Indeed, Scanlon (1993) suggests, desire satisfaction theories o f well-being that 
exclude desires which do not contribute to well-being are in the same league as the capability 
approach. Such desire satisfaction theories are substantive theories that explicitly specify 
what well-being is and can therefore be distinguished from (subjective) hedonistic or desire 
satisfaction theories (Parfitt, 1984). It follows that operationalizations o f the capability 
approach that view only capability satisfaction as a well-being metric are more utilitarian 
than Griffin’s (1996) or Qizilbash’s (1997) utilitarianism, based as they are on more 
substantive moral and well-being concerns.
In summary, Sen (2006b:92), a capability advocate, and Sumner (2006), a substantive 
utilitarian, agree, in principle, evaluation— whether done by individuals or institutions— is 
mental. Sen (2006b:93), however, wishes to distinguish between mental, subjective, and 
objective. For Sen, all evaluations are mental but subjectivity can be overcome if  scrutinized 
and reasoned. Subjectivity then involves feelings and preferences as they stand, i.e., un­
scrutinized (ibid.:94). Yet this view o f subjective renders Sen’s position very close to that of 
the more sophisticated utilitarians and prudential value theorists (including John Stuart Mill) 
which integrate deliberation in their framework to filter preferences and insure they are 
congruent with a person’s interest or what is good for her (Griffin, 1986; Mill, 1861 [1998]; 
Qizilbash, 1997; 2002). Thus, for Sumner (2006), the moral reasoning necessary to reduce an 
initial infinite list o f functionings to a selected list o f valuable functionings is not a
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distinguishing feature o f the capability approach because substantive utilitarians and 
prudential value theorists do the same.
Capability advocates, more specifically, have argued objectivity in evaluation obtains 
from inter- and intra-group deliberations (Bruni, et. al., 2008:6; Peter and Schmid, 2007; Sen, 
1999; 2002a; 2005; 2009). Capability advocates therefore emphasize the importance of 
individual level reasoning and scrutiny to identify and correct distortions from social 
conditioning (Gasper, 2005; Sen, 2006b). Still, inter- and intra-group deliberation with 
individual reasoning and scrutiny are far from sufficient to insure self rule and authenticity 
from heteronomy, false consciousness, and adaptive preferences. Inter- and intra-group 
deliberation can lead to groupthink, shared information bias, and confirmation bias, among 
others (Forsyth, 2006; Sunstein, 2009). Individual reasoning is also subject to a long list of 
biases (Baron, 2000; Kahneman and Tversky, 1971). As Sumner (2006:9) observes, “even if  
Sen is right in thinking that valuing is a more cognitive and reflective activity than either 
enjoying or desiring, personal values are also notoriously subject to influence by external 
social conditions” . Self-scrutiny may, furthermore, be also detrimental to individual w ell­
being (Pugno, 2008; Wilson, 2004).
To filter out reasoning biases and other social conditionings both positional 
objectivity and ethical inquiry are necessary. Both require the adoption o f principles, 
standards, and procedures, including Adam Smith’s impartial spectator or the “view from 
everywhere” (Ruger, 2010; Sen, 2009). The reliance on external criteria and perspectives is 
also needed because recent operationalizations o f the capability approach focus relatively 
more on individual based evaluations such as satisfaction with capability (W olff and D e­
Shalit, 2007:99).
But to the extent that feelings and un-scrutinized desire satisfaction are also valuable, 
subjectivity may still integrate the capability approach either as an agency capability input or 
as a happiness functioning (see Chapter 7). The literature on the relationship between 
subjective well-being and the capability approach is, in fact, expanding (Comim, 2008; Bruni 
et. al., 2008; Van Hoorn, Mabsout, and Sent, 2010; Samman, 2007) as capability advocates 
(Schokkaert, 2007) argue their framework needs to account for individual agency, including 
happiness and life satisfaction. Rura et. al. (2007), for example, define well-being in the gap 
between individual capability reality and individual capability expectation. In their 
framework, capability expectations are internally specified and subjectively set by individuals 
who establish the benchmarks. Anand and Van Hees (2006) also stress individuals’ 
satisfaction with capabilities as well-being. However, not all capability advocates are
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comfortable with this subjective turn considering “these efforts incorrectly equate utilities 
with capabilities” (Ruger, 2010:108). The next sub-section explores this theme further as it 
reviews the prioritization o f well-being— or what is prudential for an individual— over 
agency— which starts from an individual autonomy to achieve what she deems o f value, 
independently o f her own benefits, interests, or goals.
V. The priority of well-being over agency.
Although both agency and well-being are necessary to further specify the capability 
approach, both are extensions o f the broad ethical foundations. M ore contextual and 
substantive theories o f agency and well-being complete the open moral-empirical structure of 
the capability approach. Such openness is not a reluctance to engage metaphysical and 
substantive issues but simply an acknowledgment o f the pluralism underlying theories of 
well-being and agency which need deliberative, interpretative, and dialectical methods to be 
understood and articulated.
The concept o f individual agency has also subjective elements and, next to w ell­
being, plays an essential role in the capability approach. According to Alkire (2005b), 
psychologists Deci and Ryan’s self determination theory (SDT) is the closest 
operationalization o f Sen’s conception o f agency. But unlike well-being evaluation which is 
based on prudential values, or what is in the interest o f the individual, agency evaluation is 
more open ended and focused on the processes leading to action, choice, and functionings. 
Thus, under agency evaluation, achievements as such may be secondary to how or by whom 
an act is done. Agency evaluation recalibrates the weights beyond well-being since what is 
agency enhancing may be distinct from what is welfare or own goal enhancing (Sen, 
1992:59-62; 1993b:36-7; 2002a). Agency objectives could include risking one’s life to help 
others (eg., Rachel Corrie) or even purposefully fasting and abstaining from ingesting 
nutritious food for political reasons. Thus, even if  as own welfare and the ability to achieve 
goals is reduced, individual agency is enhanced.
Sen’s interest in agency was intended to reflect the informational restrictiveness of 
well-being concerns. It brings about a re-ordering o f priorities in social evaluations. The 
capability approach is, however, sharper in well-being evaluation (Sen, 1993b:49). Sen 
(1992:70-2), furthermore, suggests societies may assume responsibility for a given threshold
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of well-being whereas personal agency goals do not impose as strong a claim. Social security, 
poverty alleviation, gross economic inequality etc. tend to have priority over agency when it 
comes to social justice for, as Powers and Faden (2006:29) put it, “self-determination 
requires some material basis for its exercise” . For the capability approach, therefore, 
evaluation should not presuppose autonomy or agency. W hat is central to the capability 
approach is leaving as much options as possible open for individuals to make use o f their 
autonomy if  they so wish (Nussbaum, 2000a:49).
W ell-being also has priority over agency because o f a basic value supporting the core 
components, namely, ethical individualism (cf. Chapter 2). If  and where persons and 
communities are misguided about their “sense o f justice” , external interventions are needed 
to challenge power inequalities within groups in general and for the poor in particular 
(Burchardt, 2004:743-4; Deneulin, 2005:78; Nussbaum, 2000a:34-5). Such interventions may 
however require breaching the agency o f some to secure basic well-being for the most 
vulnerable.
In summary, Philips (2006:8) argues, Sen’s capability approach is distinct from 
theories where critical participation and autonomy are universal goals because it is “wide- 
ranging, freedom oriented, non-hierarchical” . Phillips concludes— unlike autonomy— “the 
requirement for meeting basic needs is universal and unconditional and indeed prescriptive” 
(ibid.:247). W alsh (2008:221, emphasis added), also points out, “opportunity freedom [unlike 
process freedom] requires the freedom for all agents to realize some minimal levels o f  vital 
human capabilities '’ Sen (1992:46) finally observed the “primary claim” o f his approach to 
justice is the selection o f functionings and capabilities necessary to assess well-being 
achievement and freedom (see Ruger, 2010:56-7). Nevertheless, as elaborated in subsequent 
chapters, the instrumental dimension o f agency— empowerment— may be necessary to 
achieve well-being.
VI. The capability approach as an alternative ethical metric.
As explained earlier, metrics and their justificatory frameworks cannot be reduced to a 
measurement issue. All metrics, in other words, are ethically motivated even if  this is not 
explicitly acknowledged. It follows that, as a metric, capability offers much more than a 
space.
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A principle moral concern behind the capability approach is how doing well in one 
dimension o f well-being can hide more serious ill-being in others. From this perspective, 
individuals differ in ways evaluation cannot ignore. Often, it is not necessary to account for 
all types o f human differences. But in other contexts, specific heterogeneities between 
individuals can be crucial. Thus, according to capability advocates, acknowledging the 
ubiquity and pervasiveness of heterogeneity between individuals’ capabilities to achieve 
valuable functionings is a moral dem and.10 In the capability approach therefore heterogeneity 
between individuals is partly accounted in the conversion factors to be further elaborated 
upon in the following sections and chapters.
Functionings as valuable achievements are therefore also multidimensional. 
Functionings, then, range from acquired knowledge, health, happiness, flourishing, and 
dignity, among others. It is likely, furthermore, that functionings have, over and above their 
value as ends, instrumental value. Such “fertile functionings” (W olff and De-Shalit, 2007) 
may be necessary for survival and include adequate nourishment, health, and education or the 
capability thereof (see below and Chapter 8).
To accommodate multidimensionality in functionings, the capability approach has to 
reflect a plurality o f informational spaces (Alkire, 2002; 2005a; Deneulin and Shahani, 2009; 
Robeyns, 2005; 2006). Genuine pluralism entails incommensurable functionings dimensions 
may also have to be accounted for. Incommensurability implies limited substitutability 
between functioning dimensions. For Sunstein (1994b:796), it “occurs when the relevant 
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered 
judgm ents about how these goods are best characterized.” Accommodating the possibility of 
incommensurability implies aggregation into a single index such as income or utility “begs 
important questions and ignores qualitative distinction” (ibid.:795).11
But incommensurable functionings dimensions also imply measurement challenges 
beyond the standard aggregation problems o f preference, utility, or income. Thus, accounting 
incommensurable functioning dimensions involves ethical inquiry because there is no single
or higher functioning dimension all the other dimensions can be reduced to (even if
12comparisons are made and the most rational functioning chosen).
10 Diversity between individuals in their freedoms to do things is also illuminatingly discussed by Hayek 
(1960:75-7). Hayek, however, departs from the moral implications of diversity in the capability approach. Thus, 
although there is agreement on facts, there is disagreement on values.
11 In economics, it is interesting to note, Boulding’s (1969:9) thesis that economic decision-making involving 
calculatedness cannot be reduced, and may even undermine, the three major forms o f heroic decisions, namely, 
the military, the religious, and the sporting.
12 Sunstein (1994b) lists various examples of incommensurability, among which, buying friendship or
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The capability approach therefore needs frameworks to motivate and select valuable 
individual and societal functionings. These frameworks may select the same functionings as
13valuable but could have distinctive motivational grounds for their choices.13 For example, 
two capability advocates may agree being literate is a valuable functioning but disagree why 
it is so. Thus, within the capability approach, there are both complementarities and rivalries 
between the various ethical schools o f thought. Informational heterogeneity is compounded 
by the multi-disciplinary background o f the various capability advocates.
At this stage, one should also ask how the capability approach is useful in supporting 
policy, including the choice o f dimensions for welfare evaluation. Furthermore, how can the 
capability approach support decisions on the achievement o f specific welfare policy goals? It 
is important to illustrate how this may be done given ethical inquiry and the values 
underlying the capability approach. To engage these questions consider a project manager in 
search o f a criterion to assess the well-being impact o f a new microcredit initiative. W hat the 
capability approach has to offer a pragmatic minded, outcome oriented, manager?
Imagine therefore a practically minded project manager about to assess a microcredit 
scheme and selects happiness scores collected both before and after the experiment to draw 
conclusions. She considers happiness a proxy for well-being. The manager wants to know 
whether women who joined the microcredit initiative are feeling better, that is, whether they 
are happier. Data collection includes women from villages with similar characteristics that 
did and did not participate in the initiative. The manager wishes to know what the capability 
approach will add to this evaluative exercise. W hy not base assessment on summing or 
multiplying individual happiness scores and compare them across groups? In other words, 
why should the manager bother with the complex apparatus o f the capability approach when 
the results o f the analysis appear clear and unambiguous?
environmental damage with money. Sunstein argues monetary transactions do violence to our considered 
judgments when applied to friendship and the preservation of the environment which have value that cannot be 
reduced to money. Incommensurability, however, does not entail such exchanges will never occur; indeed, 
parents sometimes sell or abandon their children and environmental damage can be sold. Yet, even in such 
circumstances, parents may feel what they did is wrong. Felt guilt, Sunstein suggests, signals an exchange has 
been made between incommensurate values (ibid.:813). Similarly, Van Staveren (2001) argues, there are distinct 
value spheres which cannot be made commensurate. Thus, for Van Staveren (2001), justice, freedom, and care 
are incommensurate value domains. Freedom is the dominant value in the market, justice in the state, and care in 
the family. The value of freedom, accordingly, cannot— as some prominent economists and legal theorists 
argue— regulate family relationships without unsettling them. It may also be observed here that pluralism in 
values is not necessary for incommensurability to obtain. The latter can emerge even with a single value as 
illustrated by parents who most likely value their children equally and incommensurably.
13 As Sunstein (1994a:1742) puts it, —people can agree on individual judgments even if they disagree on general 
theory.”
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Thus, for this utilitarian manager, a single metric, namely, happiness is sufficient as 
proxy for the concept o f well-being. From the utilitarian perspective, the project is deemed 
worthwhile if  the microcredit group is on average happier. For the example’s sake, assume 
she found the microcredit initiative successful because it raised w om en’s happiness. Now had 
the manager adopted the capability approach, she would have reached a similar conclusion. 
But while an appraisal using the capability approach still allows the manager to conclude one 
group is happier than the other, the capability approach expands her vantage point by 
highlighting subjective, one-dimensional, assessments ignore other potentially important 
functioning dimensions. Accordingly, a utilitarian framework may reveal women in the 
microcredit group are happier, but for capability advocates happiness is only one dimension 
o f well-being and the correlation between earning and happiness may be spurious if, say, it is 
the binding o f women not the income generating activity per se that raises happiness. Since 
the capability approach requires deliberation over which functioning outcomes to assess, it 
offers the manager an opportunity to consider different relationships and uncover the correct 
causal correlates. It is so because in the capability approach there is no pre-set evaluative 
functioning metric and the manager has to give reasons for focusing on happiness not some 
other dimension.
As this hypothetical example illustrates, the choice between frameworks is not trivial 
or without policy implications. Furthermore, although the capability approach expands the 
m anager’s scope, it does not entail every social evaluative exercise has to be m ulti­
dimensional. W hich and how many dimensions to account for is ultimately contingent on 
moral concerns, types o f evaluation, context, data availability, etc. Thus, while the capability 
approach can be narrowed to meet a specific goal, it is also expandable to provide a wider, 
richer, and potentially more adequate account o f social arrangements and well-being 
achievements.
The aim o f this section was to highlight how in the capability approach there is no a 
priori preferred dimension or metric. The latter is an essential property o f the capability 
approach when compared to its rivals which have adopted narrower more specific metrics.
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VII. Some caveats.
As “rigorous” modern social science excluded serious ethical inquiry from its corpus 
(Kaufman, 2008; McCloskey, 1994; Putnam, 2003; Taylor, 1989), ethics is increasingly 
perceived as a soft discipline pertaining to the humanities. The aim here is to move away 
from this reductionist view and focus on why ethical concerns are inseparable from, and are 
deeply imbedded in, scientific inquiry. Indeed, inchoate ethical concerns underlay all research 
on development, well-being, and w om en’s empowerment, among others. Thus, the thesis 
aims to explicitly articulate these ethical concerns as empirical research on the well-being of 
individuals is conducted.
It follows that reducing the capability approach to a measurement metric opposed to 
utility or primary goods does no justice to an expanding multi-disciplinary literature based on 
the capability approach. A different pathway will be explored here, one which aims to 
connect the expanding capability approach literature via broad ethical foundations. The next 
chapter therefore argues positional objectivity and ethical inquiry are necessary to sustain 
broad foundations for the capability approach. The outcome o f the foundations are the core 
components— capability, functioning, and conversion factors. The capability approach, 
however, has an open moral and empirical structure and its core components need to be 
specified and contextualized empirically and morally. The objective o f this thesis is to 
explain the function o f unifying foundations for the capability approach and show how the 
core components obtained from them can be further morally and empirically specified.
There are, however, two caveats that need to be briefly discussed before proceeding. 
First o f all, talk o f foundations, as elaborated in Chapter 2, is an easy target to criticize for 
being ad hoc and for excluding those who may not agree with them. Indeed, for foundations 
to be o f practical use they should delineate distinctions and help define what the capability 
approach involves. Consequently, it is likely that some purported capability approach 
frameworks are incompatible with the foundations. Nevertheless, more needs to be known 
about what the foundations involve— and which models and frameworks they might 
exclude—before a substantive discussion about their adequacy is engaged. In addition, the 
foundations are offered to enrich an already existing conversation with capability advocates, 
economists, social scientists, philosophers, and policy makers, among others. Still, arguing 
for the necessity o f foundations for capability approach is a pragmatic choice based on my 
reading o f the ever expanding— and potentially dispersing— capability approach literature.
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The latter, I suggest, will benefit from broad, inclusive, and firm foundations connecting the 
diverse operationalizations and further specifications.
The second caveat relates to the choice o f dataset and empirical methods. W ith 
respect to the former, the datasets are limited to Ethiopia and the years 2004/2005. The 
empirical work therefore is constrained to a specific time and place. Accordingly, 
generalizations ought to be done with care. Concerning the choice o f method, the thesis 
focuses on quantitative methods to operationalize the core components o f the capability 
approach for various reasons, one of which is my previous training as a development 
economist. The training I received as a development economist acquainted me with, and 
predisposed me for, quantitative research. Thus, my prior choice of intellectual investments 
in statistics significantly reduced my time and affected my confidence in exploring different 
methods to gain new insights on the studied phenomena. Nevertheless, even if  quantitative 
research cannot substitute qualitative research, it is not a priori inadequate. It has the power to 
distinguish between relationships that are the results of chance and those that are not. 
Although qualitative research offers a more detailed, richer, contextual, and historically 
sensitive perspective on the actual world, fortunately, the operationalization of the capability 
approach does not pre-specify a class o f methods and there is no best or unique way to 
operationalize its components. Still, whenever it was possible, qualitative insights are 
employed to triangulate, enrich, and complement quantitative results.
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CHAPTER 2
From foundations to further specification
I. Historical development.
In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle defines “human capacities” as “what we have when we 
are said to be capable o f . . .” and “states” “what we have when we are well or badly off.” The 
similarities with the capability approach are striking.14 Yet the current interest in the 
capability approach arose in the early 1980s as philosophers and economists debated how 
inequality and social injustice should be conceptualized, measured, and accounted for (Sen, 
1980; 1992).15
The debate led to the articulation o f capability as a metric mapping the abstract and 
vague idea o f equality into a more specific, morally defendable, and potentially useful 
concept. Nevertheless, how to reconcile the fact that the capability approach has an 
established theoretical and historical pedigree while at the same it remains incomplete and in 
need o f operationalization? The answer to this question is provided in what follows. I shall 
argue that this permanent incompleteness— or under-specification— is an inherent feature of 
the capability approach. It is, in fact, strategic and based on its broad ethical foundations and 
open moral and empirical structure.
The most elemental rationale o f the capability approach is a space for evaluating 
social arrangements and well-being realizations (notwithstanding its use in a variety of 
disciplines and application to a multiplicity o f social domains). To use the capability 
approach, individuals with characteristics, living a particular life, in a specific social and
14 See Finnis (1983:21,124) and Nussbaum (1987). The capability approach has also links to the work of Karl 
Marx (Qizilbash, 2006:103) and John Stewart Mill (see the 2006 special Utilitas issue on Sen and Mill). A very 
similar definition o f capability has more recently appeared in the work of Dewey (1935 [1987:360]) since he 
defines liberty as the “effective power to do specific things”. Walsh (2008:217) also points out he employed a 
similar concept in 1961.
15 For an overview of modern political philosophy and theories of justice see Kymlika’s (2002) textbook.
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environmental context, are the subjects o f social evaluation. It follows that evaluation is done 
with the newly articulated concepts o f capability, functionings, and conversion factors. Such 
evaluations can inform whether, say, poverty has risen for individual i living near x over time 
period t.
Evaluations are not necessarily institutional or impersonal and any concerned agent 
willing to acknowledge the implications o f positional objectivity and ethical enquiry can be 
an evaluator. The outcome o f the evaluation is eventually contingent on how subjects are 
faring primarily as individuals in a given social context. The core components o f the 
capability approach— capability, functioning, and conversion factors— then need to be 
operationalized to obtain justifiable evaluations. These evaluations, furthermore, need not be 
necessarily complete or comprehensive. In other words, social evaluations may be 
conducted— and concluded— with whatever available and accessible information.
The evaluation are also social in the sense that the capability approach is not an 
individualized prescription on the good life nor does it offer “a basis for judging whether a 
life is worth living ... [or] answer the question o f what the best life for individuals is” 
(Powers and Faden, 2006:29,43). Still, since the evaluation o f social arrangement and w ell­
being realizations is partly moral evaluation it is also concerned about the lives o f individuals 
going well and the capability approach necessitates further empirical and ethical theories 
about what it means for a life to go well.
Initially, Sen (1980:218) defined basic capability as what basic things persons can do. 
He defended capability as the most adequate concept because individuals differ from each 
other in ways that cannot be ignored if  we are to account for the important things they can do 
in life. For example, given an equally distributed sum of money, not all individuals can use it 
equally effectively to do things. An individual in a wheel chair, for instance, cannot ride on a 
bus unless it is equipped with special wheelchair access doors and aisles. Inaccessibility to 
the bus is unrelated to how much the person earns or how happy she is. Alternatively, 
offering the impaired person additional resources for her to afford a taxi ride may equalize 
her capability to achieve valuable things such as moving around in the city. From the 
perspective o f the capability approach then, equality o f resources or happiness is inadequate 
because uninformative about what persons can actually do. Furthermore, since the additional 
amount o f resources offered to the impaired individual above was estimated assuming equal 
capability to move around, the adequate metric is individual capability. In fact, as 
disadvantage is plural, monetary compensation for certain disabilities is unlikely to discharge
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claims on all harmful debilitating inequalities (W olff and De-Shallit, 2007:29-35).16 It is, 
accordingly, capability— or the power individuals have to do various valuable things, 
including transporting oneself around— which is o f ultimate value. If, when, where, which, 
and how capability inequalities should be eliminated is, however, not answerable from the 
broad foundations alone and requires further moral and empirical specification.
The capability approach has outgrown its initial debating arena as its advocates 
introduced it to the fields o f development and environmental economics, socio-economics, 
feminist theory, and quality o f life studies, among others (Van Hoorn, Mabsout, and Sent, 
2010; Qizilbash, 2002:467-8). The capability approach was also recently described as “post- 
disciplinary” because it is being operationalized with a variety o f methods and employed in a 
multitude o f different disciplines (Robeyns, 2006). Still, its ethical roots cannot be left in the 
background and this thesis attempts to make the relationship between ethical foundations and 
operationalization more explicit and transparent.
Thus, even though the capability approach has expanded beyond its initial function as 
a metric, Sen (2009) continues to emphasize it offers a space rivaling utility, rights, and 
primary goods. Others, however, took the capability approach much further. Nussbaum 
(2000a), for instance, expanded the basic framework introducing concepts and values others 
have not adopted (Alkire, 2002; Robeyns, 2005). Yet even if  the capability approach is 
offering a space, it still has important implications for the evaluation o f social arrangements 
and well-being realizations. At any rate, this thesis considers the further specification (both 
morally and empirically) o f the capability approach a necessary step for its continuous 
development and relevance to the scientific, ethical, social, and policy worlds.
In this chapter the argument for the broad foundations and open moral-empirical 
structure o f the capability approach is laid out (Section II). The third section discusses the 
impact o f openness on the actual capability approach literature. Subsequently, the fact/value 
dichotomy and its implications for the capability approach are studied. In the final section, a 
model o f the capability approach, to be further elaborated upon in subsequent chapters, is 
introduced.
16 If disability, for example, hinders one from working, monetary compensation is unlikely to substitute the 
social gains and friendships one would have had access to in a socialized work environment. Yet this does not 
imply monetary compensation should never be used.
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II. Broad ethical foundations for the capability approach.
W hy are broad ethical foundations for the capability approach adequate to support its 
development and progress? The broad foundations to be elaborated upon entail the capability 
approach is incomplete and should be further specified by integrating additional moral 
theories and contextual empirical information. Put otherwise, the capability approach has an 
open moral and empirical structure. A corollary o f these foundations, therefore, is that the 
relationship between the capability approach components as they are further specified is 
increasingly context dependent.
The objective here is not to fix foundations once and for all or even to argue 
foundations are the only (or best) way the capability approach can be justified. The broad 
foundations offer ju st a framework to support the core components o f the capability approach 
(capability, functioning, and conversion factors). The aim here is to demonstrate how these 
core components are obtainable from broad and inclusive ethical foundations. The adopted 
strategy entails, nonetheless, evaluation o f social arrangements and well-being realizations 
requires further moral and empirical specification. Accordingly, the empirical research 
conducted in the subsequent chapters o f this thesis reflects one kind o f operationalization.
As noted earlier, the capability approach is not a substantive theory about the good 
life. The broad foundations o f the capability approach by themselves cannot be used to guide 
an individual towards flourishing or well-being (it is important to re-emphasize). Instead, at 
its most abstract, the capability approach is an ethically motivated framework for how 
(individual) lives can be evaluated, starting from ethical deliberation and positional 
objectivity. Still, an evaluator wants the lives o f individuals to go well and needs to 
understand what it means for a life to go well in general and to go well for a particular type o f 
individual. It is why more specific empirical and moral theories are needed to conduct social 
evaluations with the capability approach.
The suggested broad foundations are diagrammatically depicted in Figure 2.1 below. 
They will be revisited in Chapter 8 after synthesizing the empirical work. The pre-requisites 
for the broad foundations are acknowledging the realism o f ethical inquiry and the 
situatedness o f knowledge and evaluations. An engagement with genuine ethical inquiry 
entails a willingness to recognize the rationality o f ethics as well as the possibility o f ethical 
knowledge, including agreements over moral theories. From this perspective, ethical inquiry 
may also be used to understand and explain moral phenomena. Indeed, according to
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Beauchamp (2006:4), “the purpose o f ethical theory [and moral philosophy] is to introduce 
clarity, substance, and precision of argument into the domain of morality . [which] refers to 
conventions in society about right and wrong human conduct.” For Brink (1989:204-5), a 
helpful distinction between (1) popular moral thought—which is more likely subject to 
“distorting influences such as particular conceptions of self interest, prejudice and other 
forms o f social ideology” (ibid.:205)— and (2) reflective moral theory— which begins with 
(1) but also “allows for the dialectical investigation of our moral beliefs to force significant 
revisions in those beliefs” (ibid)— can be made. W hile Brink claims progress is more likely 
initially to be made on level (2) he also points out that “significant convergence o f moral 
belief or moral progress [has occurred] over time at level (1) [since] most people no longer 
think that slavery, racial discrimination, rape, or child abuse is acceptable” (ibid.:208).
Thus, a central feature o f ethical inquiry is the notion o f moral reasoning. According 
to Scanlon (1993:196), moral reasoning is the ability “to justify one’s action to others on 
grounds that they have reason to accept if they are also concerned with mutual justification” . 
For Brink (1988:8), moral reasoning involves “trying to discover what sorts o f things are 
valuable, praiseworthy, or obligatory.” Moral reasoning is here necessary to attain 
impartiality and overcome skepticism over moral issues (McNaughton, 1988:72-6). Moral 
reasoning is used by various other theorists, the most famous o f which is probably Rawls 
(2001:31-2), who employs concepts such as “reflective equilibrium” and “overlapping
17consensus” in his theory o f justice. Still, even if  moral reasoning can offer justified moral 
beliefs, the latter are not necessarily true moral beliefs (Brink, 1988:31-5). Indeed, the 
process o f justification can be adequate yet mistaken. W hich is why, as argued next, both the 
process and outcome o f ethical enquiry need to be objectively positionally situated.
Acknowledging the situatedness o f all knowledge and evaluations entails the notion 
o f positional objectivity (Sen, 1993b; 2009) which differs from N agel’s (1986) famous 
definition o f objectivity as the “view from nowhere” (Anderson, 2003). Positional objective 
evaluations integrate (i) positional dependence “because what is observed varies from 
position to position” (Sen, 1993b:127) and (ii) interpersonal invariance “as a requirement of 
objectivity relates to the fact that it is possible to check whether such an observation could be 
reproduced by others in a similar position” (ibid.:129). Positional dependence is not just 
locational— it also involves “any condition that may influence observation and can apply
17 Ruger (2004:2078; 2010:70,208-15) further discusses these Rawlsian links. See also Brink (1989:103-4;131- 
2) who argues Rawls’s reflective equilibrium supports the coherentism-realism thesis for the foundations of 
ethics.
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parametrically to different persons” (ibid.: 127), including location and characteristics such as 
myopia or knowledge o f the world, among others. A positionally objective observation, one 
may further note, can be partial or false (as Sen suggests, since the sun and the moon appear 
to be o f equal size from the earth). It is via triangulation, or the intersection o f multiple 
positionally objective observations, that a more adequate representation o f reality can 
emerge. Positional objectivity is also related to Sen’s (2002b) open impartiality— which 
involves the possibility o f invoking views external to a group— as well as Adam Smith’s 
impartial spectator— the observer that deliberates and evaluates over social concern from a 
sympathetic external perspective (Sen, 2006; 2009). Furthermore, it is supported by 
H arding’s (1995:23) thesis that the contours o f a given conceptual scheme or paradigm are 
more adequately engaged from outside (and “not from within categories, concepts, puzzles 
and other preoccupations ... [because] we want to start o ff our thought from ‘elsewhere’”).
Since Figure 2.1 does not presuppose a comprehensive agreement, it is an 
incompletely theorized one (Ruger, 2010:70; Sunstein, 1994a). An incompletely theorized 
agreement entails “coming to workable consensus around some elements of an issue without 
necessarily agreeing on every element” (Ruger, 2010:xiv). Thus, it reflects an “Incompletely 
Specified Agreement” in which disagreements over more specific and particular cases are 
permitted but not over general principles (Ruger, 2010:71). From this perspective, 
disagreement takes place against a background o f agreement (McNaughton, 1988:155).
Still, foundations in general, and broad ethical foundations in particular, are not the 
only way to justify the core components o f the capability approach—which may be obtained
using other methods, including analogical-lower-level reasoning over particulars such as
18physiological needs, psychological human needs, and values.
In Figure 2.1, then, the core components o f the capability approach are obtained from 
the combination o f positional objectivity and ethical inquiry. There is, however, an 
intermediate stage between ethical inquiry-positional objectivity and the core components, 
namely, concern about individual human beings as such. The concept o f ethical individualism 
reflects this focus on human valuable ends and entails individuals— not social wholes— are of 
primary interest in evaluations (Robeyns, 2005; 2008:90-4).19
18 See Sunstein (1994a; 1994b:851-3) who defines analogical reasoning as “a ‘bottom-up’ approach, building 
principles o f a low or intermediate level of generality from engagement with particular cases ... it reflects the 
plural and diverse goods that people really value” (Sunstein, 1994b:853).
19 Ethical individualism is distinct from (i) methodological or “explanatory” individualism which explicates 
aggregates from micro-phenomena and (ii) ontological “reductionist” individualism which suggests wholes or 
aggregates are constituted by micro level phenomena (Robeyns, 2005:107-8).
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Figure 2.1. The ethical foundations of the capability approach.
Capability Functionings C o n v e rs io n  fa c to rs
Ethical individualism
Positional objectivity Ethical inquiry
A few capability advocates have, nevertheless, voiced concerns over the 
individualistic characteristics o f the capability approach. They argue the capability approach 
does not account for social structures such as trust, care, and honesty which constitute, and 
are necessary to, individual well-being (Davis, 2009; Deneulin, 2008; Evans, 2002; Hills, 
2003; Jackson, 2005; Stewart, 2005; Van Staveren and Gasper, 2003). But such insights can
be accommodated as institutional conversion factors among the core component (alongside
20capability and functioning). Social goods are then accounted for as valuable and enabling if 
distinct from capability and functionings as such (W olff and De-Shalit, 2007:6). The 
inclusion of “social capabilities” as valuable and enabling conversion factors is also 
consistent with their instrumentality to human well-being and agency. The capability 
approach, accordingly, does not account for social goods as ends but as instrumental and 
critical to what is o f ultimate moral concerns, namely, individual capability and functionings. 
For instance, in an environment where trust and mutual support are relatively high, these 
factors are not framed as capability inputs but instead as determinants necessary to 
understand why some individuals have larger capability sets than others. Nevertheless, there 
is also no a priori objection to account for social structures by aggregating the capabilities of 
various individuals (as suggested below).
Reasoning from ethical individualism, the core components— capability, functionings, 
and conversion factors— are obtained. The broad initial concern for individuals is gradually 
made more specific as capability, functioning, and conversion factors are further specified
20 See also Alkire (2008:34-40), Robeyns (2008:91), and Sen (2009:244-7).
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and articulated morally and empirically. Capability and functionings, for instance, can be 
further specified as involving two distinct yet interrelated concepts, namely, well-being and 
agency. The articulation and further specification o f the components remains contingent on 
moral reasoning (Alkire and Black, 1997; Ruger, 2010; Sen, 2009). More specific definitions 
o f capability and functionings can be supported with articulated moral theories and empirical 
facts. As Sen (1993a:48) puts it, “the recognition that an agreement on the usability o f the 
capability approach— an agreement on the nature o f the ‘space’ o f value-objects— need not 
presuppose an agreement on how the valuational exercise may be completed” . It is precisely 
the rationale behind the open moral and empirical structure o f the capability approach. Yet, as 
a corollary, disagreements within the capability approach may persist. Such openness is 
worthwhile if  it keeps dogmatism at bay. In a continuously evolving world, where values and 
preferences are questioned and changing, and where new, unknown, problems are emerging, 
such openness may be the only way forward (Kaufman, 2008).
In summary, the foundations ground the core components o f the capability approach 
on ethical individualism, itself a requirement o f the demands o f positional objectivity and 
ethical inquiry. Thus, beyond Sen’s elementary definitions o f capability, functioning, and 
conversion factors, a consensus is not necessary and an open moral and empirical structure 
can be assumed (Deneulin and McGregor, 2009:12). Empirical operationalizations will then 
differ depending on the type o f evaluation, context, and the researcher’s disciplinary 
background.
As discussed in the next section, the foundations are broad enough to accommodate 
most, though not all, specifications adopted by capability advocates to study and evaluate 
poverty, inequality, and development.
III.Open moral and empirical structure.
In economics, attempts to integrate ethics begin— and often end—with a discussion o f three 
major theories: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics (Graafland, 2008; Hausman and 
McPherson, 1994; Solomon, 1998; Van Staveren, 2007). The three theories focus on different 
individual states and conditions offering alternative, sometimes competing, others 
complementing, views o f what is valuable and why. They are ethical because they identify 
and articulate what the good is for human beings (Foot, 2001). Succinctly, utilitarians argue
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the good involves individual valuable internal state (happiness for example) and the good 
society is the society which maximizes the aggregate o f valuable internal states. 
Deontologists distinguish themselves from utilitarians by contending the good involves the 
pursuit o f rational moral rules and principles (often independently o f their consequences). 
Finally, virtue ethicists, following Aristotle, claim the good evolves from the practices of 
individuals imbedded in the institutions o f the community they live in.
Since the capability approach has an open moral structure it could incorporate content 
from all three frameworks. From utilitarianism, the capability approach is consequentialist 
when functionings are the basic evaluative element (Sen, 1987b:108). From deontological 
theories, capability can be made the element o f value independently o f which functionings 
are actually achieved. Ruger (2010), for example, in her health capability paradigm, 
combines both consequentialist and freedom ethics to assess health justice in terms of 
functionings (health achievements), capability (what health outcomes people are able to 
achieve), and agency (responsibility). From virtue ethics, the capability approach can tap 
from the virtues to specify a list o f incommensurable capabilities (McCloskey, 2006) or, 
alternatively, by defining capability as endogenous to “the interrelatedness of agents and 
[their] commitment to shared values beyond the rules that a society has institutionalized” 
(Van Staveren, 2007:21).
The capability approach therefore— or, more precisely, Sen’s conception o f it—  
subsumes no pre-commitments to a particular moral or descriptive theory— it is under­
specified. Still, a recurrent argument is that under-specification is a vulnerability (Nussbaum, 
2000a; Robeyns, 2001; 2003; 2008:94-5). In this thesis, however, under-specification is
considered strategic (Ruger, 2010) because we live in a complex, emerging, evolving, and
21partly non-algorithmic world. Under-specification, or incompleteness, seen from a strategic 
angle, is also advantageous since it accommodates incommensurable moral theories. An open 
moral and empirical structure is consistent with various moral and descriptive theories.
W ith so much openness, however, is it not likely that someone will use the capability 
approach in a gender biased way or as if  ethically neutral? There are two answers which can 
be made. The first (as noted above) is that it is the price to pay to cultivate freedom of 
thought and keeping dogmatism at bay. Second, the broad foundations— which combine 
ethical inquiry and positional objectivity to obtain ethical individualism— are at odds with 
any harmful or biased interpretation o f the capability approach. In fact, ethical individualism
21 I discuss this further in Mabsout (2010). See also Aldred (2009), Byers (2007), Giddens (1984), Hayek 
(1960), Kaufman (2008), and Lawson, (1997).
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entails subjects have equal values— and, by extension, equal capabilities— unless there are 
good, justifiable, reasons for this not to be the case. Accordingly, if  the capability approach is 
ethically individualistic it cannot be androcentric at the same time (see Robeyns, 2001:3). 
Thus, if  extensively adopted, the broad foundations will for instance exclude discriminatory 
and racists views from the capability approach.
Nevertheless, incompleteness is a burden if  the capability approach is not further 
specified. There are several alternative paths for further specifying the capability approach, 
one o f which is lists o f capabilities and functionings. Such lists offer a selection o f valuable 
capabilities individuals ought to have— they are a further specification o f the core 
components and can be situated after agreement on the broad foundations. M ost capability
advocates who favor a list argue theirs is “open” (i.e., not definitive and broad enough to, in
22turn, subsume a variety o f further specifications). Lists therefore also seek to overcome 
under-specification without over-specification. For instance, capability lists can avoid 
functioning over-specification by focusing on capability and giving individuals the freedom 
to choose the functionings they wish to achieve (Nussbaum, 1987:12). In this way, 
N ussbaum ’s (2002/3:500) central human capabilities are cast in terms o f “being able to . . .” . 
Still, to suggest a functioning or capability is essential or valuable is not the same as arguing
23it is valuable for everyone at all times (Putnam, 2003:404).
W hile some capabilities lists are justified on the grounds o f being necessary for 
flourishing (Nussbaum, 2000a), others propose criteria or pre-requisites that need to be 
fulfilled before the list is validated. Robeyns (2003), for example, offers five criteria for the 
selection o f capabilities, including explicit formulation, methodological justification, 
sensitivity to context, different levels o f generality, exhaustion, and non-reduction. Capability 
lists are also obtainable via ethical inquiry (Alkire and Black, 1997). Alkire (2002), for
24instance, starts with the Thomist natural law school to build a capability list based on the
22 Alkire (2002), Gasper (2004), and Phillips (2006) offer excellent surveys.
23 Thus, a capability can be valuable to most people or to a representative population proportion for example.
24 Natural law philosophy encompasses a considerable diversity of thinkers, including Hayek (Angner, 2007). 
Oderberg and Chappell (2004) edited a set of short and accessible essays on ethics and natural law. For Murphy 
(2008), a fundamental principle of natural law is that goods should be pursued and evils avoided. Goods support 
right action. Human beings possess an implicit basic knowledge of goods and an ‘intrinsic directedness’ towards 
them which can be made explicit through reflection on practice. Murphy (2008) suggests “human beings exhibit 
a tendency to pursue life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth; and reflection on this tendency occasions 
an immediate grasp of the truth that life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth are goods. The affirmation 
of the claims ‘life is good,’ ‘knowledge is good,’ ‘friendship is good,’ etc. makes intelligible the persistent 
pursuit of these ends by rational beings like us” (quoted from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law- 
ethics/).
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basic aspects o f human well-being and the question “why do I do what I do?” . Alkire, 
accordingly, employs the most basic reasons for acting to support a list o f capabilities. Her 
list is subsequently applied— and further specified— in the evaluation o f empowerment 
projects for poor communities in developing countries.
Other capability advocates start with an existing list and attempt to refine it using 
empirical methods. One way to achieve this is to ask people which capabilities they value the 
most. Yet, empirical methods are never ethically neutral since most start with a broad list of 
elements and ask individuals to prioritize which capability or functionings they value the 
most (Schokkaert and Van Ootegem, 1990). M ore recently, a Belgian sample was used by 
Van Ootegem and Spillemaeckers (2010) to further refine Nussbaum ’s list and query 
individuals which capabilities they value the most. Others have adopted a similar strategy, 
including Anand and Van Hees (2006), Rura et. al. (2007), Schokkaert (2007), and W olff and 
De-Shalit (2007), among others. Thus, there appears to be no attempt in the literature to build 
an empirical capability list that makes no prior ethical commitments.26
Although this section did not explicitly attempt to explain the entanglement o f facts 
and values in the capability approach, it started suggesting this might be the case. 
Accordingly, the next section further elaborates how the core components o f the capability 
approach are ethically thick concepts.
25
IV. The fact / value dichotomy.
In Reinventing the Sacred, Kaufman (2008:12) considers our world devoid o f a global ethics 
partly because modernity split values from facts. Among the early and most prominent 
defenders o f the split was David Hume who excluded from the definition o f truth moral
25 These are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and 
religion (Finnis, 1983:50-1).
26 Empirical lists designed to avoid ethical content face weaknesses that would lead to their unraveling. Such 
lists, if they exist at all, are of dubious validity because people do not always acknowledge the situatedeness of 
their evaluations. Thus, unfiltered evaluations are problematic because too sensitive to a battery of contextual 
and individual factors— including income, warm glow and bounded rationality effects—that systematically bias 
evaluations (Hayek, 1960:90-107; Nussbaum, 2000:160; Powers and Faden, 2006; W olff and De-Shalit, 2007). 
A striking example is offered by Van Ootegem and Spillemaeckers (2010) who found evaluations are a function 
of the actual situation of respondents. Their Belgian participants for example highly ranked the capability 
dimensions which were problematic for them and paid almost no attention to democracy and political stability 
even though they latter acknowledged these are essential dimensions of well-being. Put otherwise, it may be 
“much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust outcome with which most or even 
almost all agree” (Sunstein, 1994a:1769). Finnis (1983:18-9) also quotes Aristotle arguing in determining 
“‘what is good for man’ we do not have to defer to the opinions of the multitude.”
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judgm ents (Anscombe, 1981:27; Foot, 2001:6). Putnam (2002; 2004) has further illuminated 
the nature o f this split by tracing it to logical positivist philosophy o f science. For logical 
positivists, only two types o f knowledge claims could be made— mathematical (analytical) 
and empirical scientific (synthetic) (Hands, 2001a:74). Logical positivists, accordingly, 
distinguished between analytical and synthetic knowledge, on the one hand, and subjective 
moral values, on the other hand (Putnam, 2002). Logical positivists pointed out only 
empirical-factual statements and analytical-mathematical truths are worthy o f rational 
inquiry. A third class o f statements, which included moral values, was deemed metaphysical, 
meaningless, and excluded from the domain o f rational inquiry. But the logical positivist 
worldview has collapsed and it is now acknowledged values, may they be moral or not, 
inhabit both natural and social science (Hands, 2001a; Harding, 1994; Lacey, 2004; 
McCloskey, 1994; Putnam, 2002; 2003:397-8). But even though logical positivism has 
unraveled, it remains influential among some philosophers and practicing natural and social 
scientists, particularly economists (McCloskey, 1994; Morris, 2010:41-2; Putnam, 2002; 
W ilber and Hoksbergen, 1998:18).
As Putnam (2002:35) further points out, an insuperable challenge for logical 
positivism— and the fact/value dichotomy— is explained by the pervasiveness o f “thick 
ethical terms” . For logical positivists had argued “thin ethical terms” had no factual 
correspondence and included “ought”, “virtue”, and “good” . However, Putnam suggests, 
unlike thin ethical terms, thick ones entangle facts and values. Thick terms include cruelty 
and crime. If  capability and functionings are thick terms, decanting the factual from, say, the 
moral is problematic. In other words, it is questionable to refer to capability and functionings 
as value free concepts because, by definition, they are the valuable capability and
27functionings o f human beings (Anscombe, 1981:29,31).
The entanglement claim is, at any rate, contingent on the definition o f capability and 
functionings as thick terms from which moral values cannot be purged. It is necessary 
therefore to ask at this stage whether functionings are by definition valuable beings and 
doings (Courtwright, 2008). The answer to this question is related to the distinction between
27 Furthermore, the values in capability and functioning do not have to be good since it is also possible to 
account for ill-being as a negative value in the capability approach. For example, Vallentyne (2005) posits in 
addition to positive functionings (happiness, health) negative functionings such as pain or hunger. Both views 
can be synthesized by defining negative functioning as dis-functionings and positive functionings as 
functionings. The distinction between functionings and dis-functionings parallels the utilitarian distinction 
between pain and pleasure. But as Hawtrey (1926) suggested, ethical criteria are (still) needed to distinguish 
between good satisfactions which are welfare enhancing and bad satisfactions which are not (Backhouse and 
Medema, 2007). The distinction is, accordingly, based on moral arguments that further highlight the ethical 
entanglement of utilitarian economics.
3 0
analytical, empirical, and ethical concepts. For those who argue ethical content can be 
disentangled from empirical or analytical content, functionings can be ethically neutral or 
value free. But this position is untenable because the specification o f a space to conduct 
social evaluation is in itself an ethical—value laden— exercise. The capability approach was 
in fact first articulated by Sen (1980) to surmount an moral concern in theories o f justice. The 
introduction o f capability as a metric to evaluate social arrangements and well-being 
achievements was, in other words, from its inception an ethical endeavor.
But the facts / values dichotomy also has adherents among advocates o f the capability 
approach and there are attempts to define and operationalize capability and functioning as if  
free from (moral) values. A potentially informative stratagem to gauge this concern is to 
query how the components are usually defined in the literature and whether these definitions 
are thick. The following definitions all suggest that capability and functionings are conceived 
from inception as thick entangled components. For example, Alkire (2005a:118) argues, all 
functionings are positively valuable; Robeyns (2005), in turn, defines functionings as what 
makes life valuable; Nussbaum ’s (2000a; 2002/3) capability list is deemed necessary for a 
decent life; Jackson (2009:9) suggests capability “not as disembodied freedom” but as 
capability to flourish within certain clearly defined limits; Putnam (2002:62) concludes the 
capability approach requires the use of a vocabulary which “consists almost entirely of 
entangled concepts” . Sen’s categorization is, however, more ambiguous because he motivates 
the capability approach in a variety o f different ways. While, on the one hand, Sen employs a 
thick vocabulary defining capability as positive freedom and functionings as valuable beings 
and doings (Sen, 1999), on the other hand, he also employs a seemingly neutral mathematical 
language where capability and functioning are abstract value free mathematical functions
(Sen, 1985a; 1987b). Sen’s switch to mathematical formalism tends to be followed by
28equations and social choice vocabulary. For instance, in Commodities and Capabilities, he 
suggests equation (2.1) below to formalize capability.
Q  (X  ) = b  I b  = f  (c  (x ,)), 3 f  (.) e  Ft and 3x, (.) e  X, ] (2.1)
Where,
xi = the vector o f commodities possessed by person i,
Xi = the restricted choice commodity vector for person i,
28 Can the switch to mathematical formalism by Sen be adequately described as a gestalt switch (Kuhn, 1962)?
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C (.) = the function (not necessarily linear) converting a commodity vector into a vector of 
characteristics o f those commodities, it is not assumed identical for everyone because it is 
assumed that different people from different cultures will perceive and value differently the 
characteristics o f similar good,
f  = a personal “utilization function” o f i reflecting one pattern o f use o f commodities that i 
can actually make (in generating a functioning vector out o f a characteristic vector o f 
commodities possessed),
Fi = the set o f “utilization functions” fi, anyone o f which person i can in fact choose,
bi = f i(ci(xi)) = the vector that gives the achieved functions, or the person’s being and doings
(e.g., whether well nourished, well clothed, m obile...)
Qi= his/her capability which is the freedom i has in terms o f the choice o f functionings 
Sen also derives equation (2.2) to introduce evaluation
V = [v, I v  = v, (b  ) ,  3bi e  Qt ] (2.2)
Where,
vi = the valuation function and,
V, = the values o f well-being i can possibly achieve.
A few clarifying remarks are in order. First, the equations are specified at the 
individual level and no aggregation function is defined. An aggregating function such as 
W  (V ) may therefore be added. Furthermore, though equation 2.1 appears descriptive it is
neither empirically “calibrated” nor testable or falsifiable. It does not, for example, specify 
the rate at which or how capability maps into functioning achievement; nor does it suggest 
what might be the determinants o f capability. Both equations are not intended to explain 
well-being or behavior as such. Equation 2.1 simply specifies a space for social evaluation 
with abstract elements (x,, fi, and Qi). Moral values or “value judgm ents” can enter in 2.2 
where the function V is used to evaluate well-being in terms of, say, a given level of
29functioning achievements.29
29 Note that adding a subscript e to Vei explicitly posits an evaluator. Assessment of own capability or 
functioning is accounted for when e = i (Brandolini and D ’ Allesio, 1998:5).
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Our concern here is with the way equation 2.1 is introduced as if  no prior ethical 
inquiry took place, as if  these elements spontaneously emerge from the thinker’s mind. The 
separation o f 2.1 from 2.2, in fact, frames the capability approach in such way that, on one 
hand, there is capability, functioning, and conversion factors while, on the other, evaluation,
30ethics, and value judgments. A distinction such as this, therefore, reminds the one 
advocated by logical positivists between analytics (in the former) and evaluation (in the 
latter). A symbol, b, suffices to depict an abstract functioning. It is unfortunate because Sen 
has stated elsewhere (2002a) that social choice leads to an infinite regress unless some non­
formalized values are posited. M ost mathematical accounts o f the capability approach, 
including Sen’s (1985a), start, however, with this distinction. But if  one accepts it, the 
disentangling o f the evaluative from the analytical is legitimated and the ethical, it is 
insinuated, is confined to 2.2.
The disentangling above between moral values and analytical content appears 
elsewhere in the work o f capability advocates who, for instance, suggest it is possible to 
“engage in a purely descriptive analysis o f capability sets [where] there is no automatic 
assumption that these ends will do good” (Goerne, 2009:6). According to this view, the 
capability approach has two separable components, namely, “moral” value judgm ents and 
empirical— value free— elements. Goerne (2009) considers the distinction necessary to build 
a conceptual structure independent o f ethical theories. Different ethical theories are 
subsequently plugged as “value judgm ents” in evaluation. Goerne (2009) and others then 
sustain the capability approach cannot be operationalized unless the descriptive and the 
normative are disentangled. Yet, this reverses the prioritization o f the ethical in the capability 
approach and ignores the entanglement o f fact and value by presuming well-being concerns 
can be engaged without ethical inquiry.
Alkire and Deneulin (2009:16) respond quite well by pointing out “normative analysis 
is fundamental and in some ways prior to predictive and positive analysis” . As Streeten 
(1950:583) also argued 50 years ago: “There is a fairly wide agreement that both positive and 
welfare economics depend in some sense on value judgm ents and that the aim o f unbiased 
thinking is not to avoid these value judgm ents but to bring them into the open. Conclusions 
are biased not because they are derived from political or ethical values premises but because 
those value premises are not stated explicitly.” Equations 2.1 and 2.2 mislead by not 
revealing a prior evaluative exercise was necessary for capability and functionings to be
30 The separation—of 2.1 from 2.2—is reminiscent of the other dichotomy logical positivists posited namely the 
one that disentangles abstract analytical relationships from subjective “emotive” value judgments.
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considered worthwhile concepts in the first place. Before mathematical modeling is 
engaged, therefore, it is necessary to explicitly acknowledge ethical inquiry (with positional 
objectivity) has earlier established capability and functionings as ethically worthy concepts. 
Ethical inquiry is necessary to identify what matters and understand why capability may be 
superior to utility as a welfare concept. Going back to the equations in Commodities and 
Capabilities one could argue 2.1 depends on 2.2 because the evaluative equation identifies 
the metrical space o f value. Equation 2.2 is the primitive relation here and should be solved 
first. Thus, only after an evaluative framework is articulated— and the elements o f value 
identified— may the distinction between positive and normative be attempted.
Nonetheless, the suggested re-prioritization o f the equations is not sufficient because 
ethical inquiry has a dialectic non-algorithmic component where “illumination is to be 
obtained by a process o f making the general and abstract more detailed and precise” (Kraut, 
2006:203). Ethical deliberation is, o f course, not indifferent to the cannons o f reasons but 
these are insufficient to “win” a moral argument. As Taylor (1989:72-3) argues, prior moral 
experience is also necessary to change our reading o f what morally moves us. Yet this cannot 
be an idiosyncrasy o f ethics which, like other disciplines, also requires prior experience. For 
instance, no one expects a person with no prior mathematical experience to understand a 
mathematical proof (Anscombe, 1981:47; Finnis, 1983; Berlin, 1965). Ethical inquiry, at any 
rate, should only be cautiously compared to, or made to compete with, the kind o f reasoning 
that currently prevails in the social sciences.
In summary, although mathematics can be useful for the social sciences, quantifications 
are unlikely to successfully isolate values from facts in entangled concepts. The next section 
considers how the basic components may be more specifically defined and which kind of 
relationships between them obtains.
V. Definitions and relationships between the core components.
Sen (1984:85) argued the starting point for well-being enquiries should be the distinction 
between the ultimately and the instrumentally valuable. His answer to what is o f ultimate
31 The two equations smuggle another value, namely, the prior belief that mathematics can distinguish 
factual/analytical content from ethical/evaluative content. Dow (2007:460) observes “mathematical formalism 
itself reflects what might be called an ideological choice” and can be strategically employed to avoid ideological 
debate. Morgan and Rutherford (1998:9), in turn, suggest mathematical methods provide an apparent neutrality 
so it is not necessary “to be so scrupulously evenhanded or to depend so entirely on their virtues”.
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value is the capability to function. Functionings are the elementary building blocks of 
capability. A functioning is an individual being or doing. A being is a state (sickness, 
tiredness, happiness etc.) whereas a doing is an action (walking, working, caring etc). All 
feasible (“effective”) functionings an individual can be or do form the capability set. Which 
functionings are achieved depends on many factors including individual, social, and 
geographic conversion factors. In Figure 2.2 the core components o f the capability approach 
are diagrammatically represented.
The importance o f context is partly accounted for with the concept o f conversion 
factors (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005; Robeyns, 2008:84-5; Sen, 1985a). The latter are 
individual, social, and environmental characteristics influencing and shaping individuals’ 
capability to achieve valuable doings and beings. In this thesis, no predefined relationship 
between conversion factors and the other components is assumed. Thus, no overarching 
theory, unique formula, or algorithm predetermines the mapping o f (potential functionings in) 
the capability set into a unique bundle o f achieved functionings (Hodgson, 2001; Tabb, 
1999). Since individual behaviors are not theorized a priori, a bottom-up strategy is adopted 
in which empirical relationships shed light on potential causal relationships between 
components (Kincaid, 1996:99). From this perspective, it is not necessary to assume 
individuals, say, maximize a utility function (Hirsch, Michaels, and Friedman, 1987; Ruger, 
2010:162-3; Sunstein, 1994b:787). Still, because they are partly based on findings in 
literatures which have attempted to explain similar relationships, the models estimated on the 
basis o f Figure 2.2 are far from being a-theoretical.
Furthermore, according to Figure 2.2, achieved functionings may feedback as inputs 
mediated by capability. There are then no direct effects from functionings to resources, 
empowerment or conversion factors without capability mediation. An individual can choose 
to study more (a doing) contributing to capability via one o f its inputs, education. 
Furthermore, as the capabilities o f individuals expand, their aggregate can modify a social 
conversion factor. As women participate more and more in the labor market, their aggregate 
capability sets expand as social norms about working women change as well. A person can 
also decide to use his or her capability in conjunction with empowerment and resources to 
change a conversion factor such as living location or even sex.
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F ig u re  2 .2 . T h e  c a p a b i l i ty  a p p ro a c h .
Capability occupies the centre o f Figure 2.2 to be consistent with Sen’s (1985a:70) 
suggestion that a “good life” cannot be understood without genuine choice no matter how 
“rich it might be in other respects.” Even though capability is parasitic on functionings (Sen, 
2009:235-6), it is necessary for an adequate evaluation o f achieved functionings. Exclusive 
focus on actual beings and doings is insufficient to reflect the advantage o f an individual. 
Compare an undernourished with no access to food to someone on hunger strike. Although 
both have low health functioning achievement, their capability sets are distinct. Another 
reason to focus on capability information is to avoid specifying a unique perfectionist or 
parochial list o f functionings. Focus on capability instead o f functionings is a liberal attribute 
in the sense that it attempts not to impose a worldview or a particular type o f ends on 
individuals (Crocker and Robeyns, 2010:70; Nussbaum, 2000a).
Sen (2009:288-9) further argues capability can express both well-being freedom and 
agency freedom. Capability and functionings thus reflect both well-being and agency 
concerns. Though Sen (1985b; 1987a; 1992; 1999) suggests they are distinct notions, he also 
insists, well-being and agency are interrelated and one cannot be understood without the 
other. His notion o f agency involves “someone who acts and brings about a change, and 
whose achievements can be judged in terms o f her own values and objectives” (Sen,
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1999:19). Sen’s definition o f agency has two interrelated and complementary parts. The first
32is a change component and the second an autonomy component.32 The change component is 
related to the notion o f agency presently found in economic sociology and institutional 
economics (Fine and Milonakis, 2009:154; Giddens, 1984; Granovetter, 1985). The 
autonomy component is linked to various literatures in ethics, psychology, and feminism 
(Doyal and Gough, 1991; Alkire, 2005b; Kabeer, 1999; Peter, 2003; Qizilbash, 2006; 
Sumner, 1996). W hile the two parts are deeply interrelated, the capacity to enact change is 
closer to the empowerment dimension o f agency (Alkire, 2005b) whereas autonomy is the 
closer to the deliberative and scrutiny dimensions o f agency.
Yet, as already argued in Chapter 1, even though the capability approach can evaluate 
various dimensions o f life, including agency, it is primarily geared toward well-being 
assessments (Sen, 1993b:49). Furthermore, the autonomy and responsibility aspects cover a 
range o f issues broader than well-being concerns (Kraut, 2006; Sen 1985b). Well-being, in 
turn, is related to prudence and to whatever is beneficial to, or in the interest of, a person 
(Qizilbash, 1997; Sumner, 1996). Still, other capability advocates argue against the 
separation o f well-being and agency (Nussbaum, 2000a) or attempt to integrate agency in 
their specifications o f the capability approach so that well-being achievements are dependent 
on individuals having agency in the first place (Alkire, 2002; Ruger, 2010).
In summary, even if  capability and functionings are more adequate for well-being 
evaluation, empowerment— the instrumental dimension o f agency— may be nevertheless 
critical to well-being. In addition, agency as reflection can be essential to a flourishing human 
(eudemonia). Agency and well-being then further specify the core components o f the 
capability approach and can be further specified themselves. Agency, thus, is an extension of 
the core components because (i) empowerment is a capability input instrumental for w ell­
being and (ii) and having agency can be a valuable flourishing. In what follows, these issues 
are further elaborated upon.
32 See Croker’s shared essay with Robeyns (2010) for a comprehensive and historically sensitive study of Sen’s 
conceptualization and use o f agency. Crocker reconstructs Sen’s agency by identifying four conditions 
necessary for it to obtain, namely, self-determination; reason orientation and deliberation; action; and impact on 
the world (ibid.:80-2).
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VI. Conclusion.
The second chapter revisited several methodological and conceptual issues in the capability 
approach. First, it described what the strategic broad foundations involve. Second, it 
explained the implications o f having an open moral and empirical structure. Third, it pointed 
out openness does not entail a distinction between ethics and science, or normative and 
positive. And, fourth, it reviewed the general features o f a model based on the core 
components o f the capability approach and which will be the focus o f the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
Empirical models of the capability approach
I. The ethics of operationalization.
The first two chapters emphasized the ethical foundations o f the capability approach and the 
ethical entanglement o f its core components. Being ethical, furthermore, entails the capability 
approach can also integrate descriptive content and refer to real entities in the world out there. 
It is so because ethics is practical, embedded in, and related to, human beings. Ethics 
therefore is not metaphysical as logical positivists want us to believe. Still, the basic 
empirical intuitions o f the capability approach can be further specified and articulated. The 
objective o f the empirical work that follows is accordingly not to abandon ethics and play the 
scientific game. Instead, it is to infuse the former with more realism and empirical content. In 
other words, the following empirical chapters offer an exercise in enrichment and continuity 
not replacement.
Unfortunately, the empirical literature to be reviewed in what follows does not refer to 
the ethical features o f the concepts it operationalizes, the ethical properties o f its models, or 
the ethical implications of the results obtained. It is unfortunate because explicitly stating and 
engaging the ethical content o f empirical research does not undermine impartiality but rather 
engages an essential property o f scientific work. Science, in fact, without ethics frees people 
from having to bother and defend their beliefs (Aldred, 2009:7) and would lead to “a 
nihilistic world where nothing can be known for sure because no one can be trusted” (Aldred,
332009:231). The attempt to reduce moral values to subjective preferences is a discussion 
stopper that saves us from examining “who we are, what our deepest convictions are and 
holding those convictions up to the searching test o f reflective examination” (Putnam,
33 Based on individual historical case studies, McCloskey (2006:395-6) points at a negative relationship between 
low private and professional moral conduct by scientists and philosophers and their ethical beliefs (see also 
McCloskey, 1994)
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2002:44). Hausman and M cPherson (1996:6) have also suggested belief in the existence of 
better or worse answers to moral questions suggests a willingness to know one’s own 
limitations, to understand others’ arguments, and signals an objective commitment to 
tolerance. Stiglitz (2000), in turn, argues disregard for moral demands allows ideology to 
have sway.
Thus, science needs to integrate and engage with ethics to achieve its objectives 
(McCloskey, 1994). There is in addition to that a concomitant need to acknowledge how the 
theories and hypotheses scientists formulate and test are often themselves ethically motivated, 
especially in social science and economics. In addition, scientific work often has uncertain—  
yet definite— consequences on both human and non-human life in the world. These are 
clearly ethical concerns that should be accounted for at every stage o f the scientific exercise.
The focus o f this chapter is to introduce and discuss various operationalizations o f the 
capability approach. The chapter is divided in three sections. The first reviews earlier 
literature that attempts to statistically operationalize the three capability approach 
components. Section III describes and explains the model to be estimated in this thesis. 
Finally, the last section, offers a short overview o f the three empirical chapters.
II. Empirically mapping the core components of the capability approach.
As Hill (2003:118) argues, there is a “need to take on the question o f how to advance human 
welfare through social policy ... to expand the capability approach to enable analysis o f basic 
social institutions and processes, from the firm to the family and from the market to public 
policy-making.” In what follows, H ill’s suggestion is pursued as a principle objective for the 
thesis as it attempts to operationalize the capability approach.
The operationalization with structural equations (SEM) to measure and estimate 
relationships between conversion factors, capability, and functionings is therefore discussed. 
W hile the choice o f method is not arbitrary, once a selection is made and a specific literature 
with its own methods studied, it becomes more difficult to engage or adopt other methods. 
Still, although the empirical results in the thesis are mostly based on statistical relationships, 
the latter are not assumed final and various other qualitative findings will be consulted 
before, during, and after estimation.
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Structural equation models, or SEM for short, offer a useful method to further 
empirically contextualize the thick ethical components o f the capability approach. In the 
SEM literature, capability and functionings tend to be modeled as latent “unobservable” 
variables. M ost often this is so because they were initially conceptualized as 
multidimensional complex concepts no single indicators can capture. To measure capability, 
a latent variable is usually interpolated from the common variance obtained from observed 
“reflexive” indicators.
The models introduced are described both in equation and diagrammatic form. In the 
diagrams, observed indicators are squares and unobservable latent variables ellipses. Arrows 
from squares to ellipses are explanatory in the sense o f not involving measurement. Arrows 
from ellipses to squares involve measurement. An important distinction here is whether the 
capability indicators are formative or reflexive with respect to the latent variable. With 
reflexive (or effect) indicators, the latent variable influences the measured indicators and 
explains their inter-correlations (or common variance). Formative (or causal) indicators, on 
the other hand, influence (i.e., explain) the latent variable.
Among the first capability advocates to operationalize the capability approach using 
such methods are Schokkaert and Van Ootegem (1990). W ith exploratory factor analysis 
techniques, Schokkaert and Van Ootegem grouped the indicators most correlated with each 
other, forming six functioning dimensions for unemployed Belgians. After identifying the six 
dimensions, Schokkaert and Van Ootegem regress them one by one on socio-economic 
“explanatory” variables including net income, age, sex, and household characteristics.
The models here reviewed start with Schokkaert and Van Ootegem’s approach but are 
more efficient because they estimate the model in a single step (exploration and regression). 
For the most part, such models are known as MIMICs (Multiple Indicators M ultiple Causes). 
The measurement part is a latent variable estimated from the common correlation between 
indicators. The variable is then explained with covariates (the structural part).
Addabo, Di Tommaso, and Facchinetti (2004), for instance, use a MIMIC to measure 
and explain children’s well-being in Italy. Although no model is estimated, they intend to use 
the Italian National Statistical Office multipurpose survey on family and children. Their 
objective is to model the social capability o f children age 6-10 using a measurement and 
structural part. The measurement part captures the underlying concept o f well-being with
Y = \ Yy* + e (3.1)
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where Y  = (Y1, ..., Ym) and AY = { AY,..., AYm }
Y is the set o f children well-being indicators, y  unobserved children well-being, and A the 
factor loadings that show the per unit change in Y given a unit change y  . Y  is an observed 
functioning and measured using the following indicators: interaction with brothers and 
sisters, schoolmates, cousins, friends, grandparents, mother, father, others (for cultural or 
environmental purposes), and interaction with others in socially structured activities (gym, 
music, arts).
V
The structural part is given by:
y* = x /  + C (3 .2)
where y is an (s x 1) vector o f estimates, x an (s x 1) vector o f exogenous factors that affect 
child well-being, and C a stochastic error term. Vector x includes the following indicators 
Household socio-demographic composition (number o f members and age; household type: 
single earner, double earner, lone parent; parents education & employment conditions), 
extended household composition (presence o f grandparents and number o f cousins), 
attendance o f full-time elementary school, possibility to have lunch at school, hours spent in 
front o f television, experience o f violent act, and time o f play in open air. From equation 3.1
Y -  e
and 3.2 they obtain a reduced form equation. Substituting — — = y  into 2.4 gives the
AY
reduced form equation
y  = n  + v  (3.3)
W here n  = x y  and v = AY^  + e .
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Addabo, Di Tommaso and Facchinetti (2004)
F ig u re  3 .1 . A d d a b o , D i T o m m a s o , a n d  F a c c h in e t t i  (2 0 0 4 ) .
Di Tommaso (2007) estimates a structural equation model o f the capability approach 
for child well-being in India. The sample contains 300 children between the age o f 6 and 12. 
The capabilities indicators include bodily health (height for age and weight for age), sense 
imagination and thought (enrolment in school), leisure activities, and play (work status 
indicator). The explanatory indicators are respectively, economic situation o f household 
(assets, property o f land, income deciles), literacy o f parents, and gender o f children, size of 
household, caste, and birth order. The MIMIC has a measurement component, namely,
Y = AyY  * + s  (3.4)
where Y  = (Y1, ...,Ym) is an (m x 1) vector o f independent well-being indicators; A = 
(AY,..., AY ) is  an (m x 1) vector o f factor loadings or coefficient for the effect o f a unit change
in latent variable on the indicator. s is (m x 1) vector o f measurement error with covariance 
matrix 0 s. The structural part determines the causal effect on children’s capabilities.
Y * = x 'y  + g (3.5)
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W here x is an exogenous vector o f causal variables and y parameters to be estimated. 
Substituting 3.5 in 3.4 gives:
y  = nx + v (3 6 )
W here n  = AYy
Figure 3.2. Di Tommaso (2007).
Di Tommaso (2007)
Kuklys (2005) uses a M IMIC model to capture the functionings achievement being 
healthy and being well sheltered. She employs the BHPS for two years 1991 and 2000 and 
compares the changes in estimates. Her measurement equation is
b!  = A%  + ° !  (3.7)
W here b f  is a functioning indicator with f  = (housing, health) and for each functioning there
are j  = 1, ..., m indicators. The indicators for housing she uses are: condensation, cold, rot, 
and no space; for health she uses a subjective indicator o f health status, visits to the doctor, 
and whether health limits daily activities. Abf  ( A ^ ,.. . ,A bf) is the factor loading for each
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indicator; Abf  is therefore the expected change in b f  for a one unit change in the latent 
variable. b* is the common factor which changes only with the functioning (housing, 
health). s f  is ~ (O,0ef) and the cov ( s f  , s j  ) = 0 for every i ^  j  which means that the error
terms across indicators are not correlated. In equation 3.8 the structural part links 
functionings achievement with their causes:
bf = yX1 x 1 + yx 2 x 2 + . . y x s x s + yzizi + . . . + y*zt+if (3 .8)
Equation 3.8 highlights that functionings achievements, b*, are linearly determined by
resources x = (x1 ... xs) and conversion factors z = (z1 ... zt). q is a stochastic error term. For 
resources, Kuklys uses income and education; and age, gender, job status, marriage, 
education, and living in London for the conversion factors. b* is not measured directly.
Figure 3.3. Kuklys (2005).
Kuklys (2005)
Krishnakumar (2007) uses MIMIC with country level data. She models capabilities as 
unobservable, interdependent, and endogenous. They are influenced (i) by endogenous 
factors which they can affect as well be affected by capability (social, political, and 
institutional factors) and (ii) by exogenous causes (traditions, culture, environmental factors, 
and some elements o f (i) which are not endogenous). Achievement/functionings are
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measurable and are used to measure capability. The relationship between functionings and 
capability is affected by exogenous factors. The notation has y * a (m x 1) vector o f latent 
capabilities, y  a (p x 1) vector o f observed indicators representing the functionings, z a (n x 1) 
vector o f observed variables that influence the capabilities but are influenced by them, x  a (k 
x 1) vector o f exogenous causes o f y*  and z, and w a (s x 1) vector o f factors entering the 
measurement equation. The structural model explains the capabilities and is given by
Ay  * + Bz + Cx + u = 0 (3 .9)
And the measurement model is given by
G (y) = h(y*, w) + v (3.10)
u  and v are the error terms which are uncorrelated between themselves but correlated within 
each: V(u) = E and V(v) = ¥ .  In the measurement equation, Capability, y*, has three 
dimensions knowledge, health, and political freedom. They are measured as achievement or 
functioning vectors. For health, life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, and under-five 
mortality are chosen. For knowledge, adult literacy rate and gross enrolment. For political 
freedom political rights, civil liberties, and voice and accountability. Thus,
y  = Ay  * + Dw + v (311)
with E(v) = 0 and V(v) = ¥  diagonal
w influences the outcome variables (achievement/functionings) given a level o f capability. 
The indicators for w chosen include % of population with access to essential drugs, using 
adequate sanitation, using improved water source, number o f physicians per 100’000 (for 
health); public expenditure on education (for education); control o f corruption and rule o f law 
(for political dimension). The structural model captures in addition to the interdependence 
between the capabilities, the direct effects o f the exogenous factors. The exogenous factors 
included government effectiveness, regulatory quality, population using improved water 
source, cellular mobile subscribers (1000), public expenditure on health, total debt service 
(%), population density, population growth (%), urban population growth (%), youth share
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(%), physicians (1000000), press freedom, democracy autocracy index, total fertility rate, 
FDI, Gross fixed Capital Formation, and Trade (in US $ PPP). It is given by:
Ay * + Cx + u = 0 (3.12)
with E(u) = 0 and V(v) = E positive definite.
Figure 3.4. Krishnakumar (2007).
Krishnakumar (2007) 
(macro model)
Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008) study two basic capabilities— knowledge (being 
able to be educated) and living conditions (being able to be adequately sheltered) using a 
Bolivian household survey (see Figure 3.5). They argue the small number o f capability 
dimensions explored is related to data availability and that their estimation is a sufficient first 
step towards a more complete and complex capability list. The model they estimate assumes 
the capability set is indirectly observable and reflected in multiple indicators each o f which 
offers a partial measure o f capability. Here the observed indicators are outcomes or
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functionings obtained the unobservable capability set. Exogenous causes are added to explain 
capability thus forming a MIMIC model. Krishnakumar and Ballon (2GG8) argue they move 
beyond MIMIC because they also model capability interdependence. Their two principle 
equations are:
ry* + Bxi +* , = y* (3.13)
y, = h( y*,W  ) + Ct (3.14)
For i = (knowledge, housing)
Figure 3.5. Krishnakumar and Ballon (2GG8).
Krishnakumar & Ballon (2008)
(being educated; 
living conditions)
District exogenous 
causes o f capability 
(eg., number o f schools)
Household encouragement 
exogenous 
causes o f capability 
(eg., fa th e r level 
o f education)
Household resources 
exogenous 
causes o f capability 
(eg., monthly 
pc/expenditure)
Household geographic 
exogenous 
causes o f capability 
(eg., urban/rural)
y is here unobserved capability, x, exogenous capability explanatory variables, y- observed 
functionings, w  functionings explanatory factors, and st with Q residuals. y *  is on the left and 
right hand side o f equations because capabilities are interdependent. Functionings indicators 
include literacy and level o f education; living conditions functionings include dwelling and
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habitability conditions. The xt variables include municipal characteristics such as number of 
schools and % of social investments. The xt also includes household level variables such as 
father and m other’s education, including household per capital expenditure. The w  include 
child age, gender, being the oldest, household characteristics (number o f individuals, number 
o f females), and urban /rural dwelling, among others.
Hassan (2009) considers one functioning, namely, being educated. He argues partial 
least squares is preferable to structural equation analysis because the capability approach is a 
framework o f thought without a strong theory. Partial least square he claims is predictive and 
explanatory variance based technique which does not require a strong theoretical basis. The 
model is also estimated with partial least squares because the variables are not multivariate 
normal. He argues capability depends on achieved functioning and freedom; functionings 
depend on conversion efficiency; and conversion factors on constraints and resources. The 
variables used in the model are taken from the second round o f the Pakistan Socio-Economic 
Survey conducted in 1998. Thus, the exogenous variables measuring freedom include “have 
you recently felt that you are playing a useful part in things?” and “Do you normally 
accomplish what you want to?” . Capability is measured using ht w  following variables, 
among others, “Do you life is interesting”, and “Have you recently been able to enjoy your 
day to day activities” . The variables measuring functionings include “Do you think you have 
achieved the standard o f living and the social status that you had expected?” and “Can [you 
read] and w rite?” . The variables measuring conversion efficiency include gender, age, 
province, and marital status among others.
Figure 3.6. Hamid Hassan (2009).
4 9
III.The thesis’s model.
The model o f the capability approach estimated in this thesis uses the same techniques as the 
earlier ones. Yet, it is distinct because (i) it is explicitly derived from ethical foundations; (ii) 
it does not attempt to disentangle facts from values; (iii) it openly discusses its ethical 
properties; and (iv) it attempts to estimate capability from its own inputs and not extrapolated 
from achieved functionings.
W hile (i)-(ii) were elaborated upon in Chapters 1 and 2, and (iv) will be further 
explained below, more needs to be said on (iii), namely, the ethical properties o f the model as 
such. First o f all, though the model has consequentialist features, it is not a utilitarian model 
because outcomes— in terms o f functionings— are valued for their own sake (and not for 
raising an abstract unobservable utility or earnings metric). Second, the model is ethically 
individualist and consequentialist in the sense that the outcomes o f concern are individuals’ 
own well-being functioning achievements. Third, the model is not reductionist in the sense of 
being methodologically individualist— it does not seek to explain phenomena based on 
individual behaviors only (see Chapters 5 and 7 in particular). Fourth, and finally, although 
the model focuses on the instrumental dimensions o f agency— empowerment— it does not 
ignore that agency is valuable on its own even if  it does not lead to well-being improvements. 
Other ethical implications will be discussed in the empirical and concluding chapters.
In what follows, capability will be operationalized as capability to x where x is to 
play, be healthy, be happy, or work, among others. Thus, the model operationalizes Ruger’s 
(2010:81) definition o f health capabilities “as the capabilities o f individuals to achieve certain 
health functionings.” The diagram in Figure 3.7 below highlights the main specifications of 
the model, including the various hypotheses to be explored. It differs from the one in Figure 
2.2 because it is empirically operationalized. The framework in Figure 2.2, however, is a 
comprehensive theoretical representation. The empirical model, for instance, excludes 
feedback effects because they raise empirical and estimation challenges which cannot be 
easily accommodated.
The model estimated uses Robeyns’s (2004b) input method to measure capability. 
Robeyns (2004b:23-4) suggested
analyzing the capability inputs [including] the institutional system (and basic 
structure) in which an individual functions, as well as the interaction o f others, and a
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broad range o f resources. These capability inputs also include all Rawlsian primary 
goods, together with some other social primary goods that Raw ls’s critics have 
suggested to add, such as leisure and care.
The model in Figure 3.7, however, diverges somewhat from Robeyns’s choice of 
inputs since it excludes some Rawlsian primary goods and other institutional inputs (Samman 
and Santos, 2009:5). The narrower definition o f capability inputs adopted here is based on 
K abeer’s (1999) definition o f resources (see below). Primary goods and the institutional 
environment are not ignored and will be accounted for as conversion factors. Thus, even 
though primary goods such as liberties and market opportunities influence capability, they are 
external to capability and are more adequately modeled as conversion factors. Sen (2006c:23) 
also argues it is important to distinguish between functionings-capability and the facilities 
socially offered for that achievement. In the model, a similar distinction is employed to 
distinguish between capability and functioning, on the one hand, and the conversion factors 
(which include social facilities), on the other hand. The conversion factors in the model are 
positioned prior to the capability inputs and the achieved functionings (Robeyns, 2005). The 
conversion factors calibrate the capability inputs with information on three kinds of 
conversion factors, namely, individual (age, sex), social (class, ethnicity), and environmental 
(urban, climate, country) (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). These conversion factors are 
subsequently hierarchically modeled at three levels— the individual, the household, and the 
institutional. Since institutional factors, including social norms, influence capability inputs 
and functionings, they are modeled as institutional conversion factors.
The model also adopts K abeer’s definition o f resources which includes education and 
earnings. The latter are enabling factors (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005:72) or preconditions 
because, as Cherry (2003:35) argues, “paid work is not sufficient to end patriarchy in the 
home [but] for many women it is a precondition.” For Kabeer (1999), capability obtains from 
resources (the pre-conditions) and empowerment (the process). Capability here mediates 
between conversion factors and functioning achievements. Conversion factors also have 
direct unmediated effects on functionings.
The choice o f functioning indicators is partly ethical, partly empirical, and partly 
pragmatic. An indicator is considered a functioning when it can be related to well-being. 
Furthermore, when they are necessary for further functionings, functionings are “fertile 
functionings” (W olff and De-Shalit, 2007:10). The functionings indicators used in this model 
include subjective well-being and objective health indicators.
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In Figure 3.7 below, the components and capability inputs are enclosed in the dashed 
oval. Achieved functionings form the output o f the system. The determinants o f functioning 
are the conversion factors and the capability inputs.
The model is consistent with Krishnakumar and Ballon’s (2008)— it uses education as 
a basic capability input— and Kuklys’s model which explains achieved functionings with 
resources (including education). It differs, however, from H am id’s (2009) model which 
employs happiness as a capability indicator and education as a functioning indicator. It is also 
distinct from Krishnakumar’s (2007) macro- between countries model. Furthermore, while 
the model follows Di Tom aso’s (2007) and Addabo, Di Tommaso, and Facchinetti’s (2004) 
integration o f conversion factors, it differs from their choice o f capability measurement 
indicators. In their model, the capability index reflects functionings whereas in this thesis’s 
model, capability is measured from its inputs which subsequently explain functioning 
achievements. Finally, this thesis’s model has similarities to the W orld B ank’s empowerment 
measurement framework which suggests empowerment obtains from the interaction o f 
individual agency and opportunity structure. The W orld Bank empowerment framework will 
be further discussed in Chapter 4.
In summary, capability is here measured from its inputs, including resources 
(education and earnings) and empowerment (decision-making, individual perception of 
empowerment). Relationships (1) and (2) in the diagram are direct conversion factor effects 
on, respectively, capability and functionings. Relationships under (3) test the inter­
correlations between the capability inputs including earnings, education, and empowerment. 
Relationship (4) involves the direct (as well as the conversion factor) mediated capability 
effects on achieved functionings. Finally, (5) comprises the measurement coefficients o f the 
empowerment indices.
The discussion above entails a nomological network as dimensions cannot be 
interpreted on a standalone basis (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:10). Kabeer 
(1999:452) employs this concept to describe the interdependence o f resources, agency (as 
empowerment), and achieved functioning. She defines each respectively as the pre-conditions 
o f choice, the process o f choice, and achievement. In terms o f Figure 2.2, resources are the 
pre-conditions o f choice, decision-making is the process, and functioning the achievement. 
These components are indivisible. Thus, since empowerment is the instrumental dimension of 
agency according to Alkire (2005b), the model tests its effectiveness by linking it to achieved 
functionings (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:9).
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F ig u re  3 .7 . T h e  th e s i s ’s m o d e l .
Mabsout (2010)
IV. Overview of the empirical chapters.
Earlier chapters suggested the core components o f the capability approach are neither purely 
descriptive nor purely factual. Instead, they are thick components that enclose both facts and 
values. In other words, capability and functionings entangle factual and moral content that 
cannot be disentangled but which can be further articulated and specified. Thus, in the 
framework o f the capability approach elaborated here, agency and well-being are concepts 
that should be further specified and contextualized. According to Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, 
agency and well-being are off-shoots o f capability and functionings. Care should also be 
taken not to collapse the capability approach with “agency” or “autonomy” frameworks such 
as Deci and R yan’s self-determination theory or Doyal and Gough theory o f human needs.34
The challenge o f empirical mapping is heterogeneity in terms o f components 
(capability, functionings, and conversion factors) which also have a plurality o f indicators. 
Since there is no single right way to measure and model capability or functionings they can 
be operationalized using a multitude o f ways. For instance, for some, capability is an asset or
34 For an overview see Phillips (2GG6).
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a form of capital (Narayan, 2005). They report, for example, health, education, and literacy as 
capabilities. Others define capability over the space of all potentially achievable functioning. 
Others, still, define capabilities in a normative way as an all purpose list of functionings 
everyone should have access to. Sometimes, these differences raise communication barriers 
both between advocates of the capability approach and others who may be interested in or 
seeking to further understand the capability approach. Thus, even though an open empirical 
(or moral) structure is inclusive and plural, it may however bring about new challenges if 
advocates develop isolated conceptions. Broad ethical foundations such as the one elaborated 
here offer one way to cultivate diversity yet maintain a common framework which unites. 
The Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) has also been quite successful 
in bringing capability advocates from different backgrounds and creating a space for mutual 
exchange and learning.
There is, then, a distinction between empirical models and welfare— “aggregative”— 
models. While the former attempt to offer capability-functioning models of poverty and 
inequality, the latter are used to argue whether capability-functioning poverty or inequalities 
have stabilized, fallen, or risen. In this thesis, however, only empirical models are estimated. 
Still both types of models are connected in their mapping of abstract notions into measurable 
ones.
The empirical chapters shall explore and test hypotheses from various fields of social 
science and empirical enquiry, ranging from bargaining household models to development 
ethics. The empirical findings will also seek to guide policy work by specifying the most 
effective pathways for achieving valuable functionings. Note also that the use of statistical 
techniques is here not instrumental to, and does not constitute, a further step towards further 
mathematical modeling. The choice of statistics as a method is based on the alleged 
congruence of instrument to its object of study.
The empirical chapters focus on Ethiopia—a choice guided in part by the country’s 
ethnic and geographic diversity; Ethiopia has recent datasets, including the Demographic 
Health Survey (2005) and the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (2004); Ethiopia also 
illustrates the importance of the discrepancy between formal and informal institutions. As 
elaborated Chapter 1, capability based and Rawlsian based theories of justice diverge on 
whether the domain of justice should be restricted to formal institutions—the basic structure 
of society—or whether, in addition to the basic structure, justice must also engage private 
inequalities. Most capability advocates opt for the latter defending a non-ideal approach to 
justice in which unfair inequalities are engaged independently of whether formal institutions
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caused the injustice or not. In fact, most, though not all, capability advocates sidestep Rawls’s 
idealization of justice to focus on the most practical way capability and functioning 
discrepancies can be remedied.
Thus, the capability approach is adequate for Ethiopia where formal institutions 
regarding women’s rights have become less gender biased—the new federal constitution 
grants equal rights to women and men in all spheres of life, including in marriage, property 
rights, inheritance, and bodily integrity. Female circumcision has been prohibited, polygamy 
abolished, and the minimum marriage age for girls was increased from 15 to 18 years—but 
informal institutions, including behavioral norms, and traditions, remain very unequal (see 
Chapter 4).
Chapter 5, in particular, focuses on the paradox that operates at the individual level 
where more resources fail to increase women’s decision-making in the household. Cast in the 
conceptual language of the capability approach, it suggests policies which aim to empower 
women and give them more control over the kind of life they want to lead should not only 
target individual level indicators. The chapter shows that gender norms and attitudes 
influence actual behaviors in the household. Accordingly, to change behaviors, group level 
norms indicators may be policy targets. Such indicators can lead to an expansion of women’s 
capabilities by targeting community gender norms directly.
Chapter 6 augments Chapter 5’s capability model by adding functionings and 
endogenizing the other capability inputs (education, earnings, and decision-making). Using 
the same data set, Chapter 6 then assesses the importance of decision-making in the 
household for functioning health achievement and explores how empowerment could be 
instrumental for achieving positive development outcomes (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007:395). 
By linking the decision-making index to health functionings, the model also gauges the 
adequacy of decision-making as an empowerment indicator (Aslanbeigui, Oakes, and Uddin, 
2010:188). More specifically, in Ethiopia, the results indicate that women who take more 
decisions in the household may, but need not be, better-off. The chapter concludes that the 
choice of health functioning determines which ordering of the decision-making index is more 
empowering. Policy wise, it signals decision-making in the household is likely to be an 
important mediating variable for health policy.
Chapter 7 uses a different survey—the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (EHRS)— 
and studies villages representing the diversity of farming systems in Ethiopia. The chapter 
also substantiates and complements the statistical analysis with anthropological studies based 
on the sampled villages from the same source. Furthermore, although the EHRS model is
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structurally similar to the one estimated in Chapter 6, it introduces new indicators including 
the perception of empowerment (a process indicator in capability measurement) and 
subjective well-being (as an achieved functioning). The EHRS model results are not 
inconsistent with those obtained for the nationally representative sample of Chapters 5 and 6. 
Its main finding is a consistently statistically significant correlation between the perception of 
empowerment and social relationships indicators with subjective well-being.
Chapter 8, finally, synthesizes what was achieved, adding further insights on the 
theoretical implications of the thesis for the capability approach. Because the capability 
approach is ethically thick, no statistical empirical result by itself can falsify it. Since the 
capability approach offers a space to conduct social evaluations, there are adequate and 
inadequate operationalizations of its components. Chapter 8 also employs the findings of the 
three empirical chapters and interpolates their policy and ethical implications. Chapter 8 thus 
offers a final reflection on the meaning of a contextual, time bounded, operationalization of 
the capability approach.
V. Conclusion.
The chapter started with the ethics behind science and ended discussing various SEM models 
which are currently being used to operationalize the core components of the capability 
approach. Most of these models, including the one estimated in this thesis, are not novel in 
the sense that they rely on what are currently considered adequately successful theoretical 
and empirical explanations obtained in the development, health, and sociological literatures. 
Nevertheless, the model to be estimated is distinct to the extent that it offers ethical 
underpinnings (which are not always explicitly stated) in a unified framework that joins the 
fields of moral and social inquiry.
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CHAPTER 4
Empirical operationalization and human development in
Ethiopia
I. Ethics in empirics.
Guided by ethical inquiry, the entangled ethical properties and descriptive underpinnings of 
the models to be estimated in the three empirical chapters are further elaborated upon here. In 
earlier chapters, the definitions of components were pitched at a quite abstract level. Here, the 
process of contextualizing them further is engaged because abstract definitions are 
insufficient for empirical operationalization. More specific definitions further up the 
foundations offer competing, often incompatible, definitions of what capability is even 
though some consensus exists on what functionings are. Such controversies, it should be 
noted, are not restricted to the capability approach. Thus, in what follows, adequate 
definitions of capability, functioning, and their relationship are crucial for an enriching 
empirical exercise.
In practical terms, the capability approach assesses individual well-being in terms of 
capability—one’s effective opportunities to achieve valuable beings and doings or 
functionings—given diversity among individuals. For instance, two different persons can be 
equally capability poor yet the actual discrepancies in the space of potential functionings are 
contingent on each individual’s living place, culture, and other social factors. Thus, two poor 
families—one in New York City and the other in Dhaka—may have similar inadequate basic 
capabilities to educate their children even if the former can only afford a public school 
whereas the latter barely affords primary school. Each family, in its own socio-cultural 
environment, is perceived as being unable to provide adequate education for its children. 
Another example involves a person habituated to a life of poverty where ambitions are 
limited to meeting daily survival needs. From the perspective of the capability approach,
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however, this person is both poor in terms of resources and is mentally restrained. While such 
a poor person may have had no choice—she was born poor and accepts her lot because this is 
what she was taught—evaluating her well-being from the perspective of the capability 
approach entails her adaptation, over and above the inadequacy of means, is a crucial cue 
about her well-being—about what she can and cannot do.
Thus, capability reflects an individual’s potential to achieve valuable functionings. It 
is an individual’s positive freedom, power, capacity, or ability to do things given constraining 
(or enabling) individual, social, and environmental factors (Sen, 1985a; 1993b; 1998; 2009). 
Functionings are “constitutive of a person’s being” (Sen, 1992:39). All potential achievable 
functionings form capability sets. Functionings include nourishment, play, self-respect, and
35health, among other things. Sen (1980; 1999) argues a range of valuable functionings can be 
listed ranging from nourishment, health, adequate shelter, and feeling safe. These very basic 
and fertile functionings are necessary for biological survival and offer a moral threshold 
below which no one ought to be (Alkire, 2002; Kabeer, 1999; Ruger, 2010; Sen, 1993b). 
Consequently, any difference in achievements of basic functionings may be related to 
injustice and not autonomous choice. It should be noted here, achieving basic functionings 
such as being adequately nourished and in good health, is also valuable in itself. In addition, 
as ends, functionings have a convenient statistical interpretation as dependent variables to be 
explained by covariates (here, conversion factors and capability inputs).
Because there are overlaps between the capability approach and the bargaining power 
literature, this thesis is particularly concerned with the link between capability as effective 
freedom to achieve valuable functionings and the household bargaining and empowerment 
literatures (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009:34; Hill, 2003; Iversen, 2003:96; Robeyns, 2001:4). In 
the bargaining power literature, households are the most basic unit of analysis for individuals 
because they are likely to be the “central locus of women’s disempowerment” (Malhotra, 
Schuler, and Boender, 2002:5). In what follows, these issues are expanded upon.
For a start, the literature on empowerment and agency in general, and women’s 
empowerment and agency in particular, has greatly expanded over the last couple of years.36
35The debate over whether functioning or capability is the most elementary concept in the capability approach 
continues though Sen (1993b) argued both are important and which to consider depends on contextual 
parameters as well as the type of evaluation. Sen (1992; 2002a) also argues it is possible to use refined 
functionings or functionings enriched with capability information to gain capability information (Fleurbaey, 
2006). In other words, from achieved functionings, information on the capability set is extrapolated. For 
example, in some contexts there is no need to map all the capability set of a person who died from hunger to 
know she did not have access to this elementary functioning. Other possibilities to extrapolate capability 
information are discussed in Sen (1999:82-3).
36 The literature is vast. See, among others, Alkire (2005b), Aslop, Berteslen and Holland (2006), Bloom,
58
The empowerment literature now acknowledges empowerment and agency are multilevel, 
multidimensional, relational, and contextual. For Mahotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002:5-6), 
most definitions of empowerment suggest it involves either a process, an agency, or both. 
Process relates to change whereas agency entails women are significant actors in the process 
of change (Malhotra and Schuler, 2006:72). However, in this thesis, and as further elaborated 
below, Sen’s broad definition of agency as the ability to act on behalf of what matters to 
oneself and of empowerment as the instrumental dimension of agency—as suggested by 
Alkire (2005b)—is adopted.
A closer look at the capability approach and women’s empowerment literature reveals 
a mutual overlapping concern for similar concepts (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Kabeer, 1999; 
Narayan, 2005; Samman and Santos, 2009). The capability approach, nevertheless, more 
explicitly articulates the inchoate ethical issues of empowerment and gender. Still, both 
perspectives emphasize the process leading to the achievement of valuable functionings. The 
focus on agency, accordingly, underpins a mutual ethical concern about autonomy, self 
scrutiny, and reflection—a trust in human reason—to achieve valuable ends. The meeting 
grounds for these frameworks, in other words, are their attempts to introduce to social science 
a new perspective (or model) centered on a contextualized and personalized view of 
humanity. The major difference is that the capability approach explicitly articulates the ethics 
whereas the empowerment literature tends to leave them inchoate.
Even though the following authors may not use the term empowerment specifically, 
their definitions provide considerable overlap among themselves and the capability approach. 
For instance, Kabeer (1999) defines empowerment as acquiring the ability of making 
strategic life choices. For Narayan (2005:4), empowerment is the expansion of freedom of 
choice and action to shape one’s life. Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland (2006:10) argue 
empowerment is “the process of enhancing an individual’s or group’s capacity to make 
effective choices, that is, to make choices and then transform those choices into desired 
action and outcomes.” Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton (2005) claim it is the capacity of 
actors to envision alternative paths of action, decide among them, and take action to advance 
the chosen path as an individual or collectively with others. Bloom, Wypij, and Das Gupta 
(2001:68) define it as the “capacity to manipulate one’s personal environment through control
Wypij, and Das Gupta (2001), Cheston and Kuhn (2001), Deshmukh-Ranadive (2005), Durrant and Sathar
(2000), Dyson and Moore (1983), Furr and Das (2006), Furuta and Salway (2006), Griffiths and Stephenson
(2001), Ghuman (2003), Ghuman, Lee, and Smith (2004), Ibrahim and Alkire (2007), ICRW (1997), Jejeeboy 
(1995), Kabeer (2001), Malhotra and Schuler (2005), Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002), Mason (1986; 
2005), Narayan (2005), Obermeyer (1993), Osmani (2007), Presser (1997), Samman and Santos (2009), Steele 
and Goldstein (2006), Williams (2005).
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over resources and information in order to make decisions about one‘s own concerns or about 
close family members.” For Ghuman (2003:19), it is the “ability to make and execute 
decisions regarding personal matters of importance on the basis of power over others, access 
to information, control over material resources, and freedom from violence by husband and 
other men.” Etc.
A further distinction of interest in the household bargaining power literature concerns 
the distinction between the outcome of bargaining and the process of bargaining (Doss, 
2003:44). The distinction appeared to be necessary to explain the conflicting evidence over 
whether micro-credit empowers women or not. The micro-credit research paradox emerged 
from evidence on women which were not more empowered after joining micro-credit 
initiatives (Haile, 2009). The evidence sparked an interesting debate on the measurement of 
empowerment. Studying this conflicting evidence, Osmani (2007) and Kabeer (2001) observe 
that even though women in micro-credit groups may have experienced lower process 
empowerment indicators, they had consistently higher outcome empowerment indicators. 
Thus, if the distinction between outcome (eg., better health) and process (more decision­
making) in empowerment is accepted, it could be argued studies in which there was no 
relationship between micro-credit and empowerment used only process empowerment 
indicators. Accordingly, failing to distinguish between process and outcome empowerment 
indicators could partly explain the paradox in the empowerment evaluation of micro-credit 
initiatives.
But this finding, nevertheless, remains contingent on the extent to which the chosen 
process indicators actually capture empowerment—or so argued Osmani (2007:697-8). The 
corollary of his hypothesis is that process and outcome empowerment ought to be positively 
correlated and that the aforementioned studies did not adequately capture process 
empowerment. Kabeer (2001), in fact, had also suggested outcomes and processes of 
empowerment cannot be neatly disentangled.
In what follows therefore, the Osmani-Kabeer thesis on the expected positive 
correlation between the various empowerment indicators is tested (Alsop and Heinsohn, 
2005:13). Indeed, the multidimensionality of empowerment entails that it is possible for 
women to gain empowerment in one dimension (the economic, for instance) yet loose in 
another (the political) (Hindin, 2000:1521; Malhotra and Mather, 1997:604,625; Malhotra, 
Schuler, and Boender, 2002:11-4,17; Mason, 2005).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section discusses 
the agency-empowerment framework used in the empirical chapters. The subsequent three
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sections introduce respectively the models estimated in each of the chapters. The final section 
reviews the state of human development and gender equality in Ethiopia circa 2005.
II. Agency and empowerment.
The general theoretical framework for agency and empowerment is here introduced and 
explained. It is also depicted in Table 4.1 and will be useful to classify the various capability 
and functionings indicators. First of all, Table 4.1 distinguishes between subjective and 
objective functionings because only the former involve feelings and preferences (Gasper, 
2005; Scanlon, 1993). Second, it is centered on the concept of agency, which was elaborated 
upon in earlier chapters. As noted there, Sen (1999:19) defines an agent as “someone who 
acts and brings about a change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own 
values and objectives.” Agency, therefore, is the overall umbrella term that covers our 
interest in empowerment. Here, furthermore, Alkire’s (2005b) definition of empowerment as 
the instrumental dimension of agency is also of use. It follows that agency has a non­
instrumental dimension which includes valuing the process that brings about the realization 
of functionings by individuals (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007:386; Samman and Santos, 2009:4-5; 
Sen, 1999). Here then, the non-instrumental dimension of agency accounts for the process of
37choice as a valuable functionings in itself.
The thesis’s basic theoretical framework to operationalize the capability approach 
has—as noted earlier—overlaps with the World Bank’s empowerment framework. The 
World Bank’s empowerment measurement approach considers individual empowerment 
obtains from the interaction of agency and opportunity structure (Naryan, 2005; Alsop and 
Heinsohn, 2005; Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland, 2006; Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton,
2005). Agency is broadly defined as the capacity to make meaningful choice where as 
opportunity structure includes formal and informal institutions or the rules of the game 
(Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005:9). Empowerment obtains when three conditions are met: (i) an 
opportunity to make a choice exists; (ii) a person actually uses the opportunity to choose; and 
(iii) the choice results in the desired result (ibid.: 10). Empowerment, subsequently, can bring 
about the achievement of desirable development outcomes (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; 
Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland, 2006; Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:9).
37 The latter also overlaps with the valuation of choice as a valuable functionings (Fleurbaey, 2006; Sen, 1987b).
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Nevertheless, there are some differences between this thesis’s framework and the 
World Bank’s concerning to (a) the definition of agency and (b) the inclusion of opportunity 
structure in the definition of empowerment. In what follows, these two issues are discussed in 
order. First, various definitions of agency are used by the World Bank not all of which are 
consistent. Thus, agency was defined as “the capacity to make meaningful choice” (Alsop 
and Heinsohn, 2005:8); as an actor or group’s ability “to envisage and purposively choose 
options” (Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland, 2006:11); as the “pursuit [of] purposeful courses of 
action that further [agents] goals. The goals may relate to individual well-being but can also 
relate to the range of other objectives that an individual may deem desirable. The agent is 
able to envision alternative paths of action, decide among them, and take action to advance 
the chosen path as an individual or collectively with others” (Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton, 
2005:42); and, finally, agency as the capacity for women themselves to be significant actors 
in the process of change (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005:71). The concern here is that some of 
these definitions are too broad including “meaningful”, “purposeful”, and “actors in the 
process of change.” For instance, any choice can be meaningful in some way and for 
someone, even for an individual lacking autonomy. Some kind of boundary is then necessary 
to delineate the bounds of meaningful. Sen’s definition of agency is deemed more adequate 
because it explicitly states it is individual’s own (and not a group’s) “values and objectives” 
that give meaning and purpose to choice.
Furthermore, Alsop and Heinsohn (2005:8) and Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland 
(2006:11) argue agency is measured using “assets” indicators (including psychological, 
information, organizational, material, social, financial or human). For them, “social capital” 
is an asset that can be used to measure the capacity to make meaningful choice. However, 
while these indicators may be correlated with agency they are not agency indicators as such. 
Instead, following the framework adopted here, assets indicators are perceived as potentially 
close determinants of agency. A similar concern arises with respect to Narayan’s (2005:7) 
five capabilities: the material, human, social, psychological, and political. To Narayan, 
human capabilities include “health, education and productive or other life enhancing skills” 
(ibid: 10). However, the latter are better conceptualized as inputs or enabling factors not 
capabilities as such.
Second, as Samman and Santos (2009:4) have argued, the World Bank’s framework 
includes opportunity structure in its definition of empowerment. Petesch, Smulovitz, and 
Walton (2005:41), for instance, define empowerment as the product of the interaction
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between agency and the opportunity structure. By loosening the focus on the individual as 
such, Samman and Santos conclude, this approach broadens the definition of empowerment 
too much. Even though the general definition of empowerment by the World Bank does not
39include opportunity structure, the included notion of effective choice does. Obviously, no 
one claims opportunity structure is unimportant to assess what individuals can and cannot do. 
Still, opportunity structure can be accounted for in the conversion factors as elaborated 
further below, and without including it in the definition of empowerment.
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Table 4.1. Theoretical framework for agency and empowerment.
Measurement indicators
Subjective (feelings, preferences) Objective
Functioning (achievement/end/ output) Individual satisfied with own agency Blood pressure, stress hormones, serotonin, dopamine
Empowerment (instrumental) Perception of control and autonomy Decision-making in the household, control over earnings
Sour ces : A lkire (2005b), G asper (2005), Layard (2005), Philips (2006).
In chapters 5 and 6 a decision-making index is estimated to gauge empowerment in 
the household with the 2005 Ethiopia DHS (Demographic Health Survey). The index is 
estimated from final say household decision-making questions over health care, visits to 
family, and large household purchases. In the DHS, women in relationships were asked 
whether someone else takes the decision, the decision is shared, or whether it is taken alone. 
Subsequently, the common variance shared by the indicators is used to estimate for each 
woman a decision-making index score. Decision-making patterns in the household can reflect 
the power a respondent has (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007:386) and a sizeable literature sustains 
the relationship between household decision-making and empowerment (ibid.:390).
In Chapter 7, a different Ethiopian survey is used, the EHRS (Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey). Here, the instrumental dimension of agency—empowerment—is also a 
(process) capability input although two distinct dimensions of empowerment are tested. The 
first is a perception of empowerment index which involves feelings and is not limited to the 
household (Diener and Diener, 2005); the second is the standard decision-making index 
which does not involve feelings and is limited to decisions in the household. Since the latter 
index does not involve feelings or express a preference, it is considered objective (see Table
38 Furthermore, although Narayan (2002:v) argues empowerment refers broadly to the expansion of freedom of 
choice and action, she also points out that —powerlessness is embedded in the nature of institutional relations 
[and] the book adopts an institutional definition of empowerment.”
39 Alsop and Heinsohn (2005:6) argue “a person or group is empowered [if] they possess the capacity to make 
effective choices ... [and that the] capacity to make effective choice is primarily influenced by ... agency and the 
opportunity structure.”
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4.1). The EHRS then integrates two different measures to triangulate empowerment. Women, 
in the first measure, are asked whether they actually control the income they earn—an 
important empowerment variable for both Asian and African women (Anderson and Baland, 
2002; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009). The second measure of empowerment in the EHRS 
relates to women’s perception of empowerment. More specifically, in the 2004 round of the 
EHRS women were asked to answer three questions on their perception of empowerment. 
Each had a scale from one to seven (with four as the neutral option). They had to express 
whether they “Strongly disagree” (=1) or “Strongly agree” (=7) with the following 
statements: “I am usually able to protect my personal interests”, “My life is determined by 
my own actions”, and “I have the power to make important decisions that change the course 
o f my life”.
In summary, the aim is to attempt to triangulate empowerment across chapters with 
different measures. The measures are validated by whether a relationship obtains with 
achieved valuable functionings (as empowerment outputs). The EHRS perception of 
empowerment index is nevertheless broader in scope since its domain is not restricted to the 
household.
The determinants o f  empowerment
In household economics, individual empowerment emerged as an important dimension 
following the critique of the unitary model (Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinot, and Kanbur, 1993; 
Ferree, 1990:867; Iversen, 2003:95-6; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). In the unitary 
model, individual and household decisions are taken by a dictator or altruist head. 
Heterogeneity of interest, however, introduced different, possibly even conflicting, 
preferences and goals between household members. Still, the possibility of conflicting 
interests has not ruled out cooperation (Sen, 1990; Agarwal, 1997). Bargaining models, at 
any rate, require decision-making mechanisms (Rubinstein, 1991; Sen, 2002a) that 
encompass both cooperation and conflict.
A considerable literature is available on the determinants of women’s empowerment. 
Most link empowerment to economic indicators including access to micro-credit, income, 
and assets.40 Compared to all male property rights, for example, joint property ownership of 
land and houses improves women’s decision-making power, their self-confidence, and 
reduces domestic violence (Panda and Agarwal, 2005; Datta, 2006). Other studies point at the
40 See Agarwal (1994), Bali Swain and Wallentin (2008), Cheston and Kuhn (2001), Doss (1994; 2003), Haile 
(2009), ICRW (1997), Kabeer (1999), Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2003) and Quisumbing (2003).
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importance of differences in resources between partners, moving from the strictly individual 
level of empowerment to household level determinants of power (Doss, 2003).
Although the empirical literature on the determinants of empowerment points at the 
positive impact of women’s earnings on their bargaining position, having more education 
compared to partners could have a stronger positive impact (Koolwal, 2005; Orrefice and 
Bercea, 2007). Furthermore, age difference between partners influences bargaining 
(Friedberg and Webb, 2006). In some studies women’s absolute level of earnings had no 
impact on power but a lower gender wage gap in the local labor market appeared to 
significantly lower women’s unpaid work load (MacPhail and Dong, 2007) and reduced 
domestic violence (Aizer, 2007). Additional extra-household variables appear to affect 
bargaining. For example, more gender-aware divorce laws reduce married women’s suicide, 
domestic violence, and the number of women murdered by their partners (Hoddinott and 
Adam, 1996; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). The implication of these recent empirical 
findings is that individual access to, and control over, resources does have an important 
positive impact on women’s position but that household variables and extra-household 
variables appear to matter too (Doss, 2003).
As argued earlier, process and outcome empowerment indicators are most likely 
positively correlated yet empowerment is also multidimensional and contextual; accordingly, 
the impact of positive determinants is not always in the expected direction and can sometimes 
be negative (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005:79). Thus, the relationship between women’s 
resources (work, assets, earnings, and education), empowerment, and well-being is far from 
being consistently positive linear. It is quite plausible complex non-linear relationships obtain 
where empowerment is a zero sum game.41 Thus, as women gain empowerment, men’s 
authority and identity is challenged. Often, indeed, and as argued further below in the 
following chapters, women’s empowerment challenges gender norms and leads to reduced 
cooperation and punishment. Such effects have been observed in South-Asia women’s access 
to credit. There, women’s loans have been appropriated by men even if they remained 
responsible for pay-back. In South-Asian then some women lacked control over credit they 
received and the income earned from it. For some women, then, credit can make them worse 
off in terms of net income (Goetz and Sengupta, 1996) or domestic violence (Rahman, 1999), 
while it raises their hours of wage labor at very unfavorable conditions and at cost of their 
own businesses (Garikipati, 2008). These findings are consistent with the conceptualization
41 See Alsop, Bertelsen and Holland (2006:2), Cheston and Kuhn (2001), Kabeer (2001), Mayoux (1999), and 
Narayan (2005).
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of empowerment as multidimensional, relational, and contextual. Another study based on a 
household survey in Bangladesh also found women with a job had less decision-making 
power than housewives (Hossain, 1998). Other research, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, 
indicates that the higher women’s income, the lower men’s contribution to household 
expenditures and the higher the share of income that men spend on personal consumption 
(Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Cheston and Kuhn, 2001:34; Odebode and Van Staveren, 2007).
In this thesis some of the above hypotheses will be tested via the operationalization of 
the core components of the capability approach. The first empirical chapter focuses on 
explaining a process capability input—decision-making in the household. Decision-making in 
the household is perceived as one means to empower women (ICRW, 1997; Mason, 2005) 
and was recently considered a “robust, internationally comparable, empowerment indicator 
that can address key research questions” (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007:388). While Chapter 5 
further explores the extent to which household decision-making patterns are determined at the 
institutional level, in Chapter 6, the model is extended and simultaneous equations are used to 
endogenize capability inputs and explain achieved health functioning indicators. 
Accordingly, Chapter 6 tests whether the household decision-making index is related to 
functioning well-being in general and health functioning in particular. If a relationship can be 
established between decision-making patterns in the household and health functioning it can 
be argued that (i) decision-making is partly validated as an effective empowerment index and 
(ii) the data support a non-cooperative household bargaining model. In the latter class of 
models, binding contracts cannot be made and health functioning can, in theory, be improved 
with changes to household decision-making patterns (Doss, 2003:46).
Chapter 7 distinguishes itself from the earlier ones via the different indicators it 
employs to measure capability, functioning, and conversion factors. Chapter 7, accordingly, 
focuses on motivating the indicator selection process and the subsequent estimation of 
relationships between capability inputs, achieved functionings, and individual, social, and 
environmental conversion factors. Unlike Chapters 5 and 6 which employed a nationally 
representative household survey (the 2005 Ethiopia DHS), here new indicators are selected 
from the rural 2004 EHRS dataset. The subjective indicators in the EHRS were collected for 
the first time in the 2004 round. They include the perception of empowerment, life 
satisfaction, and happiness. Decision-making indicators are not considered subjective because 
they do not involve feelings.
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III.Gendered institutions and household decision-making.
As explained earlier, Chapter 5 explores the extent to which bargaining power indicators and 
capability inputs explain a household decision-making index. The decision-making index is 
considered and tested for its properties as a process capability input in the broader 
operationalization framework (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, Chapter 5 attempts to gauge the 
extent to which individual level empowerment is determined at higher levels, beyond the 
individual, and at the institutional level. The hypothesis tested is backed by Mason (2005:91) 
who reports that inter-community variation in household empowerment can explain between 
40% and 80% of variance. Such evidence explains the motivation behind the variety of 
empowerment frameworks that also include the institutional context and the social political 
structure in their definitions of empowerment (Malhotra and Mather, 1997:601,627; Mason, 
1987:739-40; 2005:91; Narayan, 2005). Such factors cannot be ignored—especially in 
Ethiopia where ethnic groups differ substantially with respect to social norms and cultural 
practices, including those related to gender (Bjerén, 1985). Yet in the framework adopted 
here, institutional factors, including gender norms, are modeled as exogenous conversion 
factors. In other words, they are integrated in the model without defining them as capability 
inputs (or empowerment indicators).
Chapter 5 then tests how behavioral gender differences can be at least partly explained 
by ethnic group membership in Ethiopia. Ethnicity is here used as a proxy indicator for 
gendered institutions. The choice of this proxy finds support in the anthropological literature 
(Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996) and in a recent paper by Deininger, Ali, Holden, and 
Zevenbergen (2008) on land certification in Ethiopia which reports clear differences in social 
norms and cultural practices between ethnic groups affecting ownership and control over land 
by men and women.
Chapter 5 thus explores (i) the determinants of decision-making in the household and 
(ii) attempts to explain the sometimes paradoxical effect of women’s individual resources on 
decision-making in the household. The latter hypothesis entails that individual level 
bargaining power may either be overruled or supported by the influence of a higher level 
bargaining conversion factor, including, culture and gendered institutions (Ferree, 1990; 
Malhotra and Mather, 1997; Mason, 2005). For this reason, bargaining conversion factors 
include the gendered structures of constraint which generally limit women’s behavior more 
than men’s and advantage men as a group (Folbre, 1994). Gendered institutions are the
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(often) asymmetric social norms, beliefs, and practices affecting men and women’s behavior 
differently, and often unequally (Doss, 2003; Ferree, 1990; Goetz, 1997; Odebode and Van 
Staveren, 2007). They are related to Mason’s definition of gender systems as
the socially constructed expectation for male and female behaviour ... found (in 
variable form) in every known human society. A gender system’s expectations 
prescribe a division of labour and responsibilities between women and men and grant 
different rights and obligations to them, either intentionally or as a side effect, they 
also create inequality between sexes in power, autonomy, and well-being, typically to 
the disadvantage of the females. Although gender systems change over time, many of 
the expectations that lie at their heart are strongly enforced by the state or community 
and through informal sanctions between neighbours, kin and friends (quoted in 
Presser, 1997:310).
Accordingly, overall individual bargaining power is not limited to powers derived 
from income and exit options or the threat each partner has. At least three more bargaining 
dimensions have been acknowledged (Agarwal, 1997; Iversen, 2003; Kabeer, 1999; Sen, 
1990). First, there are the objects to be bargained over. For example, in many societies issues 
such as whether the husband marries a second wife, or the division of unpaid labor 
concerning cooking, cleaning, and child care are often not up for negotiation. Second, men 
and women’s preferences are not just exogenously given but affected by beliefs and 
expectations. Sen (1990) has referred to adaptive preferences that reduce women’s bargaining 
power by simply limiting what they seek to get out of the bargaining process what is socially 
acceptable or feasible. Such an effect is comparable to the discouraged worker effect in labor 
markets. Third, there is bargaining strategy and style which is the way the bargaining process 
is done. Some forms of bargaining may be more effective than others, and these tend to vary 
by gender. Men, for example, tend to bargain in more aggressive ways than women, who 
have often been socialized into submissive and indirect modes of communication and 
negotiation, not demanding explicitly what they want.
Gendered institutions as social conversion factors interact with the process capability 
inputs—decision-making—in all four ways. They influence men’s and women’s exit options; 
what can legitimately be bargained over; women’s and men’s preferences; and male and 
female bargaining agency. The chapter therefore tests the impact of gendered institutions and 
bargaining power indicators, including other capability inputs such as education and earnings,
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on a bargaining power index based on decision-making in the household. The next chapter, as 
elaborated below, expands this basic model in several ways.
IV. Expanding and validating the basic model.
Economists study bargaining power in households with resources, including public resources, 
income shares, unearned income, assets at marriage, and current assets (Doss, 2003; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000:18). Subsequently, they are interested in capturing (non- 
spurious) correlations between bargaining power indicators and expenditure patterns. If a 
correlation between bargaining power indicators, expenditure, and allocations patterns 
obtains, effective bargaining power discrepancies are likely to exist. Though cast in the 
conceptual language of the capability approach and focused on non-economic functioning 
objective health indicators, the sixth chapter achieves something roughly similar.
More specifically, the objective of the sixth chapter is to test how in contexts of 
unequal gender norms, bargaining power conversion factors, decision-making indicators, and 
the remaining capability inputs, are instrumental to women’s health functionings (Hindin, 
2000; Kabeer, 2005; ICRW, 1997; Thomas, et. al., 2002). Thus, where women are 
marginalized but important contributors to household and community life (Pankhurst, 
1992:7), the model seeks a better understanding of the pathways from capability to 
functioning.
Chapter 6 is grounded in earlier research which studied differences in preferences 
between male and female partners and attempted to untangle the impact of household 
decision-making on women’s welfare (Cheston and Kuhn, 2001:8-9). In Ethiopia, for 
example, Webb and Von Braun (1994:77) observed, female headed households (widows, 
divorcees, or wives of soldiers) earn less than male headed households (US$53 versus US$62 
per person) but spend absolutely more on food (US$18 versus US$16). Such empirical results 
highlight how women’s role in the household—and the ensuing gender division of labor and 
responsibilities—leads to patterns of spending where women spend proportionally larger 
amounts on food and health than men (Doss, 2003; Thomas, 1990).
The capability approach based model described in the final section of Chapter 3 is 
fully operationalized here. Figure 4.1 highlights the principle model regressions. Following 
Robeyns (2005), the conversion factors are set prior to the capability set. The figure also
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integrates Robeyns (2004b) input capability measurement suggestion combined with 
Kabeer’s (1999) operationalization of capability as emerging from resources (pre-conditions) 
and empowerment (process). Achieved functionings are positioned on the right as outputs. 
Capability input indicators, thus, mediate between the conversion factors and functionings 
and have direct functionings effects.
In what follows, conversion factors influence capability sets with three different 
kinds of information, namely, individual (age, sex), social (class, ethnicity), and 
environmental (urban, climate, infrastructure) (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). The conversion 
factors are modeled as exogenous variables and partitioned in three distinct levels, the 
individual level, the household level, and the institutional level. The model adopts the same 
broad definition of resources as education and earnings (Kabeer, 1999; Narayan, 2005). 
Health, however, is an output and an achieved functioning. The determinants of health 
functioning are the conversion factors and capability inputs. Conversion factors can have 
both direct and indirect effects on functionings. The indirect effects are mediated by the 
capability inputs. Social norms affecting behaviors are integrated as institutional conversion 
factors. Thus, after controlling for the conversion factors, capability is the ability of the 
individual to achieve health functioning. In this model, finally, though indirect (mediated) 
effects are estimated, no interactions (moderating) are (in contrast to Chapter 5).
In the figure below, relationships between conversion factor and capability inputs are 
marked (1) and (2). Relationships between capability inputs are marked (3). Relationships 
between capability inputs and health functioning, including the indirect effects of the 
conversion factors on functionings, are marked (4) and (6). The direct effects of the 
conversion factors on functionings are noted (5).
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Figure 4.1. Conversion factors, capability inputs and functioning achievements.
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The relationships between the various capability inputs in (3) are described below in 
Figure 4.2 which models how the different inputs interrelate. Thus, some inputs, including 
education, explain others including earnings and decision-making in the household. 
Education is then set prior to earnings, control over earnings, and the decision-making index. 
While total earnings could be theorized as leading to control over earnings—the more a 
woman earns the more empowered she will be (Mayoux, 1999:960-2)—the relationship 
between earnings and control over earnings is, however, most likely endogenous—women 
who earn more are more likely to control their earnings but those who control their earnings 
are also more likely to earn more. To avoid further biasing (coefficient and standard errors),
42their relationship is not estimated. The resources indicators—education and earnings—with 
the control over earnings indicators are all set prior to the decision-making index. In other 
words, an educated woman who controls her earnings is expected to take more individual and 
household decisions.
42 The choice may cause another bias, namely, omitted variable bias. However, a pragmatic choice has to be 
made and in simultaneous system of equations instrumental variables is problematic because it raises 
interdependence between indicators. The latter renders model estimation difficult. In addition, few structural 
equations models software at the time of writing incorporate 2SLS computation possibilities. Since 2SLS is 
manually estimated it is also likely to produce inefficiencies. Still, a 2SLS is estimated for the relationship 
between empowerment indicators and earnings. In addition, Chapter 8 tests the robustness of omitting 
endogenous variables.
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Figure 4.2. Relationships between capability inputs.
The section described the principles elements of the model estimated in Chapter 6. 
The next section elaborates on the properties of the model estimated in Chapter 7 which uses 
a different but equally recent Ethiopian dataset.
V. The perception of empowerment and subjective well-being as capability 
and functioning indicators.
The resource capability inputs in the seventh chapter are, as before, years of education and 
the various earnings indicators as pre-conditions. However, for process capability inputs, an 
additional feeling subjective indicator is used—the perception of empowerment index. 
Furthermore, for functionings, subjective well-being indicators are used. Subjective 
indicators are distinguished from objective indicators because they are un-scrutinized 
preferences and feelings (Gasper, 2005; Scanlon, 1993). Accordingly, because no feelings are 
involved in the body mass index it is an objective functioning indicator and Chapter 6 only 
incorporates objective physiological functioning indicators.
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As Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002:15) argue, the psychological dimension of 
empowerment is rarely operationalized. But for Deshmukh-Ranadive (2005), mental space is 
the internal spatial dimension of empowerment, one which complements the other four 
external dimensions, which are, the physical, economic, socio-cultural, and political. 
Deshmukh-Ranadive (2005:115), in fact, considers “empowerment is as much a matter of 
emotion as of practical access to and control of spaces.” Mental space is here perceived as a 
power within and a necessary condition for empowerment to obtain (Deshmukh-Ranadive, 
2005:113). Mental space, accordingly, frees individuals from internalized restrictions and 
constraints. The opposite—fear—is “the single most debilitating, disempowering and 
dehumanizing experience” (Narayan, 2005:21). As an indicator of mental space, therefore, an 
individual’s feeling of empowerment is a distinct process indicator capturing an internal 
dimension of empowerment (Diener and Diener, 2005) which may (but need not) be 
correlated with other dimensions such as decision-making power in the household.
Chapter 7 also introduces happiness and life satisfaction as subjective functionings 
indicators involving feelings (Layard, 2005). Both happiness and life satisfaction indicators 
are evaluative (Phillips, 2006:18) and to be distinguished from Kahneman’s (1999) “objective 
happiness” or “instant utility” which requires no reflection or evaluation from the 
individual.43
The criteria for considering a variable—including subjective well-being indicators— 
as a functioning indicator is its relationship with individual well-being. The relationship with 
well-being, it should be noted, is not necessarily empirical and indicators may be defined as 
functionings using other criteria. Happiness is a valuable functioning indicators because it is a 
cross-culturally stable feeling shown to be positively correlated with health and flourishing 
(Diener and Diener, 2005; Layard, 2005:17-24,33-4). Furthermore, as Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2004:1361) note, self-reported happiness is correlated with evaluations made by 
significant others including spouses, friends, and family members. Blanchflower and Oswald 
also point out happiness is related to objective life circumstances such as unemployment and 
traits such as heart rate, blood-pressure measures, responses to stress, and psychosomatic 
illnesses including digestive disorders, and headaches. Domain specific satisfaction reports 
(“emotional well-being”, “health”, “family connections” etc.), furthermore, appear to be 
positively correlated with overall life satisfaction reports (Cummins, 1996:322). In sum,
43 Still, happiness and life satisfaction integrate Kahneman’s (1999:4) well-being framework which places well­
being as the most comprehensive category followed by subjective well-being and instant utility respectively.
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subjective well-being functioning can be interpreted as an indicator for “doing acceptably 
well in a sufficient range of functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007:122).
Subjective well-being indicators are, nevertheless, hedonic metrics and capture a 
different empirical reality than the perception of empowerment (Diener and Diener, 
2005:136). Subjective well-being and the perception of empowerment are, accordingly, 
conceptually and empirically distinct. The perception of empowerment is closer to Deci and 
Ryan’s autonomy dimension in Self Determination Theory. While the empirical differences 
between these concepts are further explored in Chapter 7, at the conceptual level, happiness 
and life satisfaction variables are outcome indicators which capture end states. Here, these 
subjective well-being indicators capture “the various possibilities open to us [as] we choose 
whichever combination of activities will make us feel best” (Layard, 2005:26). Feeling 
empowered, however, is procedural and involves the instrumental dimension of agency 
(Alkire, 2005b). Indeed, individuals who “feel self-confident, and are thus “psychologically 
empowered”, are more likely to make progress towards their personal goals and are more 
likely to be happy” (Diener and Diener, 2005:130). Still, in this framework, it remains 
possible for an ambitious individual to feel empowered and unsatisfied with life or to lack 
empowerment yet feel happy and satisfied with life.
Subjective well-being is also distinguished from flourishing or eudemonia. The latter 
involve realizing one’s human potentials comprising a multifaceted measure of flourishing 
(Samman, 2007). Accordingly, “people’s reports of being happy (or of being positively 
affective and satisfied) does not necessarily mean that they are psychologically well” (Deci 
and Ryan, 2008:2). Furthermore, while in the subjective well-being literature happiness and 
satisfaction are perceived as ends, eudemonia “is a process of fulfilling or realizing one’s 
daimon or true nature—that is, of fulfilling one’s virtuous potentials and living as one was 
inherently intended to live” (ibid.:2). There appears to be, nevertheless, consensus on the 
close relationship between flourishing and subjective well-being in the psychological 
literature (Ryan and Deci, 2001). It follows that subjective well-being is also promoted when 
basic psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—are fulfilled (Phillips, 
2006:31-2).
Section V concludes the overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical 
chapters. The next section offers a short overview of Ethiopia at the national level. It reviews 
human development statistics and offers a general picture of the state of gender equality.
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VI. H um an developm ent in  E th iopia .44
Ethiopia is the 27th largest country in the world and boasts a rich geography inhabited by a 
multiethnic society. Ethiopia is divided in nine regional states and two city administrations. It 
has three levels of analysis—or administrative boundaries—namely, the macro level which 
involves the federal state; the intermediate level which is the woreda; and the micro-level or 
the kebele--village (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005:13). The largest Ethiopian urban centers are 
Addis Ababa (center) and Dire Dawa (east). In 2004, Ethiopia’s population was rising and 
approaching the 80 million threshold (from 34.2 million in 1975). Its urban population in 
2005 was estimated at 16% and the share of the population under 15, 44.5%. The urban 
population share was higher—but the under-five population proportion lower—than in Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for 2005. Over the period 2000­
2005, Ethiopia’s average fertility rate was 6.7 births, a rate also higher than the average for 
LDCs and SSA countries.
Only three countries from those with data have less than Ethiopia’s average of three 
doctors per 100,000 inhabitants for 2000-2004. In 2005, life expectancy at birth was 51.8 
years—lower than the mean for LDCs and SSA countries. Female life expectancy was 53.1 
years, higher than male life expectancy male at 50.5. It is a favorable rate for women as it 
signals no systematic pregnancy and after birth selectivity against females. Ethiopia’s 
decrease in under-five mortality is more impressive than the one achieved by LDCs and SSA 
for the period 1970-2005. Still, about 10 million Ethiopian suffer from temporary food 
insecurity (Hando, 2009:95; OECD, 2008b). The share of undernourished in 2002/4 was 46% 
and famine affected Ethiopia a new in 2008, threatening the gains made in child nutrition and 
health over the last decade. According to UNICEF (May 2008), 126’000 children are in need 
of urgent therapeutic care for severe malnutrition whereas six million under-five are 
impoverished, living in high risk draught areas, and in need of preventive health and nutrition 
interventions.
The Ethiopian adult literacy rate for 1995-2005 averaged 36%, a much lower mean 
than most LDCs and SSA countries. Ethiopia also achieves lower scores on the HDI (Human 
Development Index) than most LDCs and SSA countries (ranking 169th out of 177 countries). 
The HDI is a summary measure which aggregates country level indicators for life 
expectancy, education, and income into an index which can then be used to rank countries.
44 Unless otherwise specified, the data source is UNDP (2008/9).
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Only a few countries score worse than Ethiopia on the HDI among which Chad, Central 
African Republic, Mozambique, Mali, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, and Sierra 
Leone. In Figure 4.3 below it is noticeable that Ethiopia starts with the lowest base in 1990 
but parallel’s Senegal’s slope obtaining some catching up after 1995.
Figure 4.3. HDI trends.
Source:  U ND P (200S)
•South Africa 
•Kenya 
•Senegal 
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I 1 M alawi
•Ethiopia
The Human Poverty Index-1 (HPI-1) is a poverty indicator developed by the UNDP. 
The HPI-1 is computed with following equation and indicators:
a a a
H PI - 1 = [P ------ 2------3— ]/
3
(4.1)
With a=3 and
P 3 = (4.2)
P 1 is the percentage of people not expected to survive to age 40, 
P 2 is the percentage of adults that are illiterate,
P 3 is the composite for overall economic provision, composed of:
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P 31 is the percentage of people without access to safe water,
P 32 is the percentage of people without access to health services,
P 33 is the percentage of moderately and severely underweight children under five.
The HPI-1 score for Ethiopia is 54.9 and its rank is 105th out of the 108 developing 
countries for which the index is computed. The countries below Ethiopia are Chad (108), 
Burkina Faso (106), and Mali (107). The difference between the HPI-1 rank and the income 
poverty rank is positive for Ethiopia meaning that it ranks better on the income poverty 
indicator than the human poverty indicator. In other words, Ethiopia has more successfully 
reduced income poverty than human development “multidimensional" poverty.
Gender inequality
Unequal gender norms prevail in Ethiopia (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005:9,17; Berhane et. al., 
2001; Biseswar, 2008; Hando, 2009; Legovini, 2006; Mayoux, 1999; Mulugeta, 2007; 
Pankhurst, 2002). Ethnographic research reveals that women’s status is relatively higher in 
the North of the country especially among the Tigrays (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005; 
Haile, 2009; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). In Ethiopia, still, approximately 56% of 
women are not consulted for partner choice in marriage (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 
2005:15). A significant gender gap in school enrollment and literacy also exists. For example, 
the adult literacy ratio of female to male in 2005 was 0.46 while the gross tertiary enrolment 
ratio of female ratio to male in the same year was 0.32. Overall, Ethiopia’s rank in the GEM 
(Gender Empowerment Measure) is 72nd out of 93 countries. The GEM according to the 
UNDP is a measure of agency and reflects women’s participation in political and economic 
spheres. Ethiopia nevertheless outperforms Nepal, Pakistan, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and 
Thailand. The Gender Development Index (GDI) uses the same indicators as the HDI but 
reflects gender inequalities in achievements. Ethiopia’s GDI score was 0.393—or 
approximately 96.8% of its HDI value—ranking it 148th out of 157 countries on the GDI 
rank.
Women in Ethiopia received right to vote and stand for election in 1955. The first 
woman elected to parliament was in 1957. In terms of women’s representation in 
government, Ethiopia is below the SSA regional average (Legovini, 2006:125).45
45 The share of women in government at ministerial level in 2005 was 5.9% while they held 21.9% of all seats in 
parliament in 2007 (the sixth highest rate among low human development countries) and 18% in upper house or 
senate.
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Furthermore, even though harmful practices such as genital mutilation have been outlawed, 
the penal code has no provision to enforce them whereas judges often ignore women’s rights 
and apply unfair informal norms (Legovini, 2006:126,133). A meta-analysis of African 
micro-credit initiatives on women’s empowerment and well-being, led Mayoux (1999:964) to 
conclude Ethiopian women—as in Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea—experience restrictions that 
parallel those in parts of Asia. So while on the formal institutional and political level 
Ethiopian indicators reveal progress over the 2000-2010 decade, in practice it is doubtful 
these changes have reached the communities and household where most women live and 
support their families.
Ethiopian rural women have additional challenging, multitasked, all year round work 
activities (Pankhurst, 1992). For instance, according to Abate (1993:129-120),
... many observers have commented on the physical hardship that Ethiopian women 
experience throughout their lives [including] carrying loads over long distances, 
grinding corn manually, working in the homestead, raising children, and cooking. 
Ethiopian women traditionally have suffered socio-cultural and economic 
discrimination and have had fewer opportunities than men for personal growth, 
education, and employment. Even the civil code affirmed woman’s inferior position, 
and such rights as ownership of property and inheritance varied from one ethnic group 
to another.
Hando (2009:34) also notes
women may face social exclusion in household, kin and public arenas. The household 
and kin level exclusion processes have a basis in gender norms of the community ... 
The tradition of paying a bride price also dehumanises women as property in which 
money is invested. This gives social justification for their wok burden: there should be 
returns on an investment. Women have practically no part in the property of the 
family and the property of inheritance rights reflects this.
Formal and informal gender institutions
Table 4.2 offers a recent snapshot of women’s status in neighboring countries. The closer the 
index to 1, the less empowered women are. In terms of the laws, customs, and norms that 
constrain women’s economic participation, Ethiopia performs relatively well. However, when
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it comes to female genital mutilation and violence against women Ethiopia performs worst of 
all. From the selected countries, Sudan has the highest score for family code (0.8). Ethiopia 
has the lowest score for the family code (0.33) but the highest for female genital mutilation 
(0.8). With Kenya, Ethiopia is also one of the most violent against women (0.75).
Table 4.2. Gender institutions in Ethiopia.46
| SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Family
code
Female
genital
m utilation
Violence
against
w omen
M issing
w om en
Freedom
of
movem ent
Obligation to 
w ear a veil in 
public
W omen's 
access to 
land
W om en's access 
to bank loans
Women's 
access to 
property
Ethiopia 0.33 0.8 0.75 0.16 0 0 0.7 0.5 0.5
Kenya 0.44 0.38 0.17 0.22 0 0 0.7 0.7 0.7
CAR 0.66 0.43 0.75 0.05 0 0 1 0 0.4
Sudan 0.8 0.89 0.75 0.27 0.7 1 1 1 1
Senegal 0.7 0.2 0.25 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Source : OECD Gender, Institutions and D evelopm ent Data Base.
Formal institutions regarding women’s rights in Ethiopia have changed recently: the 
new federal constitution grants equal rights to women with men in all spheres of life, 
including in marriage, property rights, inheritance, and bodily integrity (Alsop and Heisohn, 
2009:9,17). Female genital mutilation (FGM) has been prohibited, polygamy abolished, and 
the minimum marriage age for girls increased from 15 to 18 years (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 
2003; Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007). Informal institutions, however, are still very unequal in 
the country. Hando (2009:108) found in a sample of 57 widows— 13 of which are under 18— 
only three had completed primary education even though the constitution stipulates eight 
years of universal basic education as an obligated minimum. Older Ethiopian widows, he 
further reports, are rarely directly involved by agents of social policy makers and a male 
representative has to act as an intermediary with these officials (ibid.: 100-1,118). In addition, 
74% of Ethiopian women have undergone FGM (DHS, 2005; see also Santow, 1995:152-3), 
polygamy still occurs (Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007), and in spite of the legal reforms, 
traditional practices and customs dominate marriages (Abate, 1993; Fafchamps and
46 The family code is the complex of formal and informal laws, customs, and traditions that constrain women’s 
economic participation. Prevalence of female genital mutilation (share of women affected: 0=none, 1=all). 
Violence against women quantifies information on the existence of laws against (i) domestic violence, (ii) 
sexual assault or rape, and (iii) sexual harassment as follows: 0 if specific legislation is in place, 0.25 if 
legislation is in place but of general nature, 0.5 if specific legislation is being planned, drafted or reviewed, and 
0.75 if this planned legislation is of general nature; 1 captures the absence of any legislation concerning violence 
against women. Missing women describes the difference between the number of women that should be alive 
(assuming gender equality) and the actual number of women in a country. A value of 1 was assigned to the 
country with the highest percentage of missing women relative to the total number of women. All other 
countries are assigned values between 0 (no women are missing) and 1 accordingly. Freedom to move freely 
outside of the house (level of discrimination between 0=none and 1=high); obligation to wear a veil in public. 
Level of discrimination between 0=women are not obliged to wear a veil and 1=all women are obliged to wear a 
veil. Women's access to land ownership (between 0=full and 1=impossible). Women's access to bank loans 
(between 0=full and 1=impossible). Women's rights to own property other than land (between 0=full and 1=no).
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Quisumbing, 2002; Hando, 2009; Pankhurst, 1991). The federal government has limited 
capacity to enforce laws (WHO, 1999), in part because various states are granted full 
sovereignty allowing them to practice earlier laws that discriminate against women (World 
Bank, 1998). At the same time women’s political representation is low and their activism 
small and weak (Biseswar, 2008). Thus, pressure on the government to increase enforcement 
efforts to apply gender equality laws remains limited. Underlying the weak representation of 
women in politics and civil society is, according to Biseswar, the dominance of the Amhara- 
Tigray culture, which is hierarchical and has “respect for unchallenged authority as its core 
virtue” (ibid.: 139). She observes, “within this hierarchy, women are relegated to the bottom, 
where they silently accept their fate, never daring to question male authority” (ibid.: 140). 
Bevan and Pankhurst conclude that “female circumcision is widely supported by males and 
females throughout rural Ethiopia; uncircumcised girls/women (depending on cultural 
context) bring shame on their families, cannot get married, and cannot be buried in 
churchyards” (Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007:12). In fact, the DHS 2005 data reveal 
approximately 1/3 of the sampled women support the continuation of FGM.
In multi-ethnic Ethiopian villages few inter-ethnic marriages and ceremonies take 
place (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). Accordingly, geographical clustering is not very likely to 
capture different norms of groups living in the same geographic area. Two recent studies on 
women’s position in households in Ethiopia acknowledge the important influence of 
gendered informal institutions and both find instances of the paradoxical impact of women’s 
resources and awareness of their rights on bargaining power. An evaluation of a women’s 
development project found that half of the women accept regular wife beating (Legovini,
2006). But the study also revealed that it is mostly women who are more aware of their legal
47rights who are beaten the most . The other study, based on a rural household survey, found 
that even when Ethiopian women own assets, these assets are controlled by the household 
head, most likely a man (Lim, Winter-Nelson, and Arends-Keunning, 2007). Ownership of 
assets, hence, does not provide women with a suitable exit option. The study also found that 
where women did control assets did not reduce their labor input into male cash crops. Only 
the ability to control assets upon divorce enhanced women’s bargaining power, reduced their 
labor input to cash crops, and increased their labor input in food crops (which they control). 
The finding implies that the share of assets that women control upon divorce is not defined by 
law but by custom, and is in itself probably dependent on other sources of bargaining power
47 If this was only because of more awareness of rights would lead to a higher rate of reporting abuse, there 
would, of course, not be any paradox. The study does not give information of such a possible effect.
80
in the household. Both empirical studies, hence, suggest that women’s household position in 
Ethiopia is at least partly characterized by a paradoxical effect of resources and awareness of 
rights on bargaining outcomes, as further discussed in the next chapter.
VII. Conclusion.
The chapter has paved the way for the empirical models of Chapters 5-7. Accordingly, it has 
attempted to discuss in further detail the motivation behind these models, leaving further 
specifications to the empirical chapters. It also offered an overview of human development 
and of the unequal formal and informal institutions, including gender norms, which prevail in 
Ethiopia.
Succinctly, in what follows, the first of the empirical chapters focuses mostly on 
explaining a household decision-making index. The subsequent chapters expand the model by 
endogenizing capability inputs and adding functionings to the system of equations. Thus, in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the process capability input is a decision-making index whereas Chapter 7 
includes both, a decision-making and a perception of empowerment index. These indices are 
integrated alongside resources and conversion factors to explain functioning achievements.
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C H A P T E R  5
C o n v e r s i o n  f a c t o r s  a n d  c a p a b i l i t y :  F r o m  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  
h o u s e h o l d  l e v e l  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n s 48
I. Multiple levels of analysis.
Sen (1992; 2002a) argued the effective freedoms of individuals includes the functionings they 
can achieve without their direct control or choice. For instance, an individual’s effective 
freedom is enhanced if malaria is eradicated by government policy without consulting the 
people first. Here, a malaria free environment brings more health functioning for all even 
though individuals as such had no direct control over the policy process and its 
implementation (Iversen, 2003:99-100). In this example, freedom as the space of all valuable 
functionings an individual has access is expanded without the individual having exercised 
control or being in charge of malaria policy.
In a similar way, the effect of gendered social norms—including beliefs and practices 
shaping gendered institutions—form a pre-condition for individual and household level 
bargaining and a source of extra-household bargaining power for the advantaged partner 
(Hindin, 2000:1526; Kuhn and Chisel, 2001:12-3; Malhotra, Schuler, and Bonder, 2002; 
Mason, 2005). Agarwal (1997) studied extra-household power arguing gendered social norms 
are a pre-condition for individual household decision-making power. Here, gendered 
institutions can be framed as a “windfall gain bargaining power” because beyond the control 
of partners and household members (Hando, 2009:73). Accepting male authority when they 
have formally equal rights, (Blumberg, 1991; Nikiema, Haddad and Potvin, 2008), adapting
48 This chapter is mostly based on Mabsout and Van Staveren (2010). It benefited from the inputs of four 
anonymous referees, Bilisuma Dito, Janine Huisman, and Jeroen Smits, the participants at the ASSA 2009 (San 
Francisco) session on Households and Gender Equality, the Nijmegen Center for Economics seminars, and the 
International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague seminar.
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preferences to what is deemed proper for women (Sen, 1990), or limiting their roles in the 
household to what can and what cannot be bargained over (Cuesta, 2006). These are just a 
few examples (see Cheston and Kuhn, 2001:13).
Whether gendered institutions are formal—such as property rights or divorce laws— 
or informal—such as the gender division of labor or harmful traditional practices—in both 
cases, institutions provide asymmetric bargaining power for partners. By affecting exit 
options (Heath and Ciscel, 1996) and bargaining agency, gendered institutions thus may 
either neutralize or support the bargaining power women derive from individual resources.
But how do gendered institutions overrule capability inputs such as income and 
education (Malhotra and Mather, 1997)? In gender studies, the overwhelming influence of 
gender norms, beliefs, and practices is explained with the concept of “doing gender” (West 
and Zimmerman, 1987; see also Ferree, 1990:868-9,878). Doing gender refers to the often 
subtle social activities by men and women in their everyday lives that express their 
masculinity or femininity, and thereby re-assert their membership of their respective sex­
categories: male or female. Doing gender thereby is “a means of legitimating one of the most 
fundamental divisions of society” (ibid.:126). West and Zimmerman then argue that “ ...the 
institutional arrangements of a society can be seen as responsive to the differences ... [so 
that] doing gender ... is a powerful reinforcer and legitimator of hierarchical arrangements” 
(ibid.: 146). Accordingly, gendered institutions and individual behavior seem to mutually 
reinforce each other. Which help explains why women who have high earnings, or who are 
well educated, can nevertheless accept male authority over household decisions, do all 
housework on top of a paid job, or accept domestic violence. In all such cases, they are doing 
gender by balancing their deviation from social norms such as the male breadwinner or the 
male household head, by submissive behavior vis-à-vis their male partner, who in his doing 
gender seeks to compensate his perceived loss of masculinity precisely by exercising power 
over his partner in other spheres of life. Through this compensation, the bargaining power 
that women generally derive from individual resources is neutralized. A recent example of 
this is provided by a study by Grunow, Florian Schulz, and Hans Blossfeld (2007) who found 
in a longitudinal study that German married couples’ distribution of unpaid work is not 
affected by women’s control over resources but can be explained largely by reference to 
social norms about who should do housework (see again Ferree, 1990:876-7). Even in cases 
where wives earned more than their husbands, unpaid work remained largely the wife’s 
responsibility. Women living in a context of unequal gendered institutions, including the one 
that currently prevails in Ethiopia, may also be unable “to at least imagine the possibility of
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having chosen differently” (Kabeer, 1999:441). Chapter 7 offers further evidence on the 
hypothesis of “doing gender.”
The starting point for integrating the role of gendered institutions in the model to be 
estimated here is the recognition that marriage is an incomplete contract and household 
bargaining is of the non-cooperative bargaining sort. The model allows for asymmetric exit 
options, non-pooled individual resources, individual endogenous, and social preferences, 
heterogeneous agency (for example through differences in risk-aversion or modes of 
interaction), and barriers to what can be subject to bargaining.
To bring some order in this complex social process, three levels of power 
determinants and indicators are distinguished: the individual level, the household level, and 
the institutional level. Each can be measured with objective or subjective variables (see Table
5.1). Subjective indicators are distinguished from objective variables because they involve 
feelings and preferences (see Chapters 3 and 4).
Table 5.1. Examples of bargaining power determinants.
Individual Household Institutional
Objective A ge, education, earnings, disability
Age difference, educational 
difference, shared assets, relative G ender unequal laws and regulations
earnings
Subjective (feelings) Self-esteem , courage Difference in attitude towards violence against wom en
G ender asymmetric social norms, 
cultural beliefs, traditional practices
According to Table 5.1, at the individual level, some variables are bargaining power 
conversion factors while others are capability inputs. At the individual level, the variables 
include variables persons may have some control over (eg., earnings, education, bargaining 
skills), psychological traits (eg., self-esteem, courage), or physiological characteristics (eg., 
age, disability). At the next higher level, namely, the household level, indicators no longer 
identify individuals and maybe less under their control; they include joint assets, age and 
educational difference between partners, as well as marriage characteristics such as polygamy 
and who is the head of the household. The third level is beyond the control of partners and 
involves institutional bargaining power including the gendered institutions which provide an 
asymmetrical power to one partner against the other.
The three levels of bargaining power determinants and indicators are not isolated from 
each other but closely interrelated (Aslop, Bertelsen, and Holland, 2006; Hindin, 2000; 
Narayan, 2005). Institutions affect individual level bargaining power, for example, by 
limiting women’s access to resources, and household level bargaining power by raising age 
differences at first marriage. At the same time, “doing gender” implies that the institutions
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may be reinforced by women’s and men’s individual and household level bargaining 
behavior. Moreover, as both Basu (2006) and Kabeer (2001) argue, bargaining power 
determinants affect each other in a two-way relationship, so that bargaining power is a 
complex of endogenous processes going well beyond individual bargaining power.
Both direct and indirect effects are estimated in the model—they are, respectively, the 
thick and thin arrows in Figure 5.1. X  is the vector of covariates (i.e., independent variables), 
r  their respective coefficients, and r  the decision-making index to be explained by the 
conversion factor and capability inputs. In subsequent chapters, the impact of bargaining 
power conversion factors and capability inputs on functioning indicators is tested. In all 
chapters, variables are modeled at one or more of the three levels as indicated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. Relationships between determinants of empowerment and empowerment indicators.
In the next section the dataset and the choice of variables are further explained and 
justified.
II. Data and descriptive statistics.
The DHS variables and indicators
The 2005 Ethiopia Demographic Health Survey (DHS) is a rich data set to explore 
relationships between bargaining power conversion factors and capability inputs, including 
the decision-making index. The Ethiopia 2005 DHS samples a total of 14500 households and 
is representative of the Ethiopian adult women population. For a subset of households, the
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husband is also interviewed, so that the weighted couples sample size is only 3236 
households.49 It should also be noted that is quite common in the micro-econometric literature 
to use sample sizes with more than 2000 cases if not more.50
Table 5.2 lists all descriptive statistics used in estimation. The dependent variable is 
women’s decision-making in the household and is as a proxy for bargaining power. For the 
2005 Ethiopia DHS all interviewed women answered questions on who decides over four 
domains: own health, daily household needs, large household purchases, and visits to family 
and relatives. Interviewed women answered (i) someone else takes the decision, (ii) the 
decision is shared, or (iii) the decision is taken by the respondent alone. A score of 1 is given 
when someone else takes the decision, 2 when it is shared and 3 when the decision is taken 
alone (see Table 6.6).
The operationalization of the capability approach in this and the subsequent chapter 
models empowerment in the household as a decision-making index. The use of more than one 
indicator enhances reliability when compared to a single indicator (Malhotra and Schuler, 
2005:75). The objective of the operationalization, accordingly, is also to test for the 
interrelatedness of the empowerment indicators given that they cover different spheres of 
decision-making in the household (Malhotra and Mather, 1997). For the index to be reliable, 
therefore, the combination of indicators must capture a single phenomenon (Malhotra, 
Schuler, and Bonder, 2002:14).
The dimension of interest to us here is then an aggregate decision-making power 
index for the household. Although more formal tests will be conducted, already similar 
distributional patterns for the own health and family visits indicators emerges: Most 
Ethiopian women share these decisions with their partners. The distribution of answers for 
decisions on large household purchases slightly differs as the distribution is approximately 
evenly split between sharing and husband alone. However, decisions over daily needs follow 
a distinct pattern: Most women take these decisions alone (50%). The distinctiveness of the 
pattern may be reflecting the gendered division of labor which currently prevails in Ethiopia 
where women are largely responsible for insuring daily household needs (cooking, cleaning 
etc.) are met (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1994; Legovini, 2006:142; Pankhurst, 1992). Since, 
because decision-making over daily needs appears to be capturing a different phenomenon, it 
is excluded from the decision-making index.
49 The dataset and all information concerning it can be accessed from the DHS website www.measuredhs.com.
50 See for example Molini et. al. (2010).
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The following variables are selected to explain the decision-making power index. 
They are based on the capability, empowerment, and household bargaining literatures.51 The 
variables include wife age, age difference between partners, wife years of education, 
proportion of wife income compared to husband, an index for household wealth, control over 
earnings, and urban dwelling. The proportion of wife earnings relative to husband is used 
both as a proxy for wife individual earnings and to explain bargaining power within the 
household. Unlike the EHRS dataset where the absolute earnings (in Birr) for wives are used, 
for the DHS only the relative earnings are available. Furthermore, Chapter 7, which actually 
introduces the EHRS dataset, includes household assets and the subjective perception of 
relative household wealth by wife. These variables are used as household conversion factors 
to explain earnings and test whether women in wealthier households earn more (again, 
relative to their husband/partner in Chapters 5 and 6). Thus, household wealth explains 
individual earnings. The explanation for this is women, the literature suggests, spend most of 
their income on household goods such as food and other basic needs (Bevan and Pankhurst,
1996) and therefore it is unlikely they contribute much to asset purchase. In addition, the 
likelihood that actual earnings may explain household wealth is weakened by the possibility 
that the earning indicators (in Chapters 5 and 6) are relative earnings (not absolute). Finally, 
since the wealth index includes “almost all household assets” (Rutstein and Johnson, 2004:8), 
including those inherited, and assets in most developing countries are relatively stable over 
time, current earnings should not determine assets (Doss, 1996:10).
The other indicators are women’s attitude towards whether FGM (female genital 
mutilation) should be continued, husband’s attitude concerning the rights he believes 
husbands have over their wives, wife and husband’s attitudes towards wife beating 
justification (reported by both), and the difference between responses to beating justification 
included as a measure of polarization in attitudes. Questions concerning gender beliefs 
included “husband believes husband has right to get angry, refuse financial support, use force 
for unwanted sex, and have sex with other women”. Husband and wife also responded to 
questions on their attitudes to domestic violence including whether they believe “wife beating 
justified if she goes out without telling him, if she neglects the children, if she argues with 
him, if she refuses to have sex with him, and if she burns the food”. In what follows, both 
indicators for husband rights and wife beating justification are used to test the extent to which
51 See, among others, Alsop and Heinsohn (2005:19), Aizer (2007), Datta (2006), Doss (2003), Friedberg and 
Webb (2006), Hindin (2000), Jejeeboy (1995), Kambhampati (2009), Laderchi (2007), Malhotra and Mather 
(1997), Panda and Agarwal (2005), Girikipati (2008), Samman and Santos (2009), and Chapter 4.
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wives and husbands agree with dominant gender norms in their ethnic groups (Doss, 
2003:52-3). It is important to emphasize that these indicators are conceptually distinct from 
whether they actually experience domestic violence in their household. These attitude 
indicators are introduced as conversion factors and aggregated in indices. Still, to control for 
multi-colinearity, not all indicators could be used. Thus, variables such as in-laws in the 
household, difference in years of education between wife and husband, and husbands’
52attitudes for wife beating justification are therefore excluded.
Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics (categorical and continuous variables).
N M ean M edian Standard
deviation
Skewness Kurtosis M in M ax D escriptive
W ife age 3126 29.97 29 8.32 0.39 -0.72 15 49 Years
Pregnant / breastfeeding 3126 0.67 1 0.47 -0.71 -1.5 0 1 1=Yes, 0=no
W ife education 3126 1 0 2.48 3.14 10.61 0 18 Years o f schooling
Should fem ale genital mutilation 
(FGM ) continue?
2679 0.41 0 0.49 0.35 -1.88 0 1 1=Yes, 0=no
Age difference 3126 -7.39 -6 5.16 -0.99 1.88 -31 16
W ife(age) - 
H usband(age)
Polygamy 3126 0.06 0 0.24 3.6 11 0 1 1=Polygamous 
0=none; 1=less than
W ife earnings relative to husband 3126 0.12 0 0.45 4.51 22.27 0 3
husband; 2=as much as 
husband; 3=more than 
husband
Control over earning 3126 0.08 0 0.27 3.08 7.5 0 1
1= yes, 0 =no/no 
earnings
H ousehold w ealth 3126 2.94 3 1.36 0.06 -1.2 1 5
H ousehold assets and 
utility services
Urban 3126 0.08 0 0.27 3.06 7.34 0 1 1=urban, 0=rural
H usband rights to index (husband)a 2967 0.03 -0.56 1.02 1.95 3.29 -0.6 3.9 1=yes, 0=no
W ife beating justification index 
(husband)a
2969 0.03 -0.32 1 0.79 -0.82 -0.8 2.01 1=yes, 0=no
W ife beating justification index
(wife)a 3056 0.16 0.55 0.97 -0.65 -0.94 -1.6 1.13 1=yes, 0=no
Difference beating justificationa 2900 0.16 0.28 1.29 -0.42 -0.39 -3.6 1.96 wbj -  hbj
W ife final say health 3125 1.77 2 0.64 0.26 -0.7 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3=alone
W ife final say large household 
purchases 3125 1.65 2 0.65 0.5 -0.7 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3=alone
W ife final say household daily needs 3124 2.34 2.45 0.73 -0.64 -0.91 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3=alone
W ife final say visits family relatives 3125 1.88 2 0.51 -0.2 0.57 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3=alone
Notes:  W eighted sample size. aFactors calculated using linear principal com ponent analysis and the regression method in w hich the scores that are produced 
have a mean o f  0 and a standard deviation o f  1.
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Multilevel correlations
Only this chapter uses multilevel correlations to attempt and explain a decision-making 
index. The other chapters focus instead more on explaining achieved functionings and their 
relationships with empowerment indicators using structural equations models.
52 Multi-colinearity has serious consequences in structural equations modeling. Given the high correlation 
between total children born and wife age (0.76) only the latter was included. Education and education difference 
are also correlated albeit to a lesser extent (0.5). The DHS Ethiopia (2006:xxvii) report in fact suggests 
difference in years of education widens at higher level of education. Low correlations furthermore do not imply 
independence. Husband wife beating justification was excluded because it led to convergence problems related 
to interdependence with the husband rights index.
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The estimation of intraclass correlations (ICCs) is the first step in multilevel modeling (Heck 
and Thomas, 2008:81). ICCs gauge the level of homogeneity in groups and provide an 
empirical criterion for indicators that should be modeled at the higher level. The ICC of an 
indicator is its proportion of higher level variance to total variance. In other words, the ICC is 
the expected correlation between two randomly selected individuals from a group (Hox, 
2002:16). The more similar individuals in ethnic groups are, the larger the ICC. The 
multilevel literature has set thresholds for intraclass correlations and design effects (DE) 
above which variables ought to be modeled at the higher level. For inclusion at the higher 
level, the ICC should be above 5% (Heck and Thomas, 2008:21) while the threshold for DEs 
is above two (Muthen, 1999). The larger the ICCs the less additional information is gained 
with the increment of an individual within ethnic groups (all individuals are similar and an 
additional case adds no new variance). Groups, in other words, can be homogeneous in 
specific dimensions.
Unless one controls for group homogeneity using dummies and multilevel models, 
estimates will be biased (Heck, 2001:91). The two largest ethnic groups in the sample are the 
Amhara (32%) and the Oromo (36%). The Southern Nations and Nationalities and People’s 
Regions (SSNP) contain more than 45 small ethnic groups. SNNP individuals are aggregated 
as Southern Minority (4.3%). Groups with (weighted) size less than 50 households are 
deleted from the initial sample of 24 ethnic groups in the database. As expected (Stapelton, 
2006:356), demographic indicators have lower, while socio-economic indicators and attitudes 
higher, ICCs. All design effects are above two, except for age. With unbalanced group size 
such as these, larger clusters weigh more on the overall mean parameter estimates (Heck and 
Thomas, 2008:54-5). Furthermore, an overall large sample size will not compensate a small 
number of groups at the higher ethnic level (Cheung and Au, 2005). The model estimated has 
12 different ethnic groups with an average cluster size of 216. Estimation at the higher level 
with less than 20 is, however, not uncommon in the multilevel literature (Cheung and Au, 
2005:603-4). Still, the higher level estimates computed here are only suggestive given the 
small numbers of ethnicities. The estimated random intercept model below therefore offers 
only an indication of higher level effects which would require more and larger groups to be 
more accurately gauged. The results obtained for ICCs and DEs are further discussed below 
but Table 5.3 unveils different patterns of answers between ethnicities. The table suggests 
significant variation between ethnic groups on gender norms and women’s decision-making 
patterns. For example, women in the Somalie ethnic group have the lowest decision-making
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index. In contrast, Gamo women express the strongest opposition to husband wife beating, 
whereas Gurarie men have on average the least support for husbands’ rights over wives.
Table 5.3. Cross tabulations of ethnic means.
Ethnicity
Difference in wife 
beating 
justification
Factor husband: 
Husband rights
Wife final say 
health
Wife final say 
large household 
purchases
Wife final say 
household daily 
needs
Wife final say 
visits family 
relatives
Amhara 0.31 0.02 1.93 1.73 Max 2.33 1.94
Southern minorities 0.20 -0.20 1.67 1.58 2.37 1.75
Gedeo 0.40 0.02 1.63 1.71 2.31 1.87
Gurarie 0.30 -0.33 Min 1.75 1.68 2.60 2.05 Max
Hadiya 0.43 -0.13 1.37 Min 1.72 2.55 1.70
Keffa -0.17 -0.20 2.04 Max 1.64 2.52 1.94
Oromo -0.03 0.19 Max 1.74 1.68 2.31 1.86
Sidama 0.07 -0.23 1.50 1.40 2.72 Max 1.92
Somalie 0.49 Max 0.10 1.60 1.37 Min 1.92 Min 1.47 Min
Tigraway 0.12 -0.10 1.61 1.59 2.13 1.92
Welaita 0.46 -0.06 1.69 1.37 Min 2.56 1.63
Gamo -0.29 Min -0.05 1.69 1.44 2.38 1.91
Total 0.16 0.03 1.77 1.65 2.34 1.88
Source : Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
III. Method.
The basic model
In disentangling the influence of the conversion factors and the capability inputs on women’s 
decision-making in the household, two statistical models are considered. The first, the 
aggregate model, is a logistic regression with ethnic groups as dummy variables. The second 
is a multilevel model in which groups are formed according to ethnic identity—a proxy for 
gendered institutions. Here, individuals are assumed randomly selected from their ethnicities 
to achieve a representative sample. Although both models integrate sample weights for 
unequal probability selection, only multilevel analysis allows for covariates to explain 
variance in intercepts across ethnic groups (see Figure 5.4). Such models open the possibility 
for distinguishing between ethnic groups in which women have lower from ethnic groups in 
which women have higher probabilities of taking shared and alone decisions.
Probability regressions, including logistic models, transform the categorical decision-
53making indicators into a continuous index which can be estimated linearly. More 
specifically, the categorical decision-making indicator y c can be modeled in three different
53 See also Derose and Ezeh (2009), Obermeyer (1993), Pitt et. al., (2003), and Ramohan and Johar (2009) for 
similar models.
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ways. The first two methods are not used here but explained in the footnotes.54 The third 
involves forming an index (or factor) using all decision-making domains. The index is 
constructed with factor analysis to estimate a measurement model. One advantage of factor 
analysis is purging out systemic error from single item indicators (Heck and Thomas, 
2008:101-2,110) which tend to lack reliability in the measurement of empowerment 
(Malhotra and Schuler, 2005:75).
In the model to be estimated, like most household decision-making models, women 
who take more decisions alone or jointly (with their partner) are assumed more empowered. 
It is also assumed that women who take decisions alone are more empowered than women 
who share decisions (Bali Sawin and Wallentin, 2008:10; CSA and ORC Macro, 2006:238; 
Haile, 2009; Malhotra and Mather, 1997; Mizan, 1993). Although an Indonesian study has 
shown a three categories ordered decision-making model had similar properties to the model 
in which joint and alone decision-making categories were merged (Rammohan and Johar, 
2009:40,48), a more empowered women may decide to share household decisions with her 
husband instead of taking them alone. In Chapter 6, for instance, women who share decisions 
in the household are found to be less anemic than women who decide alone. But it is also 
likely that shared decisions are disguised as joint but are in fact male decisions (Goetz and 
Sen Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 2001:67-8). A certainty remains, namely, that humans in general 
and women in particular can exercise their power subtly and indirectly in ways that cannot be 
captured by decision-making indices (Agarwal, 1997; Ghuman, Lee, and Smith, 2004; 
Malhotra and Mather, 1997:612). Not to mention that more decision-making may “empower” 
women to further oppress other women—as experienced by South Asian women who know 
that graduation from the subordinate position of daughter-in-law earns her the status of 
mother-in-law allowing her to dominate the son’s wife in the same way she was dominated. 
Additional decision-making in inequitable gender systems may then help recreate the beliefs 
and behaviors behind gender disempowerment (Malhotra, Schuler Boender, 2002:10-11).
54 First, in method 1, empowerment is low probability for someone else taking the decision. Hence, a latent
continuous variable generating the observable y c is assumed. The unobservable variable y ‘varies from more to
less empowerment with thresholds T = (m = 1,...,j )  (Long, 1997:116). The outcome variable is here ordered
ordinal. Second, in method 2, no underlying continuity of y  from less to more empowerment is assumed
because it is not possible to rule out a priori the possibility a woman who shares decisions with her husband is 
more empowered than a woman who takes decisions alone. For instance a shared decision can be taken in a 
spirit of cooperation whereas a decision taken alone may reflect conflict and separate spheres. The outcome 
variable for method 2 is accordingly nominal (Heck and Thomas, 2008:208,213). Hence, every response would 
be modeled as a dichotomous variable. The third method is explained and used in the body of the chapter. 
Further technical details are given in Muthen and Muthen (2008b) and Muthen (2004:2-5).
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Statistical analysis therefore may not capture such subtleties and other hidden aspects 
of decision-making power, including bargaining skills. These considerations can be critical 
for women who must avoid direct confrontation with their partners (Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 
1999; Iversen, 2003). To capture these qualitative distinctions different methods are 
necessary. Thus, even though the decision-making index is no panacea, an exploratory 
attitude is adopted with the objective of further testing the correlates and consequences of a 
simple decision-making index. It follows that the decision-making index to be estimated 
offers a linear model which for the very least presumes women who take no decisions at all in 
the household are the least empowered of all.
Equation 5.1 is the aggregate individual level logistic decision-making empowerment 
regression. It uses a single (categorical) empowerment indicator to be explained by capability 
inputs and bargaining power conversion factors. In this equation, when a (continuous) 
covariate x rises by a unit, the logit (log odds) rises by (  units and the odds by exp ( units.
y*w = a  + ( x m  + + n Pm + s >jm (5.1)
Where y  * is the one-dimensional latent outcome decision-making index for individual i = 
(male, female), household j,  ethnic group k, and indicator l. a  is the intercept coefficient; (  
the slope coefficient, x the covariate for individual i = (male, female), household j, ethnic 
group k, and indicator l; r (with coefficients Y ) and the control over earnings (process) p  
(with coefficients Q); and s  is the residual error term with mean zero and constant (logistic) 
variance.
Equation 5.1, however, differs from the MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) 
introduced in Chapter 3. The MIMIC model uses multiple indicators instead to estimate the 
decision-making index (to be explained by covariates).55 Equation 5.2 includes three 
simultaneous logistic equations with six v (2 x k=2 x 3) intercepts and two unstandardized 
A coefficients.56 These measurement indicators, as noted earlier, cover decisions related to 
wife health, household large purchases, and family visits. e , in this equation, is the logistic 
random residual from the categorical regressions of the decision-making indicators on the 
decision-making index; Figure 5.3 reflects these assumptions.
55 See Kaplan (2000) for an introductory textbook on MIMIC.
56 Since each decision-making indicator has three categories two thresholds per indicator are computed (Kuklys, 
2005; Muthen, 2004). k  is the number of decision-making indicators.
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y ijkl ~  V 2xk +  ^ V j k l  + e ijkl (5.2)
Index scores t  are then regressed on the conversion factors x  with linear regression 
coefficients T , a  for the intercept, r for resources, and p  for control over earnings in 5.3. d 
here is the random residual from the multivariate regression of the decision-making index on 
the covariates. Following convention, an indicator coefficient in the diagram is fixed (=1) to 
one to identify the index.
Vljki = a  + Tx m + x¥rljk + Q pljk + d ljkl (5.3)
Note that a logistic regression is only needed to calculate the index scores and equation 5.3 is 
linear.
Figure 5.2. The MIMIC (multiple indicators multiple causes) model.
The multilevel equations are explained in the footnotes. The decision-making index 
is regressed on conversion factors and capability inputs. In the aggregate model no
57 Equations 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 describe a conversion factors only multilevel model with random intercepts.
yiju =ak +Pxiju+ i^ju (5.4)
ak =K + yX  + mk (5.5)
yju = x + rX  + flx'jk, +^k + s'jk, (5.6)
Equation 5.4 is the within group regression. Variance between groups in intercepts is used to estimate y  in 5.5 
where ethnic group intercepts are the dependent variable to be explained by group mean covariates. In 5.4, the 
intercepts are random ak. In equation 5.5, n is the fixed mean intercept; y is the fixed coefficient of the
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institutional level conversion factors are aggregated at the ethnic group level. Even though 
some household conversion factors are measured at the household level (wealth for instance), 
institutional conversion factors in this and subsequent aggregate models (Chapters 6 and 7 for
58instance) are measured at the individual level. Only in this chapter, therefore, multilevel 
modeling is employed for select institutional level conversion factors to explain variance 
decision-making intercepts across ethnic groups. Table 5.4 lists the different levels at which 
the conversion factors and capability inputs are included in the models.
Table 5.4. Conversion factor and capability inputs levels.
Individual level Household level Institutional level
Age Age difference Urban /rural
Education Relative household income Husband: husband has right to
Pregnant Difference in beating justification Husband: wife beating justified when
Earnings Household wealth Wife: wife beating justified when
Disability Control over earnings
Equations in this chapter are estimated with Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR). 
MLR corrects for non-normality and non-independence of observations by adjusting standard 
errors (Heck and Thomas, 2008:64). For additional goodness of fit measures, the MPLUS 
limited information Weighted Least Square (WLSMV) estimator is also used. Furthermore, 
since structural equations software do not test for endogeneity, STATA is used to test for the 
necessity of 2SLS (two stage least square) regressions and control for the simultaneity that 
might exist between wife relative earnings and the decision-making index.
IV. Estimation results.
The decision-making index
The dependent variable to be explained is an index covering three areas of women decision­
making in the household. The estimation of the decision-making index uses confirmatory 
categorical factor analysis (CCFA). For exploratory reasons, the index will first be estimated 
on a standalone basis. The explanatory covariates will be added subsequently. The 
coefficients of the decision-making index have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant (p<5%).59 The standardized coefficients for health, large household purchases, and
predictors x  ; and is a  the higher level random residual component also with mean zero, constant variance and 
independence from e' , the individual level error term. Equation 5.6 is obtained by substituting 5.5 in 5.4.
58 Partly because the aggregation of indicators in some models resulted in convergence problems.
59 There are other structural equation diagnostics to be discussed below. They include a chi-square model p-
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visits to family relatives are 0.67, 0.56, and 0.65 respectively (results not shown). The 
standardized coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for a standard deviation increase in the 
decision-making index, the latent variable for wife decisions on large purchases alone or with 
partner increases by 0.56 standard deviations. Furthermore, if we look at the unstandardized 
coefficients, a unit rise in the decision-making index results in a 0.75 rise in logit units for the 
wife final say on large household purchases. In terms of the odds ratio, a unit increase in the
0 75decision-making index raises the odds of the decision being taken alone by 21 (exp ).
Since the intraclass correlations and design effects reflect substantial variance 
between ethnic groups, the next step is to test a multilevel CCFA with random intercepts 
(Hox, 2002). Accordingly, a random intercept decision-making index with equalized 
coefficients is estimated.60 The equalization of coefficients across levels also accounts for 
higher level institutional level variance. In the equalized coefficients random intercepts 
measurement model, lower and higher level indicators have the same sign, magnitudes and 
significance levels. Compared to the aggregate decision-making model, the fit statistics of the 
multilevel models suggest a marked improvement, including an overall chi-square p-value of 
85%. A non-significant p-value means the difference between the model predicted values and 
the actual data is indistinguishable from zero at the 1% level. The remaining diagnostics pass 
all thresholds of model acceptance. These results entail isomorphism between levels. For Van 
de Vijver, Hermert, and Poortinga (2008:9) isomorphic relationships indicate a monotonic 
function capable of describing both levels. One method to confirm or disconfirm these 
relationships is hypothesis testing using multilevel confirmatory factor analysis. Hence, even 
though the lower and upper levels have different patterns of significance when freely 
estimated, equalizing the coefficients between levels has not led to a significant loss of 
information in terms of model fit.61 When isomorphism obtains, indicators modeled at both 
levels can be equivalently interpreted (i.e., they have the same meaning). Otherwise, they 
have different meanings at the group level and the individual level.
value > 5%. Other guidelines for overall model fit include a comparative fit index CFI>0.95, the root mean 
square error of approximation RMSEA<0.06 and the weighted root mean square residual WRMR<0.9; see 
Muthen (2004:21-4) and Kaplan (2000).
60 Although positive, some higher level coefficients when freely estimated were not statistically significant. The 
results, however, are unchanged for the individual/household level.
61 The difference in model fit was tested using the scaled loglikelihood chi-square difference test (Muthen and 
Muthen, 2008).
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The aggregate model with explanatory covariates
In the aggregate model of Table 5.6 the conversion factors and capability inputs are added to 
explain the above decision-making index. The model does not distinguish between ethnic 
group and within group variance in decision-making and the covariates. The ethnic base 
category for dummies is the Oromo. The dummy group base category was selected using 
group size and scores for attitude variables (relative to others groups). Figure 5.3 shows that 
compared to other groups, Oromo couples answer relatively close to zero (the mean) and 
their answers on both attitude questions are quite similar.
Figure 5.3. Mean scores on husband rights reported by men (FHR) and wife beating justification 
reported by women (FWBJ).
0.80
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
0.00 
- 0.20 
-0.40
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
For robustness, a model with categorical confirmatory factor analysis for wife beating 
justification and husband rights instead of linear principal component analysis is also 
estimated using Weighted Least Square instead of Maximum Likelihood.62 Although the 
results using principal component analysis are less efficient than the model in which all latent 
variables are computed from categorical indicators, they provided similar outcomes.63 The 
index for difference in wife beating justification was constructed with four possible cases in 
mind (see Table 5.5). When wife considers “wife beating is unjustified” whereas her husband 
considers “wife beating justified”, case four obtains and the score is negative [(-w_bj) -
62 ML in this instance would be too computationally intensive.
63 The full factor model was estimated with the MPLUS WLSVM estimator. The principal component analysis 
approach is less efficient because estimated in two stages.
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(+h_bj)]. A positive coefficient, therefore, combined with a negative score on the variable, 
entails wife’s decision-making power is reduced compared to wives who agree with their 
husbands’ attitude to wife beating.
The aggregate model r-square is 0.26 (Table 5.6). The age and education variables 
have been transformed to reduce variance.64 The individual level conversion factors age has a 
standardized coefficient of 0.06 and is statistically significant. A similar relationship is 
confirmed by the CSA and ORC Macro (2006:239) report on Ethiopia which also analyzed 
the data. A report analyzing Nigerian data concluded “age undoubtedly confers influence 
over decision-making ... [as] a respondent ages, she moves up the household hierarchy” 
(ICRW, 1997:8). Gupta (1997) also studied the relationship between women’s status and age 
across the world and argued it is actually context dependent—in some societies, younger 
women have higher, while in others lower, status and decision-making power. However, in 
Ethiopia, it appears older women might take more decisions in the household. The pattern has 
been observed in other locations, including Northern India, Pakistan, and China (Gupta,
1997), Zimbabwe (Hindis, 2000:1522), and Sri Lanka (Malhotra and Mather, 1997:609).
At the household level, the coefficient for age difference (0.07), difference in beating 
justification index (0.11), and polygamy (-0.1) are statistically significant and with the 
expected signs.65 Accordingly, the decision-making index rises by 0.11 standard deviations 
when women are a standard deviation more likely than their husbands to support wife 
beating. In others words, standing up against one’s husbands’ support for a gender unequal 
norm such as wife beating does not raise (but lowers) women’s decision-making index. 
Women’s awareness of their rights and self-esteem in relation to wife beating apparently 
further curtails their position in the household. It is likely that this variable reduces the 
decision-making index of women because a more assertive strategy in bargaining style may 
not appreciated by the husbands.
Table 5.5. Difference in beating justification index.
Wife score Husband score Difference (wbj - hbj)
Case 1 (+)wbj (+)hbj Ambiguous: w ife and husband state beating justified
Case 2 (-)wbj (-)hbj Ambiguous: w ife and husband state beating not justified
Case 3 (+)wbj (-)hbj Positive: w ife states beating justified, husband states beating not justified
Case 4 (-)wbj (+)hbj Negative: wife states beating not justified and husband states beating justified
64 High variance can lead to convergence problems (Muthen and Muthen, 2008b:382). To reduce the variance of 
education, the square root is taken because of the 0 values and since very few have more than a few years of 
education. For age, the variable is simply divided by ten.
65 See for example Jejeebhoy (1991). Hindi (2000) also found that wealth weakely explains decision-making in 
the household in Zimbabwe.
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At the institutional level, living in an urban area and being Christian shifts women’s 
decision-making index upward by 0.61 and 0.25 units respectively (unstandardized 
coefficients). The positive sign for urban may in part be explained by Hando’s (2009:148) 
assertion that social norms in remote areas of Ethiopia overpower formal laws. The positive 
relationship is also reported in the CSA and ORC Macro (2006:239) report. At the 
institutional level, furthermore, women’s attitude toward the continuation of FGM was not 
statistically significant. Accordingly, whether women support or reject this gender norm is of 
no relevance for decision-making power in the household. A complex issue such as this 
deserves more attention than can be given in this chapter even though the multilevel model 
below will reveal an unsuspected property of this variable. Nevertheless, women who 
respond predominantly that wife beating is justified are 0.22 standard deviations lower on the 
decision-making index. In other words, women who challenge the gendered institution of 
wife beating take more decisions. Still, when their husbands supports wife beating, the 
positive effect of women’s rejection of the social norm is limited by the negative effect of the 
challenge to her husband’s support for the group norm (by 0.11 standard deviations as 
discussed above). Husbands’ attitudes on husbands’ rights over wife are also negatively 
related to decision-making. Thus, in households where husbands claim husbands have more 
rights, women tend to take fewer decisions in Ethiopia. Most ethnic dummy coefficients are 
statistically significant. The positive ones (compared to the Oromo) are Amhara and Keffa. 
Heterogeneity among ethnic groups implies, as expected, women in some ethnic groups take 
more decisions than others. For Somalie women, for instance, their decision-making index is 
1.5 units lower than that of Oromo women. The gap widens to more than two units when 
Somalie women are compared to Amhara women.
The only statistically significant capability input is wife earnings relative to husband 
(0.13). The CSA and ORC Macro (2006:239) report found a similar relationship suggesting 
“employed women, especially those employed for cash, are much more likely to have a say in 
all specified decisions than women who are not employed”. Similar positive relationships 
between women’s earnings and their decision-making have been reported elsewhere, 
including in Mexico among the Chiapas (Beutelspacher, Martelo, and García, 2003:230-1) 
and in Zimbabwe (Hindis, 2000:1522). Education, however, was not statistically significant. 
Such a finding might appear unexpected in light of recent survey listing studies which 
establish a positive correlation between education and empowerment indicators (Samman and 
Santos, 20). But according to the CSA and ORC Macro (2006:239) Ethiopia report, an 
increase in decision-making only obtains beyond secondary schooling. Given that most
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educated women have at most primary education, the relationship with the decision-making 
index is expectedly not statistically significant. Bali Swain and Wallentin (2008:21-22) found 
a similar pattern of signs and statistical significance for both relative earnings and education 
in Indian households. Furthermore, in Nigeria, the ICRW (1997:22) report found a symmetric 
pattern of signs: a negative correlation between decision-making and secondary school 
attendance but a positive one between contribution to household expenditure and decision­
making.
Still, if “it is difficult to disentangle the cause and effect relationships between 
women’s decision making power and women’s income” (Doss, 1996:2), the endogeneity of 
wife (relative to husband) earnings may bias results. The standard econometric endogeneity 
test—the Wu-Hausman test—is not included in most structural equations programs. 
Furthermore, as Foster and McLanahan (1996:258) argue, combining logistic with 
instrumental variable estimation is problematic “when the second stage” involves non-linear 
function. Since structural equation software combine multilevel analysis with confirmatory 
categorical factor analysis, a choice was made to focus on SEM with the MPLUS software 
and undertake additional diagnostics with the econometric package STATA.
A good instrument correlates with the “endogenous” variable and relates to the 
dependent variable only through the mediator. A good instrument is also uncorrelated with 
the residuals of the primary regression. However, the detection of simultaneity through the 
Wu-Hausman test depends on the choice (and availability) of good instruments (Morgan and 
Winship, 2007). Unless such instruments are found, endogeneity cannot be established 
unambiguously.
Still, Baltagi (1998:272-3) recommends using all exogenous indicators in the system 
of equation and insuring the number of exogenous variable is superior to the endogenous 
variables to identify the system. Accordingly, at least one new exogenous variable not 
included in the original regression is needed. The exogenous instrumental variable employed 
was obtained from Kambhamapti (2009:91) who uses regional mean earnings to instrument 
wife earnings (when empowerment is the dependent variable). However, unlike 
Kambhamapti (2009), in this model, relative earnings instead of absolute earnings are used.66 
Still, to predict adjusted earnings all the covariates and instruments are included (Foster and 
McLanahan, 1996).
66 Furthermore, although Kambhamapti (2009:91) employs wife age and education as instruments this is not 
possible here because they have a direct effect independent of relative earnings on decision-making power 
(Morgan and Winship, 2007).
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To test for endogeneity, the residuals from the earnings regression on the instruments 
and all the covariates have to be predicted. Since these residuals turned out to be significant 
in the auxiliary decision-making regression, instrumenting may be necessary. In the two- 
stage-least square (2SLS) regression, a probit regression is now used and earnings remain 
positive but no longer statistically significant (see Appendix Table A1).67 The other 
exogenous indicators which were also used to predict the instrumented earnings, including 
urban, are no longer statistically significant. A capability input, however, gains in statistical 
significance, namely, control over earnings (0.05 standardized coefficient). Exploring this 
further through cross tabulation reveals a close to perfect association between earnings share 
and control over earnings. In this DHS dataset, therefore, women who earn relatively more 
than husband / partner had also more control over their earnings. The relationship is expected 
because the decision-making indicator for earnings merged the categories shared and alone. 
Accordingly, only women with no influence at all over earnings are without control. Still, 
among those who earn less than their partner, 5% had no control over earnings (12/190). In 
summary, for this aggregate model it may already be observed that control over earnings and 
earnings shares are, if not close substitutes, then highly correlated and mutually 
interdependent (see Malhotra and Mather, 1997:615). In summary, the relationship between 
earnings and decision-making appears robust to the use of instrumental variable.
67 In 2SLS, standard errors are inflated rendering the results unreliable unless bootstraps samples are used 
(Foster and McLanahan, 1996:250). The correction of the standard errors with bootstraps however cannot be 
done with sample weights and the Maximum Likelihood estimator (Muthén and Muthén, 2007). For this reason, 
weighted least square (WLSMV) was used to adjust standard errors. Note that WLSMV imposes probit 
coefficients. The results turn out close to but not identical with the ML unadjusted standard errors.
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Table 5.6. Aggregate decision-making MIMIC.
Decision-making index 
Ordered logit
Wife final say health
Wife final say large household purchases
Wife final say visits family relatives
Standardized coefficients 
0.66 
0.60 
0.66
Coefficients
1
G.84
G.99
Significance levelb
a
***
***
Decision-making index
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age G.G6 G.12 *
Pregnant / breastfeeding -G.G3 -G.11
Household level
Age difference G.G7 G.23 **
Poorer -G.G1 -G.G3
Middle G.G6 G.23
Richer G.G7 G.28
Richest G.G3 G.12
Difference in wife beating justification index G.11 G.14 **
Polygamy -G.1 -G.64 ***
Institutional level
Should FGM be continued? -G.G1 -G.G2
Urban G.11 G.61 ***
Christian G.G7 G.25 *
Index husband rights (husband) -G.G6 -G.1G *
Index wife beating justification (wife) -G.22 -G.37 ***
Amhara G.G8 G.29 *
Southern minorities -G.G2 -G.19
Gedeo -G.G4 -G.57
Gurarie -G.G2 -G.18
Hadiya -G.12 -1.22 ***
Keffa G.G5 G.7 *
Sidama -G.11 -G.72 ***
Somalie -G.18 -1.51 ***
Tigraway -G.1G -G.72 ***
Welaita -G.11 -1.G3 ***
Gamo -G.G7 -G.81 **
Capability inputs
Education G.G4 G.G6
Wife relative earning G.13 G.44 **
Control over earnings 
R-square
-G.G6 -G.33
G.26
Notes: aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  = 2059. The ethnic base category is Oromo.
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
The multilevel model
The above aggregate model mostly ignores group level institutional effects on decision­
making. More specifically, it just accounts for the ethnic dummy effects and individual 
answers to gender norms questions. But some institutional conversion factors may operate at 
the group and institutional level only. Multilevel estimation is therefore used to shed some 
light on this issue.
The estimated multilevel model is a random intercept system of equations with 
explanatory higher level covariates. The results are in Table 5.7 and diagrammatically
1G1
represented in Figure 5.4. It is comparable to the multilevel measurement decision-making 
index estimated earlier but with explanatory variables. Given the small number of ethnic 
groups included, each of the four institutional levels conversion factors is added one at a time 
(ethnic mean for FGM should be continued; husband: husband rights index and wife: wife 
beating justification index). The specification with the highest r-square at the institutional 
level is reported. The covariate which explained the largest proportion of ethnic intercept 
variance in decision-making is “whether FGM should continue” (r-square=0.58). The 
unstandardized (-3.37) and standardized coefficients (-0.76) are highly statistically 
significant. Women therefore in ethnic groups where most say FGM should be continued 
have lower decision-making intercepts. The multilevel model then indicates gendered 
institutions, through ethnic groups, have a significant impact on women’s decision-making 
the household. The results obtained in Table 5.7 suggest then in ethnic groups where women 
strongly oppose to the continuation of FGM, women’s decision-making index is higher 
compared to other ethnic groups. In the other specifications, the ethnic mean for wife 
attitudes concerning wife beating justification was also statistically significant but negative 
(standardized coefficient -0.74; results not shown) implying women in groups where women 
think beating is justified a lower decision-making power index obtains. Ethnic mean for 
husband rights also has a negative sign (standardized coefficient -0.20; results not shown) 
statistically significant result. Thus, women in groups where husbands think wives have 
fewer rights achieve lower decision-making scores on the index.
Figure 5.4. Random intercepts model.
Intercept variance in decision-making index
Covariates Institutional covariates
In the multilevel model, furthermore, the individual and household levels include the 
same indicators as before. Individual and household level conversion factors and capability
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inputs now explain within ethnic group variance only. The age (0.08) conversion factor is still 
positive and statistically significant. At the household level, age difference (0.07), the richest 
group (0.11), and polygamy (-0.12) are statistically significant predictor of within ethnicity 
decision-making variance. Thus, compared to women in the poorest households, women in 
the richest households take more decisions within ethnic groups—a relationship confirmed by 
CSA and ORC Macro (2006:239) report as well. As before, women engaged to men in 
polygamous relationships take fewer decisions. Difference in wife beating justification is, 
however, no longer statistically significant suggesting this conversion factor may require 
aggregation at the ethnic level. Finally, education (0.12), which was not statistically 
significant in the aggregate model, is now positive and statistically significant. Thus, after 
eliminating ethnic norms variance from the decision-making indicator, any level of education 
might enhance women’s decision-making in the household. Ethnic norms might then be pre­
conditions for education to raise women’s decision-making in the household.
Table 5.7. Random intercepts MIMIC._________________________________________________
Multilevel decision-making index 
Ordered logit
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Wife final say health 0.62 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.57 0.86 ***
Wife final say visits family relatives 0.64 1.05 ***
Decision-making index (Individual\Household level)
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age 0.08 0.15 **
Pregnant / breastfeeding -0.01 -0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.07 0.2 ***
Poorer -0.02 -0.08
Middle 0.03 0.09
Richer 0.07 0.26
Richest 0.11 0.41 ***
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.02 0.02
Polygamy -0.12 -0.69 ***
Capability inputs
Education 0.12 0.18 ***
Wife relative earning 0.13 0.38 **
Control over earnings -0.02 -0.10
R-square 0.09
Decision-making index (Institutional)
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Ethnic mean “should FGM be continued?” -0.76 -3.37 ***
R-square 0.58
N o tes : aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  =2428. Sample size is larger because some institutional level variables excluded.
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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As Malhotra and Mather argue (1997:608), the relevance of schooling (and paid 
work) in determining domestic power depends on the social context under specification. In 
Ethiopia, however, the link between earnings and decision-making appears to be more robust 
than in Sri Lanka where Malhotra and Mather did their research. Thus, in Ethiopia, relative 
earning are robust to this disaggregation and remain positive and statistically significant 
(0.13). Even after substituting earnings with the instrumented earnings indicator the variable 
remained positive and statistically significant (0.2; see Appendix Table A2). Furthermore, 
with earnings instrumented, control over earnings is also now positive and statistically 
significant (0.07; see Appendix Table A2). Thus, the positive statistical significance of 
capability inputs in the multilevel model supports the hypothesis that their impact on 
decision-making is in part conditional on institutional factors such as ethnic gendered norms.
Testing ethnic random slopes: the interactions model
Since the number of ethnic groups with more than 50 cases is small, a model with random 
intercepts and random slopes could not be estimated.68 The later would have also allowed 
variability both in intercept and slopes between ethnic groups. There is still one technique 
which can be used to test the presence of significant ethnic random slopes: a MIMIC with 
interaction terms also known as the moderator model (Baron and Kenny, 1986). To achieve 
this, a new index is computed using three gendered institutional conversion factors: husband 
rights over wife (reported by husband), wife beating justification (reported by wife) and if 
FGM should be continued (reported by wife). Ethnic groups scoring above the mean have 
worse institutions for women and are coded one. Groups scoring below the sample mean 
have better institution for women and are coded zero. The new dummy is interacted in an 
expanded aggregate model with five indicators—age, education, difference in wife beating 
justification between husband and wife, wife earnings, and control over earnings. The 
interaction model entails the following relationships:
variablej
dummy >. dependent variable
68 Preliminary analysis has shown that there is insufficient variance for a random intercepts-random slopes 
model. The overall small number of ethnic groups in the sample is the most likely cause.
104
Table 5.8. Aggregate decision-making MIMIC with interactions.
Decision-making index 
Ordered logit
Wife final say health
Wife final say large household purchases
Wife final say visits family relatives
Standardized coefficients 
0.67 
0.60 
0.65
Coefficients
1
0.84
0.96
Significance levelb
a
***
***
Decision-making index 
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age 0.08 0.2
Interaction age -0.06 -0.06
Pregnant / breastfeeding -0.04 -0.12
Household level
Age difference 0.07 0.23 **
Poorer -0.01 -0.03
Middle 0.06 0.23
Richer 0.07 0.28
Richest 0.03 0.11
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.09 0.11
Interaction difference in wife beating justification index -0.05 -0.08
Polygamy -0.10 -0.64 **
Institutional level
Should FGM be continued? -0.01 -0.02
Urban 0.12 0.64 ***
Christian 0.08 0.27 *
Husband: husband rights index -0.04 -0.07
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.15 -0.25 *
Amhara 0.09 0.30 **
Southern minorities -0.02 -0.18
Gedeo -0.05 -0.62
Gurarie -0.02 -.162
Hadiya -0.13 -1.26 ***
Keffa 0.05 0.62 *
Sidama -0.11 -0.74 ***
Somalie -0.18 -1.51 ***
Tigraway -0.10 -0.74 ***
Welaita -0.11 -1.03 ***
Gamo -0.07 -0.80 **
Capability inputs
Education 0.04 0.06
Interaction education 0.01 0.01
Wife relative earning 0.25 0.88 **
Interaction wife relative earnings -0.16 -0.66
Control over earnings -0.11 -0.64
Interaction control over earnings 0.06 0.46
Ethnic dummy
Dummy for ethnicities with worse gender institutions 
R-square
0.14 0.46
0.26
Notes: aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  = 2059. The dummy base category is Oromo.
Source : Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
While there are some similarities and differences between Table 5.6 and Table 5.8, 
the most striking difference is that, except for earnings, the variables to which an interaction 
was added are no longer statistically significant. In this model, then, relative earnings remain 
positive and statistically significant. Table A3 in the appendix also supports the robustness of
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earnings since it remains statistically significant when instrumented. However, compared to 
the model with no interactions, age and difference in wife beating justification are no longer 
statistically significant. Furthermore, other variables, including the husband rights index, are 
also no longer statistically significant. One potential explanation as to why the latter lost its 
statistical significance is that the interaction dummy shares variance with the husband rights 
index and may have thus attenuated its effect. The same could be said for the difference in 
wife beating justification index. In summary there may just not be enough variance in this 
sample to predict random slopes.
Indirect effects
Indirect effects, also known as mediating effects, differ from interactions or moderating 
effects (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Indirect effects coefficients are obtained from the 
computation of two coefficients. The first coefficient is the regression of the mediator on the 
exogenous (independent) indicator. The second coefficient is the regression of dependent 
indicator on the mediator. Thus, the following relationship is estimated:
variablet ^  mediator ^  dependent indicator
Here, indirect effects involve the impact of institutional factors mediated by individual 
and household variable on the decision-making index. The conversion factors urban, husband 
rights reported by husband, wife beating justification reported by wife, Christian, 
“Circumcision [FGM] should continue”, and some ethnic dummies have statistically 
significant indirect effects. Husband rights (reported by husband) has two negative indirect 
effects mediated by polygamy and difference in the wife beating justification index. Thus, 
women whose husbands say wives have fewer rights and who are in polygamous 
relationships achieve lower scores on the decision-making index. However, women who 
respond beating is justified in households where men respond it is not, take less decisions 
than other women (Williams, 2005). Christian women in relationships where the age gap is 
small, who are engaged to a husband in a polygamous relationship, and whose difference in 
wife beating justification is positive, take more decisions. Furthermore, the results indicate 
urban women who earn (in relative terms) more take more decisions. In addition, urban 
women who have a positive score in the difference wife beating justification index also take 
more decisions. Finally, women responding yes to “circumcision should continue” and in a 
polygamous relationship take fewer decisions.
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Most dummies have a statistically significant effect mediated by polygamy, age 
difference, difference in wife beating justification, and earnings share. The signs for age 
difference entail women in relationships in which the age gap is small take fewer decisions 
among the Amhara and Tigray (compared to Oromo women). Haile (2009) reports that 
Amhara women marry younger than other Ethiopian women. The DHS sample for example 
indicates that 10% of Amahra women in relationship married aged 10 or younger (5% among 
Tigray). Another distinctive feature of Amhara women is that most share decisions in the 
household (see Table 5.9 for health decision-making). When the age gap is small a wife’s age 
approximates the husbands. It is possible therefore that among the Amhara, and possibly also 
among the Tigrayans, more empowered women share decisions. The hypothesis, however, 
can only be tested in Chapter 6 where the relationship between the decision-making index 
and functioning is tested.
Table 5.9 Ethnic decision-making patterns.
Health decision-making 
Someone else Shared Alone Total
Amhara 20% 67% 13% 998
SSNP 43% 48% 9% 135
Gedeo 40% 56% 4% 52
Gurarie 39% 47% 14% 94
Hadiya 70% 23% 7% 69
Keffa 27% 40% 33% 55
Oromo 37% 52% 11% 1127
Sidama 55% 40% 5% 164
Somalie 66% 8% 26% 102
Tigraway 45% 48% 6% 187
Welaita 47% 37% 16% 70
Gamo 43% 44% 13% 70
Total 1101 1654 368 3123
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Similarly, women among the Hadiya who earn relatively more (than their husbands) 
also take more decisions. Furthermore, women engaged to men in polygamous relationships 
among Gedeo, Keffa, and Sidamo take less decisions. The only mediating variable with both 
positive and negative indirect effects is wife beating justification difference between partners. 
Thus, Sidamo women have a negative sign while Amhara, Gurarie, and Somalie positive 
signs. In other words, women among the Sidamo who say beating is not justified and 
husbands the opposite take more decisions (relative to Oromo).
The moderating (interactions) and mediating (indirect effects) offer additional support 
to the hypothesis that variation in norms affect decision-making patterns in the household. 
Thus, for women in ethnic groups with unequal gender norms additional decision-making 
may not so much depend on their access to and control over resources but on the strength of
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the gendered institutions in the communities they live in. Furthermore, in ethnic groups 
where unequal gender norms are pervasive, the impact of capability indicators such as 
education is weakened. The effectiveness of enhancing access and control over resources 
seems to depend on the institutional context of women’s daily realities. Only when gendered 
institutions are not very unequal, such individual-oriented policies are likely to be the most 
effective. An important practical implication ensues, namely, that policies supporting 
women’s empowerment should not automatically prioritize women’s access to and control 
over resources but may also target individual and community gender awareness about the 
importance of norms and attitudes.
V. Conclusion.
The analysis above points towards the importance of distinguishing between different levels 
of conversion factors and capability inputs to explain women’s decision-making patterns in 
the household. The computed decision-making index is, in what follows, integrated to the 
next chapter’s model as an additional capability input to explain health functioning 
achievements.
Using information on ethnicity and gender norms, this chapter’s model attempts to 
identify which conversion factors and capability inputs correlate with an ordered household 
decision-making index. Multilevel analysis was also used to better gauge the effect of norms 
on the decision-making index. The small number of ethnic groups however constrains 
significantly the type of analysis that can be conducted.
The first aggregate model highlights the conversion factors and capability inputs that 
correlate with women’s decision-making index. Age, difference in age between wife and 
husband, polygamy, polarization in household gender attitudes, and wife earnings relative to 
husband at the individual and household level are statistically significant. Ethnic group 
dummies indicate most groups have a negative statistically significant impact on women’s 
decision-making index compared to the Oromo. The model also highlights at the institutional 
level whether women support or rejection for the norm of FGM has no significant impact on 
decision-making patterns. A result such as this needs to be interpreted keeping in mind that 
three quarters of the women in the sample have undergone FGM, which reflects the fact that 
the institution may be widely supported. However, when women reject the gendered
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institution of wife beating women’s decision-making index improves. Furthermore, women 
engaged to husbands who respond wives have more rights, take more decisions as well. 
Nevertheless, these effects are mitigated by the household polarization index since a woman 
who responds beating is not justified and stands up against husband’s attitude takes less 
decisions. In terms of the capability inputs, only relative earnings was positively correlated 
with decision-making. In estimating the aggregate model, the endogeneity of earnings with 
respect to the decision-making index is tested with instrumental variables. Although earnings 
instrumented was no longer statistically significant, control over earnings gained in statistical 
significance. It was observed furthermore that this is related to the fact that the two capability 
inputs are very highly correlated.
The next model, the random intercept multilevel system of equations, distinguishes 
between individual/household level determinants of decision-making and institutional levels 
determinants of decision-making. The multilevel model indicates that the institutional level 
covariates can explain most variation in women’s decision-making at the ethnic group level. 
For the gendered institution of FGM, for example, ethnic groups which do not widely support 
it achieve higher scores on the decision-making index. The multilevel model therefore 
supports the hypothesis that bargaining power is partly determined at the institutional rather 
than the individual or household level. In other words, household bargaining power is social 
and requires explicit attention to the specific institutional context individuals are imbedded 
in. Accordingly, unless complemented by institutional changes, the individual/household 
level may not be very effective in increasing women’s bargaining power. Education, for 
instance, was not statistically significant in the aggregate model but was now positively 
correlated with decision-making within ethnicity. The opposite effect is observed for the 
difference in wife beating justification index which in the multilevel model does not explain 
within ethnicity variance in decision-making.
The final model adds interaction terms to the aggregate model and integrates a new 
group level ethnic dummy to distinguish ethnic groups with very unequal gender norms from 
those with less unequal gender norms. However, given the small number of ethnic groups, 
more variation and a larger sample size are needed to reliably estimate such a model. Still, 
there is a more parsimonious way to explore the effects of ethnic norms on behaviors, 
namely, via indirect mediating effects which are discussed in the last section of the chapter. 
The evidence discussed then supports the literature which considers earnings and control over 
resources are not sufficient to empower women or to change gender beliefs, norms or 
attitudes. Policy recommendations should instead also directly target gender norms. Here, and
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as further elaborated upon in the concluding chapter, the right balance between respect for 
individual agency and autonomy, on the one hand, and well-being and justice, on the other is 
necessary.
The next chapter expands the single regression model tested earlier with simultaneous 
equations. Simultaneous equations offer a more comprehensive operationalization of the 
capability approach components.
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C H A P T E R  6
W o m e n ’ s  h e a l t h  f u n c t i o n i n g  a n d  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  E t h i o p i a n
h o u s e h o l d s 69
I. Introduction.
Chapter 5 explored, estimated, and attempted to explain a process capability input, namely, a 
household decision-making index. Chapter 6 integrates the decision-making index into a 
larger model to explain functioning achievements. The decision-making model is integrated 
as a mediating variable conditional on inputs (education, relative earnings, and control over 
earnings). The relationship between the capability inputs, the conversion factors, and 
functionings is tested with the same DHS sample. In contrast to Chapter 5, this chapter 
emphasizes the explanatory power of the decision-making index as a mediating variable. 
Simultaneous systems of equations are also introduced. In terms of indicator choices, the 
selection is similar but not identical to Chapter 5. In addition, pregnant and lactating women 
are deleted from the sample because their health indicators can vary for reasons unrelated to 
the available conversion factors and capability indicators (Sahn and Younger, 2009:21). 
Furthermore, regional dummies instead of ethnic dummies are used. Regional dummies are 
more adequate for this chapter because the ultimate variable to be explained is health 
functionings. The latter depends on, among other things, climate, access to services and, 
infrastructure which regional dummies are likely to capture more adequately than ethnic 
dummies (Frohlich, Corin, and Potvin, 2001).
69 This paper is based on Mabsout (forthcoming). Earlier versions were presented at the Income Distribution and 
the Family conference (Kiel), the NICE seminar (Nijmegen), the Happiness and Capability: Theory, 
Measurement and Policy workshop (Ravenstein), the Feminist Economics annual meeting (Torino), and the 
Institute of Social Studies seminar series (The Hague). This chapter also benefited from the inputs of Irene van 
Staveren, Ellen Webbink, Jeroen Smits, Karolina Safarzynska, Jan Peil, Anita van de Kooij, Silvia Pina Neves, 
the MPLUS and EQS support teams, and two anonymous referees.
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The motivation of this chapter is related to the early days of development health 
policy and family planning when assistance was administered on the assumption that 
availability of health facilities, contraceptive education, and information suffice to reduce 
mortality, fertility, and promote socio-economic development. At the same time, it was also 
becoming clear, more effective results could be obtained if women’s empowerment—a 
demand side factor—was included in the policy mix (Balk, 1994; Easterlin and Crimmins, 
1985; Germain, 1975; Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:21).
Since then, the theoretical and empirical literature on empowerment has expanded and
70advances on many fronts, including policy ones, have been made. There now appears to be 
a consensus that individual empowerment is necessary for improving health outcomes 
(Diener and Diener, 2005:136,138; Ruger, 2010; Santow, 1995). Thus, Bloom, Wypij, and 
Das Gupta (2001) suggest, socio-demographic characteristics are not sufficient determinants 
of health outcomes. They argue “direct measure reflecting women’s degree of control in their 
lives” (p.68) are necessary to explain health outcomes. Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 
(2002:9) also contend more access to resources does not guarantee greater control over them. 
In other words, resources are enabling but not empowering. In Ethiopia, Berhane, Gossaye, 
Emmelin, and Hogberg (2001) as well as Kabira, Gachukia, and Matiangi (1997), pointed out 
women’s health cannot improve unless women effectively participate in decision-making 
over resources and access to knowledge.
Household internal dynamics and bargaining power are therefore increasingly 
acknowledged as instrumental for individual health status. Sahn and Younger (2009), for 
instance, report more than half of body mass index (BMI) inequalities in developing countries 
are explained at the within (not between) household level. These results and arguments give 
some support to the hypothesis that health status may be to an important extent contingent on 
empowerment within the household.
Still, how important empowerment is compared to other factors such as poverty is 
open to scrutiny (Santow, 1995:147). In addition, there remains uncertainty on the 
interpretation of a simple linear relationship between empowerment indicators such as 
decision-making in the household and health outcomes. Thus, more empowered women can 
choose to cooperate and share decisions with their husbands instead of taking them alone. 
Such a move could also be strategic for women to achieve more favorable health outcomes.
70 See, among others, Agarwal (1997), Alkire (2002; 2005b), Alsop, Bertelsen and Holland (2006), Bali Swain 
and Wallentin (2008), Beutelspacher, Martelo and García (2003), Ibrahim and Alkire (2007), Naryan (2005), 
Powers and Faden (2006), Samman and Santos (2009), UNDP (1995).
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But there are only a few, too far in between, and limited in space and time coverage studies 
for anything firm to established on the relationship between decision-making patterns in the 
household and non-reproductive health indicators (Malhotra, Schuler & Boender, 2002; 
Samman and Santos, 2009:25). Thus, Furr and Das (2006) and Hindin (2000) are among the 
few studies testing the instrumental importance of empowerment for non-reproductive health 
indicators. Much more research is needed to determine whether women who take more 
decisions in the household are more empowered and, possibly, better off in terms of health 
outcomes.
In what follows, the relationship between capability inputs, including decision­
making power, with functioning achievement is tested to verify if more capability implies 
women have to challenge traditional gender norms sparking reduced male support and even 
punishment (see Chapters 4-5). As Mason (2005) points out, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between violence against women and earnings in countries where women enjoy 
few rights. In Ethiopia, highly unequal gender norms reflect spousal relationships where 
women are unable “to play an active role in decisions that affect their position” (Pankhurst, 
1992:1). Levine (1965:79) long ago observed how even though Amhara women enjoy 
property and inheritance rights, they are seen as gossipers and deceivers, are often beaten, 
even as they sacrifice their lives to please men. The World Health Organization (1999:25) 
refers to
practices that place specific constraints on women's ability to make decisions ... these 
institutions exist within a broader socio-cultural context in which women's decision 
making abilities in general remain constrained and subjugated to the political, socio­
economic, and cultural dominance of men.
Jejeebhoy (1995:7-8) concludes similar patterns of gender norms hold in most of 
Eastern Africa. In Ethiopia, furthermore, Legovini (2006:142) found that women’s awareness 
of their right is positively related to spousal beating. Thus, where gender norms are 
unfavorable and human development is low, the implications of decision-making patterns in 
the household can result in serious harm for women.
The dataset used is here also the 2005 Ethiopia DHS (Demographic Health Surveys). 
The DHS survey provides extensive information on household decision-making, resources, 
and health functionings. Starting with the ethically grounded concepts of the capability 
approach, this chapter explores the extent to which capability inputs and conversion factors
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explain objective health functioning indicators. The main objective is to understand to what 
extent women with more capability and bargaining power are better off in terms of health. 
Thus, the chapter is concerned with “an individual’s opportunities to achieve well-being 
within the realm of the household” (Iversen, 2003:103). The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the statistical model. In Section 3 data and measurement considerations are 
elaborated. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
II. A simultaneous equations model.
Since this chapter’s statistical method differs from the one introduced in Chapter 5, additional 
explanations are necessary. It should be noted that the method used here is more efficient 
than the one used in earlier works, testing similar relationships, including Hindin’s (2000), 
because the systems of equations are optimized and estimated simultaneously. As before, 
capability is measured from its inputs—resources and processes. Here, health functioning is a 
valuable well-being output to be explained (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:9; 
Robeyns, 2005; Strauss and Thomas, 1998:775). The complete model can be consulted in 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.1 and 4.2. In equation 6.1 the general model is expressed.
h  =  [ c c f  (n , ^  p ) ;  x ]  (6.1)
Where h is health functioning, c  capability, q decision-making index, r resources (education 
and earnings), p  control over earning spending, and x the conversion factors calibrating the 
capability set. The capability function has the subscript CF  to indicate it is endogenous and 
only the conversion factors are truly exogenous.
The four capability inputs education, earnings share, control over earnings, and 
decision-making are respectively ordered in the system of equations. The decision-making 
index is therefore not the only capability input. Finally, the four capability inputs and the 
conversion factors explain health functionings.
Since decision-making in the household is most likely fuzzy, a single indicator can 
measure it with error (see Chapter 5). MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) models 
can control for error in measurement. They have, accordingly, a measurement and a structural 
part. In the former, a set of indicators measured with error are aggregated to form an
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unobservable or latent variable. Here, the observable decision-making indicators are 
manifestations of the latent, error free, variable. Who actually decides in the household (has 
final say) is an outcome or realization of this latent variable. Statistically speaking, the latent 
variable is constructed from the correlations between the observed decision-making
71indicators. A probit measurement model is used in equation 6.2 to estimate the latent 
variable:
y* = v2 xk + A iVt + en (6.2)
Equation 6.2 encapsulates three (=k) probit equations simultaneously estimated with v (2 x 
k=2 x 3) thresholds and A (1=2) unstandardized coefficients. I identifies the indicator and i 
the women.
In equation 6.3, the decision-making index scores, rj, are subsequently regressed on 
the following “structural” explanatory variables: conversion factors x (with coefficients T ), 
resource capability inputs r (the pre-conditions which include education and earnings with 
coefficients ¥ ) ,  and the capability inputs control over earnings p  (the process with 
coefficients Q). The conversion factors explain why some individuals have larger, and others 
smaller, capability sets. In other words, they “parameterize” the capabilities of individuals. 
To illustrate, living in urban areas may expand women’s access to services, information, and 
mass media enhancing their capability sets (Abadian, 1996:1802). Resources include 
education and earnings. Although a probit model estimates the decision-making index in 
equation 6.2, equation 6.3 is linear.
r  = a  + Txa + + QPi + d  (6.3)
The output of the model—health functioning—is measured with the body mass index 
(BMI) and an anemia indicator. These basic health functioning indicators are adequate 
because no one wants to be in bad health and various other valuable functionings depend on 
health (Ruger, 2010; Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). As Sahn and Younger (2009:17) also point 
out, “we feel that BMI should be taken seriously as a measure of well-being in its own right”.
71 See Kaplan (2000) for an introduction to MIMIC. Applied work using MIMIC and the capability approach 
include Krishnakumar (2007), Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008), Kuklys (2005), Di Tommaso (2007). See also 
Chapters 2-3 of the thesis. A specific application to empowerment is provided by Williams (2005) in rural 
Bangladesh.
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But the choice of functioning indicators is also in large part an ethical one because it 
expresses a concern for the well-being of Ethiopian women. The other major factor in the 
choice of functioning indicators is data availability. Nevertheless, it should be observed, the 
impact of low capability is multidimensional and may not reveal itself as low health 
functioning achievement.
The third and final equation links health functioning h to capability and conversion 
factors in f3 , X , £  , and /  :
h = 5 + fix, + ^  + Qd1 + c/r, + (6.4)
All descriptive explanatory covariates in the model are listed in Table 6.5. With 
categorical variables as dependent variables the statistical package MPLUS uses a WLSMV
72(Weighted Least Square) estimator and probit coefficients for categorical dependent
73variables. A model with earnings instrumented is also estimated to control for endogeneity 
as explained below.
The implications of endogeneity were discussed in Chapter 5. A model with earnings 
instrumented is therefore also estimated. Wife income share compared to husband is kept as 
an explanatory variable in the functioning regressions notwithstanding the potential
74simultaneity with health (eg., health can feed back into wife earning potential). However, 
this choice is adequate because there is evidence health and nutrition affect the wage rate of 
men not women in Ethiopia (but also elsewhere; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1989; Ferro-Luzzi 
et. al., 2001; Pitt et. al., 1990; Sahn and Alderman, 1988). Furthermore, since this chapter 
employs ratios of earnings the systemic household health feedback effects can be eliminated 
as ill-health is in the numerator and denominator. Finally, as Strauss and Thomas (1998:795) 
conclude, “a key virtue of these health indicators [height, BMI] is the absence of 
measurement error that is systematically correlated with respondent characteristics (such as 
income)”. In other words, a statistically significant correlation between a health indicator and 
income is mostly expected to be non-spurious.
72 WLSMV, unlike Maximum Likelihood, is not a full information estimator. The limited information approach 
however gives similar results (Muthen, 1989:24; 1993).
73 MPLUS is a statistical package capable of estimating standard linear regressions as well as categorical and 
multilevel structural equations models (see Chapter 4). Since a categorical indicator mediates between two 
variables (x ^  u ^  y, with u categorical) a probit is used for the regression of u on x (x ^  u) and the 
continuous latent response of u (u*) for the regression of y on u (u ^  y) (Muthen and Muthen, 2006:405).
74 See Bhargava (1997:279-80), Dercon and Krishnan, (2000), Hando, (2009:151), Strauss and Thomas, 
(1998:803) among others.
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Another source of endogeneity involves the decision-making index and health 
functionings. The hypothesis to be tested here is whether women who take more decisions 
achieve better health. But what about the other effect, namely, that healthier women take 
more decisions? Although there has not been much research done to explore such feedback 
effects, the possibility has been ruled out by Hindis (2000:1526) who argues (using the 
Zimbabwe DHS) that if  women’s past nutritional status (measured in height) is not correlated 
with current decision-making patterns in the household, then nutritional status does not affect 
decision-making power. Because height and decision-making were not correlated, she 
concluded there is no evidence “poor nutritional status decreases women’s bargaining power 
in the marriage.” Since the same relationship was obtained for the 2005 Ethiopia dataset— 
height is also not correlated with any decision-making indicator yet BMI and anemia are— 
the feedback effect may be ruled out as well.
In summary, this chapter integrates a decision-making index into a larger model to 
explain health functioning. The decision-making model is a mediating variable alongside 
other capability inputs including education, relative earnings, and control over earnings. The 
relationship between the capability inputs, the conversion factors, and functionings is tested 
with the 2005 Ethiopian DHS.
III.Data and measurement.
The DHS dataset is rich enough to explore capability approach based empirical models. In 
this section, an overview of the dataset and a discussion of measurement issues are offered. 
The DHS is a representative secondary data source collected in numerous developing
75countries including Ethiopia. Since the male questionnaire was not submitted to all 
interviewed households a sub-sample of the larger data set of Ethiopian women aged 15 to 49 
is used. All the indicators used in the estimation exercise are listed and the descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 6.2. Some of the indicators are transformed to reduce variance 
(eg., age) and facilitate convergence (Muthen and Muthen, 2008b:382).76 Thus, age is simply
77divided by ten while for education the square root transformation is used. One of the
75 Weight must be applied to make the regional distribution nationally representative.
76 They argue, “convergence problems may occur when the range of sample variance values greatly exceeds 1 to 
10. This is particularly important with combinations of categorical and continuous outcomes” (Muthen and 
Muthen, 2008b:382).
77 The square root transformation also reduces the impact of very high educational achievers. In this sample very
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mediating dependent variables—women’s decision-making index—is measured with the 
three final say questions (cf. the decision-making index of Chapter 5).
The household decision-making indicators are final say type of questions. Three 
possible answers are offered to respondents, namely, someone else has final say, shared final 
say, and alone final say. Decisions for daily needs are excluded because they follow a 
different pattern (see again Chapter 5). For instance about 50% of Ethiopian women in 
relationships have final say “alone” for household daily needs due to gender roles in the 
household. Legovini (2006:142) also found 67% of women in Addis Ababa and Amhara take 
small consumption decisions on their own. Legovini also reported as few as 16% take their 
own decision for big food items and only 10% for other important items. Table 6.1 reveals 
somewhat similar percentages of decisions taken alone (with only 1 2 % for own health, 1 0 % 
for large household purchases, and 8 % for who to visit).
Table 6.1. Proportions for decision-making indicators.
Wife final say health Wife final say large household purchases
Wife final say visits to family and 
relatives
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Someone else 983 35 1254 45 541 19
Shared 1481 53 1267 45 2039 73
Alone 336 12 280 10 220 8
Total 2800 100 2800 100 2800 100
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005. 
Notes: In italic-bold maximal values.
Questions on gender norms differ from decision-making indicators because they 
reflect socially held beliefs and attitudes on the adequacy of behaviors (Legovini, 2006:141­
3). Questions on norms are here modeled as institutional conversion factors. As suggested in 
Chapter 5, these indicators include husband response to questions on husband right (right to: 
get angry, refuse financial support, use force for unwanted sex, have sex with other women) 
and husband and wife responses to questions on wife beating justification (beating justified if 
she goes out without telling him, if she neglects the children, if she argues with him, if she 
refuses to have sex with him, if she burns the food). The indices for husband right and 
beating justification are estimated outside the model with linear principal component 
analysis. An index which takes the difference in answers by partners for wife beating 
justification is also computed. To interpret the index, Table 5.5 in Chapter 5 summarizes the
78main attributes of the index.
few women have more than five years of education.
78 A statistically significant coefficient for difference in wife beating justification implies cases three and four
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At the individual level, other explanatory indicators include wife age (as a conversion 
factor), years of formal education, and control over earnings. At the household level, the 
capability inputs wife share of income compared to husband and the conversion factors age 
difference between partners, household wealth, and whether husband is in a polygamous 
relationship are also included. Since the difference in years of education between partners 
resulted in convergence problems, this indicator was excluded. A possible cause is multi­
colinearity with wife education since only a few households have any education. Finally, at 
the institutional level, urban, religion, and regional dummies are included.
Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics.
N M ean M edian Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis M in M ax Descriptive
Age 2801 30.33 29 8.4 0.36 -0.78 15 49 Years
Education 2801 1.05 0 2.58 3.05 9.76 0 18 Years o f form al schooling
Earnings compared 
to husband's 2801 0.13 0 0.47 4.38 20.73 0 3
0=nothing; 1=less than 
him; 2=about the same;
earnings 3=M ore than him
Control over 
earnings
2801 0.08 0 0.28 2.99 6.92 0 1 1=yes; 0=no
W ealth 2801 2.98 3 1.37 0.03 -1.23 1 5
Household assets and 
utility services
Difference in wife 
beating justification
2612 0.14 0.27 1.29 -0.41 -0.42 -3.61 1.96 wbj -  hbj
Urban 2801 0.09 0 0.29 2.86 6.19 0 1 1=urban; 0=rural
W ater (distance) 2783 37.60 20 47.00 3.14 13.84 0 480 Minutes
Religion 2801 0.67 1 0.47 -0.72 -1.49 0 1 1=Christian; 0= 0 ther
N um ber o f wives 
(polygamy)
2801 1.07 1 0.31 5.04 31.22 1 7 1,...,7
Husband: husband 
rights index
2671 0.01 -0.56 0.99 1.95 3.34 -0.56 3.9 1=yes; 0=no
Husband: wife 
beating justification
2674 0.04 -0.32 1 0.79 -0.82 -0.83 2.01 1=yes; 0=no
Wife: wife beating 
justification index 2738 0.14 0.55 0.97 -0.62 -0.99 -1.6 1.13 1=yes; 0=no
W ife final say health 2800 1.77 2 0.65 0.26 -0.71 1 3 1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3 alone
W ife final say large 
household purchases
2800 1.65 2 0.65 0.5 -0.71 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3 alone
W ife final say 
household daily 
needs
2799 2.35 3 0.73 -0.64 -0.89 1 3 1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3 alone
W ife final say visits 
to family and 
relatives
2800 1.89 2 0.51 -0.18 0.59 1 3
1=someone else; 
2=shared; 3 alone
Anemia 2595 3.62 4 0.68 -1.75 2.34 1 4
1=severe; 2=moderate; 
3=mild; 4=not anemic
Body mass index 2771 20.21 19.95 2.64 2.31 16.6 13.37 52.91 18.5< undernourished
Note: Sample weights are used.
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
where couples hold different views on wife beating justification. The variable is positive when wife states 
beating justified but husband states beating not justified and negative when wife states beating not justified and 
husband states beating justified. A positive coefficient in the regression with decision-making as the dependent 
variable thus implies that in relationships where wives say beating norms are justified and husbands not, women 
score higher on the decision-making index. However, a positive coefficient also implies wives who disagree 
with the beating norms in relationships with husbands who think beating is justified, score lower on the 
decision-making index.
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Health functioning indicators
The choice of functioning indicators is a challenging task, especially since many can 
feedback into capability. In practice therefore it is extremely difficult to identify a pure 
functioning which does not involve feedback effects. In light of this, objective health 
functioning indicators need to be selected from the DHS. The most adequate indicators 
appeared to be the body mass index (BMI) and anemia. Following the literature discussed 
below, these indicators are central health metrics in the Ethiopian context and offer attractive 
statistical properties.
Malnutrition is a chronic concern in various regions of Ethiopia as past famine spells 
haunt the present and the future (Hando, 2009; Webb and Von Braun, 1994). Abate 
(1993:152) reports approximately 7% of all hospital death in Ethiopia were related to 
malnutrition and anemia. Little (2008) argues over the past two decades Ethiopia was the 
largest food aid recipient in Africa and while in some regions up to 75% of the population 
needed assistance and 16% of the overall population required food aid in 1999/2000. The 
BMI is a sex and age independent current nutrition indicator equal to weight (in kilograms) 
divided by the square of height (in meters).
The mean BMI in the 2005 Ethiopia DHS is 20.21 — a unit less than the Sub-Saharan 
Africa mean of 21.2 for the period 1957-1994 (Pelletier and Rahn, 1998). The index captures 
energy levels stored in the body (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000) and offers a direct and easy 
individual statistic reflecting current nutritional status “net of needs” (Sahn and Younger, 
2009:14). The BMI is also negatively correlated with morbidity, illness, poor birth outcomes, 
and higher mortality rates (Dasgupta, 1993:414-5; Dewan, 2008:8; Fogel, 1994; Hindin, 
2000; James, 1994; Sahn and Younger, 2009; Scrimshaw, 1996). Furthermore, as a short to 
medium-term health and nutrition indicator it is less affected by measurement and reporting 
errors than calories intake and provides “information on intra-household allocation patterns 
and on the presence of gender bias in the allocation of food and health” (Molini et. al., 
2 0 1 0 :tbd).
The WHO considers a BMI value under 18.5 as underweight. But to Shetty et. al. 
(1994), this is not necessary and individuals with a BMI under 18.5 may not be chronically 
energy deficient. Shetty et. al. (1994) argue, in fact, a cut off of 17 is more appropriate. 
Dasgupta (1993) contends a BMI range between 15 and 18.5 is an indication that the person 
is at risk. Furthermore, in a population with low body fat stores, additional weight loss leads 
to loss of lean tissue such as muscles and internal organs (Ferro-Luzzi et. al., 2001). A 
healthy BMI spans the 18.5-25 range. Above 25, the BMI signals overweight. Since few
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individuals in the DHS sample have a BMI above 25 this will not influence the estimates. 
Still, the logarithm of BMI is used to reflect the decreasing health returns obtained from the
79highest scores and reduce the variance of the indicator (Hindin, 2000:1520).
Additional empirical research shows BMI changes with age even though there is no a 
priori expected direction of change. However, in both poor developing and developed 
countries, BMI fluctuates with seasons (Ferro-Luzzi, Branca, and Pastore, 1994). BMI 
fluctuations are especially acute in rural areas of developing countries. Rural farmers may 
maximize their energy availability for the harvest season only to experience lower BMI in the 
lean pre-harvest season. In some seasons, in fact, adults can lose up to 10% of their body 
weight (Dercon and Krisnan, 2000; Dasgupta, 1993:417). To Ferro-Luzzi et. al. (2001), 
seasonal energy stress in Ethiopia occurs even in normal harvest years and affects more men 
than women.
The evidence reported in Chapter 4 that Ethiopian women face challenging work
hardships means they have all year round moderate energy expenditure rates doing long low
intensity, often post-harvest, livestock, and other nonfarm activities (Hando, 2009:59). Thus,
in rural Ethiopia, unlike Gambia, men undertake a significant proportion of very energy
demanding jobs. In addition, James (1994) observes, across countries women with the lowest
BMI have the least fall in weight with seasonal shortages. Ferro-Luzzi et. al. (2001) also
suggest in rural areas of Ethiopia the energy needs of adults are often not met to reduce
children’s seasonal nutritional fluctuations. Since this DHS survey was conducted between
April 27 and August 30, 2005, the rural population (about three quarter of the sample), should
have been in the post harvest season (the harvest months are October-January; USDA, 
802006). Nevertheless, according to the World Food Programme, 2004 and 2005 were good 
harvest years that produced surplus and the last draught occurred in 2002/03 (WFP, 2005). Be 
that as it may, it is difficult to predict in advance the direction and extent to which the 
seasonal bias has affected the results.
In the 2005 Ethiopia DHS anemia prevalence among women was collected as a 
categorical variable with four categories: severe, moderate, mild, and not anemic. It is 
estimated that more than 30% of Ethiopian population is anemic (Rispin, 1998). Anemia is 
caused by insufficient iron intake and reflected in the amount of oxygen in the blood. 
According to the University of Maryland Medical Center (2008),
79 The age, education and BMI variables had large variances. Unless these variances are reduced they might lead 
to model convergence problems (Muthen and Muthen, 2008b :382).
80 In southern Ethiopia, the period May -  August is the worst in terms of food shortage (Ferro-Luzzi et. al., 
2001:11).
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even mild anemia can reduce oxygen transport in the blood, causing fatigue and a 
diminished physical capacity. Moderate to severe iron-deficiency anemia is known to 
reduce endurance. Some studies indicate that even iron deficiency without anemia can 
produce a subtle but still lower capacity for exercise.
Over the long term, anemia leads to secondary organ dysfunction, damage, and heart failure. 
Anemia increases the chances for poor pregnancy outcomes, inhibits cognitive development 
and the motricity of children and adolescents, and raises mortality rates among the elderly 
(Farah, Noble, and Hurt, 2005; University of Maryland Medical Center, 2008).
The nutrition data shows the following patterns. Out of 2771 cases, 24% are 
considered at risk with a BMI under 18.5. In Kenya and Ghana these rate are lower at 6.4% 
and 16.4% respectively (Garcia and Kennedy, 1994). For anemia, about 28% of the sample 
suffer from mild to severe anemia.
Descriptive analysis
In Table 6.3 the regional distribution and shortfalls from the means of BMI and anemia are 
listed. The table shows for BMI most regions are slightly under the mean whereas a few 
regions (eg., Addis Ababa) are significantly above the mean. Note also the standard deviation 
of BMI for mean differences is eight times larger than the ones for anemia (1.17 and 0.15).
Table 6.3. Regional health functioning indicators.
Body mass index Anemia Mean difference Body mass index Mean difference Anemia
Tigray (N) 18.86 3.60 -0.82 0.00
A far (N) 19.53 3.38 -0.15 -0.22
Am hara (N) 19.52 3.57 -0.16 -0.03
Oromya (S) 19.82 3.59 0.14 -0.01
Somali (SE) 19.54 3.37 -0.14 -0.23
Ben-G m uz (NW ) 18.73 3.50 -0.95 -0.10
SNNP (S) 19.63 3.68 -0.05 0.08
Gambela (W) 19.14 3.41 -0.54 -0.19
H arari (CE) 20.24 3.65 0.56 0.05
Addis Ababa (C) 22.95 3.85 3.27 0.25
D ire Daw a (CE) 20.38 3.58 0.70 -0.02
Overall mean 19.68 3.60 0.17 -0.04
Notes: C center, E  east, W  west, N  north, S south. 
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000:694) argued in rural areas over the period 1994/5 the 
north (N) had the highest mean BMI. The current data suggest a different mapping where the 
north reveals a negative deviation from the mean. The DHS statistics, being more recent and
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representative of the entire Ethiopian population, indicate the centre (C) of the country enjoys 
the largest positive mean BMI deviations. For anemia, Addis Ababa has the largest positive 
deviation from the mean while Afar, Somali, and Gambela the largest negative deviations.
As expected, (see Table 6.4) urban women achieve better health functionings than 
rural women and the differences are statistically significant. Again, this is expected since 
70% of all Ethiopians live more than three days’ walk from a health centre (Abate, 1993:153; 
see also Berhane et. al., 2001:1526). Table 6.4 also shows that the poorest fifth have 
statistically significant lower mean BMI and anemia scores compared to the richest fifth.
Table 6.4. Residence, wealth, proportion of household expenditure, and health functioning.
Urban Rural Poorest 20% Richest 20%
Body mass index 22.57 19.97 19.88 21.25
Anemia 3.82 3.6 3.5 3.8
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Table 6.5 compares health and decision-making scores for groups with some 
educational attainments against no education. According to Furuta and Salway (2006), 
education improves women’s well-being because it is linked to more use of health care as 
well as spousal discussion of family planning leading to an increased likelihood of receiving 
antenatal and delivery care. The effect of education, they argue, operates in part via increased 
discussion between couples so women are able to influence decision making without 
challenging gender or age hierarchies.
Table 6.5. Education and health functioning.
Yes
Education
No
Anemia 3.72 3.59
Body mass index 20.99 19.98
Wife final say health 1.84 1.75
Wife final say large household purchases 1.78 1.62
Wife final say visits to family and relatives 1.91 1.88
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Women with no education have lower BMIs and anemia scores. The differences are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, except for decisions concerning family 
visits, educated women take significantly more decisions in all dimensions.
Table 6 .6  explores whether women who take more decisions have better health and 
nutrition. In southern rural Ethiopia the majority of married women (89.3%) require 
permission of husband to visit a heath facility (Berhane et. al., 2001:1534). Although means
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are above the 18.5 threshold, the results in Table 6 . 6  show women who answered someone 
else takes decisions have the lowest BMI. Thus, in the group who took the least decisions one 
will find the largest proportion of women with a BMI under 18.5. Most of these women are 
therefore in the borderline region and should still be considered at risk (Molini, et. al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the differences between someone else and the sharing and alone categories are 
statistically significant. For anemia, however, women for whom someone else takes health, 
large household purchases, and visits decisions achieve better anemia scores than women 
who take these decisions alone. For anemia scores, in fact, the healthiest women are more 
likely to be in the sharing decisions group. Furthermore, for anemia, the differences are 
statistically significant between shared / alone and someone else / shared nut not someone 
else / alone. These preliminary results suggest both health indicators depend on decision­
making in the household but interact differently. And while BMI scores are highest for those 
who take decisions alone, for anemia the highest scores obtain for those who share decisions. 
The multivariate regressions will confirm whether this correlation is spurious and if the 
hypothesis can be sustained.
Table 6 .6 . Decision-making indicators and health functioning.
Health
Body mass index
in fo ld  Dai'y . needs purchases
Visits Health
Anemia
h o S id  Dai,ly. needs purchases
Visits
Someone else 19.89 19.87 19.76 19.84 3.59 3.61 3.57 3.58
Shared 20.34 20.41 20.12 20.28 3.66 3.64 3.61 3.64
Alone 20.53 20.72 20.4 20.38 3.51 3.57 3.64 3.52
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Notes: M axim al values highlighted in italic bold.
Husbands in southern rural Ethiopia may not encourage women to use health care 
centers and often refuse money to cover the expenses (Berhane et. al., 2001:1531). It is 
possible to explore the relationship between husband attitudes and wife health. Is there, in 
other words, a negative correlation between husband’s attitude and wife health? As Table 6.7 
reveals, statistically significant differences in means obtain for BMI scores between husbands 
who answer yes / no to right to refuse financial support. Statistically significant differences in 
means also obtain for anemia with husband answer yes / no for right to force sex and have 
sex with other women. Is there then a relationship between sexual behavior and anemia? Is it 
possible that this relationship between husband rights for forced sex and sex with other 
women is mediated by the existence of a sexually transmitted disease (STD)? While simple 
linear correlations reveal a positive correlation between “husband has right to force sex on
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wife” and STD, there is no correlation between STD and anemia. Nevertheless, the BMI 
bivariate relationship with husband rights signals a relationship between husband’s belief in 
his rights and wife health. Indeed, women engaged to men who think husbands have the right 
to withdraw financial support have lower BMI scores. Women in such households are 
presumably in a vulnerable position of dependence. When husbands are in control of income 
they actualize their threats and withdraw support, undermining women’s health.
Table 6.7. Husband rights reported by husband and health functioning.
Body mass index Anemia
Yes No Yes No
Husband right to: get angry 20.15 20.24 3.61 3.63
Husband right to: refuse financial support 19.97 20.24 3.62 3.62
Husband right to: use force for unwanted sex 20.14 20.21 3.54 3.63
Husband right to: have sex with other women 20.21 20.21 3.72 3.62
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Since polygamy in Ethiopia is not restricted to Muslims (Levine, 1965; Pankhurst, 
1992:119-20), has negative physical and psychological effects on women (Kabira et. al., 
1997:31), and undermines women’s bargaining power, at least among coffee growers (Lim 
et. al., 2007), it is worth exploring its effect on health (Table 6 .8 ). Although women not in 
polygamous relationships have higher BMI scores, the difference is not statistically 
significant. However, in a statistically significant way, women in polygamous relationships 
take fewer decisions in health, large household purchases, and visits.
Table 6 .8 . Polygamy, functioning and decision-making.
Polygamy Mean
Anemia YesNo
3.62
3.62
Body mass index YesNo
19.96
20.22
Wife final say health YesNo
1.58
1.78
Wife final say large household purchases YesNo
1.53
1.66
Wife final say visits to family and relatives YesNo
1.72
1.90
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Finally, fasting for both Muslims and Christians can affect BMI and anemia. Fasting 
for Christians in Ethiopia is considered important and expected about 165 days a year (Abate, 
1993:134-135; Levine, 1965). Fasting Christians avoid the consumption of food from 
animals. For Muslims fasting occurs in the month of Ramadan. The interviews were
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conducted between April 27 and August 30, 2005, a period outside the yearly fasting 
calendars of the year. However, while Christians have higher mean anemia scores there is 
almost no difference between mean BMI scores.
Table 6.9. Religion and differences in health functioning indicators.
Christian Mean
Anemia No 3.55Yes 3.65
BMI No 20.20
Yes 20.21
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
IV. Estimation.
The model in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 of Chapter 4 graphically depicted the relationships—linear 
or categorical, between conversion factors, capability inputs, and health functioning—to be
estimated. The proportion of variance explained is, accordingly, of little interest as such. It is
2 81for this reason that testing model fit with % is not considered. It should also be noted that 
the decision-making index is identified simultaneously with the model explanatory 
covariates. Capability, functionings, and conversion factors are measured, and their 
relationships estimated, together. Testing the decision-making measurement index in 
isolation, as done in Chapter 5, is likely to give poor diagnostics, unless its nomological 
network is included (Bentler, 2006:34-5, 39).
Table 6.11 and 6.12 report, respectively, standardized coefficients for the body mass 
index and anemia regressions. The upper panels cover the measurement model for the 
decision-making index and the lower ones the structural equations. The standardized and 
unstandarsdized probit coefficients are reported for the measurement model. All the index 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant which means they are positively 
correlated. Note that while the health decision making indicator is fixed to one, 
standardization reveals its actual weight. The standardized coefficients can be interpreted as
81 Model testing using %2 for goodness of fit as done in Chapter 4 is not necessary because there is no interest in 
explaining the correlations between all the variables. The equation to be minimized for testing of overall model 
fit is Q = (s -a ) 'W  _1(s -CT)where Q is minimized. The sample variance-covariance matrix is s and the model 
estimated variance and covariance matrix a. The difference between data and model covariance/correlation is 
weighted by W-1. Different weight matrices can be specified for W depending, among other things, on sample 
size, multivariate normality, and whether data are continuous or not. The fit of the model is assessed using the 
optimal chi-square test t  = nQ . See, among others, Kaplan (2000) and Muthén (1993).
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follows: for a standard deviation rise in the decision-making index, the latent variable for the 
indicator for final say on health rises by 0.62 standard deviations. The coefficients can also be 
interpreted in probability terms. Table 6.10 reports the actual and two standard deviations 
above decision-making index means probability proportions. Above the mean, as expected, 
the probability of the higher categories rises while that of lower categories falls.
Table 6.10. Actual and estimated probabilities in the measurement model.
Actual
Health
Estimated at 
mean + 2 SD
Large household purchases
. . . Estimated at Actual , ,mean + 2 SD Actual
Visits
Estimated at 
mean + 2 SD
Someone else 35% 5% 45% 11% 19% 2%
Shared 53% 42% 45% 46% 73% 53%
Alone 12% 52% 10% 43% 8% 45%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Notes: For estimating the probabilities see M uthen (2004:4). Results com puted for a m easurem ent m odel only. These probabilities w ere not obtained from  the 
coefficients in table 6.10 and 6.11.
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Furthermore, the marginal probabilities for the factor at the mean can be computed for 
each category and each indicator using the following three equations for large household 
purchases:82
SProb[SOMEONE - ELSE = 1] , A -  x 
-------- ------------ =----------------- - = -  f  ( ^  + A t)A  = -35.2%
SProb[SHARED = 2] = + a “ ) ) a  -  f ( ß 2 -  + Arç))A = 22.1% 
St
SProb[ALONE = 3] . . . .  -  , n/--------[- ^ = ---------- ] = f ( { 0 2 - (Ox + A t))A  = 13.1%
St
(6.5)
(66)
(6.7)
Where ^ is the normal distribution function, ^ a n d ^ t h e  estimated thresholds, q the 
factor mean, and A the factor coefficient for the indicator. Note that these probabilities sum 
to zero. The marginal effects can be interpreted as follows: equation 6.5 suggests the 
probability of someone else other than the wife taking the decision for large household 
purchases falls by 35.2% for a small positive change in the factor score at the mean.
These probabilities are derived from the cumulative the probability function. To see this, note that 
Prob[SOMEONE-ELSE=1] = Prob[y* < 0] = Prob[v + Ay + e < 0] = Prob [e < - (  v + Ay)]. Where 0 is the first 
threshold. The last term is equivalent to ®( -  (v + Ay)) and is the area under the normal curve up to the value -  
(v + Ay). By taking the marginal derivative with respect to the factor scores y we obtain the normal probability 
density function (PDF).
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The capability regressions
In the lower panels of Tables 6.11 and 6.12 the structural regressions are reported. The panel 
is interpreted once because, except for the last columns, it is very similar for BMI and 
anemia. Endogenous covariates are excluded because they may bias estimates and are not 
necessary if the objective is to control for exogenous factors only. In Chapter 8 , a model with 
all covariates is compared to the model which controls only for exogenous factors to ensure 
the robustness of the results. The ultimate regression of interest is the functioning regression 
from which no covariates were excluded. From the education regression the following 
covariates are excluded age gap, polygamy, the norms index for husband rights (husband), 
the index wife beating justification (wife), difference in wife beating justification index, and 
wealth. Education, for instance, may delay the age of marriage and reduce the age gap (see 
Chapter 8 ). More educated women are also less likely to be with a man in a polygamous 
relationship etc. Some of these covariates were excluded from the earnings regression as 
well.
The lower panel has five sub-divisions each of which lists coefficients and levels of 
statistical significance for covariates at the individual, household, and institutional levels 
respectively. The second column from the left is the education linear regression on the 
conversion factors—hypothesis (2) in Figure 3.1. At the individual level, the standardized 
coefficient for age is negative (-0.12) and statistically significant. Thus, for a standard 
deviation rise in one tenth of a year, (the square root of) schooling years decrease by -0 . 1 2  
standard deviations. At the institutional level, urban (0.39) and Christian (0.06) are also 
statistically significant. Thus, non-Christian rural women are among the least educated. 
Regional dummy coefficients were relative to the region Oromay. Only one dummy had a 
positive statistically significant coefficient—Addis Ababa. The rest are either negative or 
statistically insignificant. The dummy patterns of signs and their significance levels are 
analyzed in a separate section below.
The third column from the left is the relative earnings ordered probit regression. Since 
it is very similar to the control over earnings regression only this one is interpreted. Also 
note, the first capability input— education—is also added as a covariate in this regression. At 
the institutional level, urban (0.16) is statistically significant. Thus, the earnings of urban 
women relative to their husbands are larger than those of rural women. Education—the first 
capability input to be integrated as explanatory covariates—is also positive (0.08) and 
statistically significant. Accordingly, more educated women earn relatively more than less
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educated women. In a qualitative research exercise representative of the diversity of farming 
system in Ethiopia, women from most villages (Aze Debo'a, Debre Birhan, Do'oma, Gara 
Godo, Geblen, Harresaw, Imdibir, Korodegaga, Shumsheha, Sirba, Turufe, and Yetmen) 
reported education as important and necessary for helping them with organizing, accounting, 
managing household, and farm and off-farm activities (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996).
The fifth column is the decision-making index linear regression. The regression 
should be similar to the one estimated in Chapter 5 except that now its coefficients are 
optimized in relation to other equations in the system. Furthermore, the indicator “Should 
FGM be continued?” was excluded because it turned out to be insignificant at the individual 
level.83 A different estimator, in addition, is used here (WLSMV-PROBIT versus ML-LOGIT
84in Chapter 4), sample sizes differs (pregnant and lactating women were deleted from this 
sample whereas ethnic groups with less than 50 cases were not), and regional—not ethnic— 
dummies are employed. Thus, any differences between results can be partly related to these 
discrepancies. For the decision-making regression then, and as in Chapter 5, age (0.08) is 
statistically significant. For a standard deviation rise in the tenth of a year, the decision­
making index increases by 0.08 standard deviations, corroborating Berhane et. al.’s finding 
(2001:1534) that older women (in rural southern Ethiopia) are more independent in taking 
health and selling crops decisions (see also ICRW, 1997:8).
At the household level, difference in wife beating justification (0.16) and polygamy (­
0.09) are statistically significant. These results again are consistent with those of Chapter 5. 
In supporting the interpretation of the polarization index, Williams (2005:20) found in rural 
Bangladesh women that conform to modesty norms take more decisions compared to women 
who do not. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, this index must be interpreted with the absolute 
response women provided for beating justification (as an indicator of gender norms measured 
at the individual level). There is no evidence that women in poorer Ethiopian households take 
less decision as reported elsewhere (Dercon, 1999:25-7).
At the institutional level, the conversion factors urban (0.09) and the gender norms 
index for wife beating justification reported by wife (-0.27) remains statistically significant. 
Although the signs are consistent with those of Chapter 5, the Christian dummy and husband
85rights index are no longer statistically significant. All dummy coefficients except for
83 Which may be explained by the fact that about 80% of the sample is circumcised.
84 One of the principle differences between the two is that the WLSMV model is estimated conditional on the 
explanatory variables, x  (Muthen, 1994:17-8).
85 The Christian dummy coefficient’s weak statistical significance in Chapter 5 and its non-significance here 
could be explained by having most religious and ethnic groups discriminate against women. For example, both
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Amhara, Ben-Gmuz, and Dire Dawa are statistically significant. Thus, compared to Oromay, 
women in Tigray, Somali, Ben-Gmuz, and SSNP achieve lower scores on the decision­
making index. These dummies patterns of sign and significance are more closely analyzed 
below. Finally, for the capability inputs, relative earning (0.11) and control over earnings 
(0.10) are now both positive and statistically significant. There is one discrepancy with 
respect to the capability inputs when compared to Chapter 5 and it concerns control over 
earnings which was not statistically significant there. Education is still statistically 
insignificant for the reasons discussed in Chapter 5.
B M I regression
The BMI regression tests hypotheses (4), (5), and (6 ) in Figure 4.1. In the last column of table 
6.11 the results are reported. Ferro-Luzzi et. al. (2001) explain BMI seasonal changes in 
southern Ethiopia with age, sex, education, per capita land area, value of life stock, household 
dependency ratio (old and young to working age), and location of residence. Here slightly 
more than a tenth of the variance in BMI is accounted for by the covariates. Numerous 
factors which cannot be accounted for here can affect BMI and anemia, including individual 
activity levels. In addition, according to Liere et. al. (1994), the determinants of body weights 
fluctuation in Benin are related to sanitation and health—not socio-economic status.86 
Although other studies report a positive relationship between household consumption and 
individual BMI in developing countries (Sahn and Younger, 2009:18), here this hypothesis is 
not tested because the DHS has only information on wife relative earnings. The latter, 
however, was not statistically significant (a lack of statistical significance between individual 
cash earnings and BMI was also observed by Hindin (2000:1524) in Zimbabwe). Still, two 
capability inputs— education (0.10) and decision-making (0.09)— are both positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, the ordered decision-making index and years of education have 
an independent positive statistically significant relationship with heath functioning. A similar 
relationship between BMI, education, and decision-making was also found in Zimbabwe 
(Hindin, 2000:1524). Furthermore, Ghuman, Lee, and Smith (2004) using factor analysis 
found (in various Asian countries) empowerment indicators had a positive effect on health. 
Nevertheless, support for a positive relationship between decision-making and BMI has not
Christians and Muslims practice female genital mutilation (WHO, 1999). Pankhurst (1992:2) reports that the 
dominant Orthodox Christian group empower men not women; furthermore, Christians are often less liberal 
than Ethiopian Muslim women who according to Legovini (2006:133-5, 141) marry later and are more aware of 
their gender political engagement (eg., knowledge of female representation in kebele and woreda —political” 
councils).
86 Attention should be given then to the wealth index which includes access to water as one of its indicators.
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been found everywhere. Furr and Das (2006), for example, obtained a non-significant result
87for Nepal. With respect to the effect of women’s education in Ethiopia, Ferro-Luzzi et. al. 
(2001) claimed it protects against seasonal (not chronic) malnutrition. The importance of 
education for health gets further support from the anthropological literature cited above 
which found in various Ethiopian villages shared belief in the benefits of education by, and 
for, women (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996).
Since at the household level no indicator is statistically significant there is also some
preliminary support for Ferro-Luzzi et. al. (2001) hypothesis that adult seasonal BMI
88uncorrelated with wealth (in southern Ethiopia). Excluding regional dummies, at the 
institutional level, only urban (0.18) is statistically significant. Accordingly, Ethiopian urban 
women have higher BMI levels than rural women. A similar finding was observed in 
Zimbabwe (Hindin, 2000:1524). Finally, the pattern of negative regional dummies maps 
Webb and Von Braun (1994:21-3) famine belts from the north-east to south of the country. 
Webb and Von Braun (1994) suggested three mutually reinforcing causes for the 
vulnerability of these regions—population pressure, agro-ecological resource base, and 
climatic regime.
87 However, it should be noted, Furr and Das (2006) censored BMI at the critical value of 18.5. In the next sub­
section their hypothesis is considered. Their measure of decision making autonomy includes who has final say 
on own health care, large household purchases, everyday household purchases, making family visits, and what 
food to cook.
88 However, in Zimbabwe a positive relationship was obtained between wealth and BMI (Hindin, 2000:1524).
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T a b le  6 .1 1 . D e c is io n -m a k in g  in d e x  (M IM IC )  a n d  B M I.
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficients1
Wife final say health 0.62 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.58 0 91 ***
Wife final say visits to family and relatives 0.67 1 17 ***
Standardized coefficients Education Earnings Ordered probit
Control over 
earnings 
Binary probit
Decision­
making
index
BMI
Individual level
Age -0.12 *** 0.07 0.06 0.08 ** 0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.015
Poorer -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.019
Middle -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.02
Richer -0.07 -0.10 0.07 0.017
Richest 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.03
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.16 *** 0.021
Polygamy -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 ** -0.02
Institutional level
Urban 0.39 *** 0.16 *** 0.19 *** 0.09 * 0.18 ***
Christian 0.06 ** 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.02
Husband: husband rights index -0.05 0.02
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.27 *** 0.01
Tigray -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.13 *** -0.09 ***
Afar -0.02 * -0.05 ** -0.09 *** 0.06 *** -0.02
Amhara -0.11 *** -0.16 ** -0.13 * 0.05 -0.07 *
Somali -0.06 ** 0.00 -0.02 -0.18 *** -0.01
Ben-Gmuz -0.02 ** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 ***
SNNP 0.02 0.09 * 0.11 * -0.18 *** -0.06 *
Gambela 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 * -0.02 ***
Harari -0.01 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** -0.01 ***
Addis Ababa 0.06 *** 0.01 0.02 0.05 * 0.03 *
Dire Dawa -0.01 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 -0.01
Capability inputs
Education 0.08 ** 0.09 ** 0.002 0.10 ***
Wife relative earning 0.11 ** 0.02
Control over earnings 0.10 * 0.03
Decision-making index 0.09 **
R-square 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.12
Notes: U n-weighted sample size N  = 2365. Dummy is Oromiya. Standardised coefficients unless otherwise specified.3 Coefficient fixed to one to identify 
metric.b Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
Anem ia regression
The anemia regression (Table 6.12) has a lower r-square. However, some bargaining power 
household and institutional level conversion factors are now statistically significant including 
age difference (0.07), the richest group (0.16), and the difference in beating justification 
index (-0.1). The age difference index suggests bargaining power is important since smaller 
age gaps improve anemia scores. A lower age gap in the bargaining literature entails more 
bargaining power for the women because relatively older women may be able to secure better 
nutrition, less physical work, and better access to health services. With more bargaining 
power women may improve the household exchange rate for chores and food distribution.
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The finding is sensible if, as reported in the anthropological literature, Ethiopian women in 
rural areas work for very long hours, often eat after everyone has eaten and the least 
nutritious pieces (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996; Pankhurst, 1992). Furthermore, if  only the 
richest can afford regular meat consumption and meat helps the body absorb iron, the 
relationship between wealth and anemia correlation is plausible (Rispin, 1998).
At the institutional level, although the urban dummy is not statistically significant, 
women’s response to beating justification (-0.1) is. Women therefore who agree beating is 
justified are more likely to be anemic supporting the hypothesis that the health anemia 
functioning indicator is more responsive than BMI to bargaining power indicators (Ghuman, 
Lee, and Smith, 2004).
None of the capability inputs is statistically significant however. Yet, as noted in 
Table 6 .6 , the highest anemia scores are achieved by women who share decisions not those 
who take them alone. Figure 6.3 suggests the kind of relationship hypothesized between 
empowerment and decision-making. It supports the idea that empowerment is relational 
(Samman and Santos, 2009) as well as Sen’s (2001:56) observation that “we live in a world 
in which being completely independent of the help and goodwill of others may be particularly 
difficult to achieve, and sometimes may not be the most important to achieve.’’
The differences between anemia health functioning—which may not be easily 
diagnosed— and BMI health functioning requires additional research. Here it is only possible 
to speculate. One implication is that more individual decision-making power can raise the 
quantity of food ingested by women but not quality. Thus, women who display more 
cooperative decision-making patterns with husbands may have access to more nutritious 
food, including meat, which raise iron levels in the body, enhancing the amount of oxygen 
carried in the blood and reducing anemia.
In summary, this model is useful as a first step to learn more on (i) which regions in 
Ethiopia have the largest shortfalls in health functionings; (ii) which conversion factors at the 
individual, household, and institutional levels have the strongest relationships to health 
functioning; (iii) and which of the capability inputs are related to health functioning. In the 
next subsection robustness and refinements are added to further learn about the 
interrelationships between the different inputs and outputs of the model.
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T a b le  6 .1 2 . D e c is io n -m a k in g  in d e x  (M IM IC )  a n d  a n e m ia .
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Wife final say health
Wife final say large household purchases
Wife final say visits to family and relatives
Standardized coefficients 
0.62 
0.58 
0.68
Unstandardized coefficients1 
1 a 
0.90 ***
1.18 ***
Standardized coefficients Education Earnings Ordered probit
Control over 
earnings 
Binary probit
Decision­
making
index
Anemia
Ordered
probit
Individual level
Age -0.12 *** 0.07 0.06 0.08 ** -0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 *
Poorer -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.05
Middle -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.06
Richer -0.07 -0.10 0.07 0.07
Richest 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.16 ***
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.16 *** 0.05
Polygamy -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 ** 0.01
Institutional level
Urban 0.39 *** 0.16 *** 0.19 * 0.09 * 0.07
Christian 0.06 ** 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01
Husband: husband rights index -0.05 0.02
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.27 *** -0.10 *
Tigray -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.13 *** 0.02
Afar -0.02 * -0.05 ** -0.09 *** 0.06 *** -0.03
Amhara -0.11 *** -0.16 ** -0.13 * 0.06 0.03
Somali -0.06 ** 0.00 -0.02 -0.18 *** -0.07 **
Ben-Gmuz -0.02 ** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 *
SNNP 0.02 0.09 * 0.11 * -0.18 *** 0.12 **
Gambela 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 * -0.01 *
Harari -0.01 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.00
Addis Ababa 0.06 *** 0.01 0.02 0.05 * 0.04
Dire Dawa -0.01 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.00
Capability inputs
Education 0.08 ** 0.09 ** 0.003 0.02
Wife relative earning 0.11 ** -0.04
Control over earnings 0.10 * -0.06
Decision-making index -0.06
R-square 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.07
Notes: U n-weighted sample size N=2365. Dummy is Oromiya. Standardised coefficients unless otherwise specified. a Coefficient fixed to one to identify 
metric.b Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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Figure 6.3. Hypothesized relationship between decision-making and empowerment for different 
health functioning.
Empowerment Empowerment
Robustness checks
Sensitivity checks to test the robustness of the results are undertaken to explore the reliability
89of the findings. First, instrumental variable estimation was tested. Here, an instrumented 
variable model (with bootstrap adjusted standard errors) is estimated. Bootstrap estimated 
standard errors adjust for biases from the two stage least squares estimations (2SLS) 
(Antonakis, 2009; Foster and McLanahan, 1996). Two versions are considered— one with the 
non-instrumented earnings indicator as a dependent variable and the other with the 
instrumented variable as dependent variable. Thus, in the former model, two earnings 
indicators are integrated in the model, namely, the unadjusted (as a dependent variable) and 
the instrumented as an independent variable in the decision-making and functioning 
regressions. The model, however, did not converge. The alternative model employed the 
instrumented earnings across the board and converged (see Appendix A). A weakness in the 
latter model is that the regression in which earnings is the dependent instrumented variable is 
perfectly predicted. With earnings instrumented, the positive correlation between earnings 
and decision-making no longer obtains. However, control over earnings remains positively 
correlated with decision-making. Functionings wise, instrumented earnings remain 
uncorrelated with BMI and anemia.
As a second robustness check, the continuous (BMI) and ordered categorical 
dependent (anemia) health functioning indicators are replaced with binary ill-being
89 Instrumental variable estimation will be further discussed in Chapter 7. But the following concern may be 
noted: The same exogenous indicators used to predict the earnings instruments (Foster and McLanahan, 1996) 
are used a second time as covariates in the system of equation in the earnings regression. Thus, in the second 
stage instrumented earnings regression predication is close to 100%.
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indicators. A BMI cut-off is set therefore at 18.5 (Daspugta, 1993; Furr and Das, 2006). 
Accordingly, women with BMI scores under 18.5 are coded one (others zero). Similarly, for 
anemia, women scoring below or equal to three (the mild anemia level) are coded one (not 
anemic zero). The regression coefficients now reflect the probability of being undernourished 
and/or anemic.
For space purposes only the BMI results are reported (Table 6.13). The sign of the 
coefficients now reverse because dependent variables reflect the probability of ill-being. For 
the 18.5 cut-off regression, urban, education, the decision-making index, and some regional 
dummies are no longer statistically significant. The significant predictors are now age (0.09) 
and relative earnings (-0.1) alongside regional control dummies. A negative relationship with 
age and BMI was also observed in Ethiopia by Ferro-Luzzi et. al. (2001:26-28) who conclude 
“the [negative] association was particularly strong among women, suggesting that older 
women may constitute a nutritionally vulnerable group”. At such low levels of BMI, older 
household members could be behaving altruistically and sacrifying for younger members. In 
Ethiopia there is evidence this may occur quite often (ibid.:ix). Alternatively, older women 
are less able to bargain and secure their nutritional needs (Hando, 2009). However, the latter 
hypothesis is less likely because the model in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 reveal that older women 
take more decisions signaling that they could be in charge— and purposefully in control of— 
food distribution within the household.
The results also indicate that wives who earn more than their husbands and who 
control their earnings have lower probabilities of experiencing a BMI under 18.5. In other 
words, the more women earn compared to their husbands and the more control they have over 
these earnings, the more they can insure their individual adequate nutrition.
The decision-making index, however, fails to explain why some women have a BMI 
below, while others above, 18.5. It is possible, still, that the decision-making index can 
explain a different BMI cut-off. Indeed, a third regression codes BMI scores under 20 as one. 
Here, the urban dummy (-0.22), education (-0.06), and the decision-making index (-0.09) are 
negative and statistically significant with the BMI dummy (< 20). In other words, a high 
score on the decision-making index, living in an urban zone, and years of education reduce 
the probability of BMI falling below 20. Under this threshold, women’s decision-making 
index is not related to BMI. As argued earlier, it is likely that women display altruistic 
behavior in the household and those women with low BMI and high scores on the household 
decision-making index are altruistically diverting resources to feed other members, possibly 
children (Ferro-Luzzi et. al., 2001:49; Hando, 2009:59; Sahn and Younger, 2009:27; Sen,
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1990). Only after other members of the household have been fed, women use their bargaining 
power to improve own nutrient intake and work effort distributions. As Hando (2009:73) 
observes “when men’s field fail to provide food, the women take on the responsibility of 
providing for the household”.
As for the binary anemia regression, the results are almost unchanged. The decision­
making index approaches statistical significance with a positive coefficient supporting the 
empowerment model of Figure 4.3. Age difference (-0.08), the richest household dummy (­
0.12), and the wife beating justification index (0.1) are also statistically significant. Thus, 
women who agree with husband beating justification have higher probability of being 
anemic. The relationship between the wealthiest group and both health indicators supports the 
intuition that access to a rich diet and basic amenities— such as water and latrines— are goods 
and services only the richest households benefit from. As late as 2006, in fact, 60% of the 
Ethiopian population did not have access to an improved water source according to the 
UNDP (2009).
Table 6.13. Continuous and binary BMI regressions.
BMI BMI 18.5 cut-off Binary probit BMI 20 cut-off Binary probit
Age 0.03 0.09 ** 0.03
Age difference -0.01 0.04 0.03
Poorer 0.02 0.00 -0.02
Middle 0.02 -0.05 -0.03
Richer 0.02 -0.08 -0.04
Richest 0.03 -0.10 -0.02
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.02 -0.02 0.05
Polygamy -0.02 0.02 0.04
Urban 0.18 *** -0.07 -0.22 ***
Christian -0.02 -0.04 0.04
Husband: husband rights index 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
Wife: wife beating justification index 0.01 -0.06 -0.03
Tigray -0.09 *** 0.07 ** 0.11 ***
Afar -0.02 0.00 0.01
Amhara -0.07 * 0.01 0.04
Somali -0.01 0.04 0.01
Ben-Gmuz -0.04 *** 0.03 ** 0.05 ***
SNNP -0.06 * 0.09 * 0.03
Gambela -0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 *
Harari -0.01 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 **
Addis Ababa 0.03 * 0.03 0.03
Dire Dawa -0.01 0.02 ** 0.02 *
Education 0.10 *** -0.03 -0.06 *
Wife relative earning 0.02 -0.11 * 0.03
Control over earnings 0.03 -0.13 * -0.01
Decision-making index 0.09 ** -0.02 -0.09 *
R-square 0.12 0.09 0.09
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005. Dummy is Oromiya.
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Indirect effects
There are three different indirect effects: The indirect effects of the conversion factors 
mediated by education on earnings; second, the indirect effects of the conversion factors 
mediated by education and earnings on the decision-making index; the indirect effects of the 
conversion factors mediated by education, earnings and the decision-making index on health 
functioning including the indirect effects of education and earnings mediated by the decision­
making index on health functionings.
The first thing to note is the anemia indicator has no statistically significant indirect 
effects. Second, only education and decision-making mediate between conversion factors and 
BMI. Thus, education mediates between age (-), urban (+), and Christian (+). Accordingly, 
older educated women achieve lower, while educated urban and Christian women achieve 
higher, BMI. In addition, further decision-making in the household raises BMI for women in 
non-polygamous relationship, for polarized relationships where women agree with beating 
justification but not men, and for women who absolutely reject beating justification. In 
addition, women who earn income achieve higher BMI by taking more decisions. Hindi 
(2000:1525) found a similar relationship in Zimbabwe where she noted women who did not 
earn any cash had lower BMI achievement when they took fewer decisions in the household.
An interesting implication of these results is that the effect of decision-making varies 
according with household characteristics. For instance, whereas in polygamous relationships 
higher probabilities of taking decisions alone do not raise BMI, in non-polygamous 
relationships they do. Decision-making has accordingly different implications in 
heterogeneous household environments.
Dummies: Some patterns
The regions with the most negative dummies compared to Oromo are Afar (x3), Amhara 
(x4), Somali (x3), Gambela (x3), and Ben-Gmuz (x3). The regions with the most positive 
dummies are Harrari (x3), SNNP (x2), Dire Dawa (x2), and Addis Ababa (x3). The relatively 
few positive (and relatively more numerous negative) dummies entail the Oromo region 
outperforms most others in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the two city administrations—Dire Dawa 
and Addis Ababa by themselves skim about half the positive dummies. Focusing on the 
geographical patterns of statistical significance for the decision-making index, Tigray 
(North), Somali (South-East), Gambela (West), and SNNP (South) have statistically 
significant negative coefficients. Women in these regions accordingly have the highest 
probability of someone else taking decisions in the household, compared to Oromo women.
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In contrast, compared to Oromo women, women in Afar (North), Harari (Center-East), and 
Dire Dawa (Center-East) take both more shared and alone decisions. While in some northern 
regions (Tigray and Ben-Gmuz) women take few household decisions, all regions with 
positive dummies are located in either Center or Northern Ethiopia, supporting the 
ethnographic research which found that women in Northern Ethiopia have relatively higher 
status (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). Furthermore, in 
two regions women have a negative dummy for both anemia and BMI, namely, Ben-Gmuz 
(North) and Gambela (West). In these regions therefore women’s well-being shortfall is the 
highest. If women’s health indicators covary with those of other members in the household, 
then these indicators may be used as proxy indicators for overall household short term 
nutrition and health as well.
Table 6.14. Regional dummies.
Education Earnings Control DMI BMI Anemia - +
Tigray -G.13 *** -G.G9 *** 2 G
Afar -G.G2 * -G.G5 ** -G.G9 *** G.G6 *** 3 1
Amhara -G.ll *** -G.16 ** -G.13 * -G.G7 * 4 G
Somali -G.G6 ** -G.18 *** -G.G7 ** 3 G
Ben-Gmuz -G.G2 ** -G.G4 *** -G.G2 * 3 G
SNNP G.G9 * G.11 * -G.18 *** -G.G6 * G.12 ** 2 2
Gambela -G.G1 * -G.G2 *** -G.G1 * 3 G
Harari G.G3 *** G.G3 *** G.G2 *** -G.G1 *** 1 3
Addis Ababa G.G6 *** G.G5 * G.G3 * G 2
Dire Dawa -G.G1 G.G3 *** G.G3 *** 1 2
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005. Dummy is Oromiya.
V. Conclusion.
The chapter expanded the capability approach based model of Chapter 5 by estimating which 
conversion factors and capability inputs correlate with women’s health functioning in 
Ethiopia. The findings include a positive relationship between the (pre-conditions) capability 
inputs education and (process) decision-making capability inputs and BMI. The anemia 
functioning indicator—when compared to BMI—was, however, more responsive to 
household wealth and to bargaining indicators such age difference between spouses, and the 
rejection of wife beating justification by wife. Although the anemia indicator was not
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correlated to the decision-making index, women who shared more decisions with their 
husbands had healthier anemia health functionings.
While a strict positive linear relationship between decision-making and functioning 
health is not supported, decision-making patterns in household clearly matter for health 
functioning. The results indicate that decision-making has a non-linear, context dependent, 
relationship with health functioning across households. As noted in Table 6 .6 , women sharing 
decisions with their husbands achieve better anemia scores. Cooperation in decision-making 
in the household may in this way help improve women’s anemia health functioning. 
Furthermore, the computation of indirect effect reveals that the impact of decision-making on 
health depends on priors such as polygamy or earnings share. Such evidence, as discussed in 
the introduction of Chapter 5, suggests in Ethiopia households are more accurately described 
using a non-cooperative household bargaining model because outcomes could be (Pareto) 
inefficient.
The chapter also allows us to conclude the decision-making index cannot distinguish 
between women who achieved less than 18.5 on the BMI. The decision-making index, 
nevertheless, distinguishes between women with a BMI less than 20 from others. In other 
words, women whose BMI is less than 20 tend to take fewer decisions in the household. 
Some hypotheses explaining this relationship were suggested. In addition, women who 
earned more (relative to husband) could reduce the probability of BMI falling under the risk 
threshold of 18.5. Micro-credit initiatives which could insure women have control over their 
earnings may then offer a safety net for Ethiopian women.
In the next chapter an equally recent Ethiopian dataset is used to introduce new 
capability inputs indicators and functioning dimensions, including women’s perception of 
empowerment and their subjective well-being indicators. The next chapter thus explores 
novel relationships between conversion factors, capability inputs, and subjective well-being 
functionings.
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CHAPTER 7
Capability and subjective well-being functioning in rural
Ethiopian households
I. Introduction.
The capability approach components in this seventh chapter are unchanged and continue to 
be the conversion factors, the capability inputs, and the achieved functionings. In what 
follows, however, these components are empirically operationalized with new indicators. In 
theory, and as noted earlier (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2), the three components remain 
asymmetrically bi-directionally causally related to each other. Thus, living in one’s village of 
birth in Ethiopia is a socio-geographic conversion factor influencing women’s effective 
potential functionings in the capability set. Yet, having capability can also include the 
potential functioning “staying in village of birth” . The variables chosen to empirically 
contextualize the components are described next.
The conversion factors, as before, are the characteristics that shape the capability sets 
of individuals (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005; Robeyns, 2005). They include heterogeneity in 
three distinct dimensions—the individual, the social, and the environmental. In all chapters, 
the three dimensions are regrouped in three levels: the individual, the household, and the 
institutional. A principle criterion in the selection of conversion factors is exogeneity which 
means conversion factors are determined outside the system of equations.
Capability— defined as the space of all achievable functionings—is the freedom an 
individual has to pursue valuable doings and beings. Capability, however, unlike height or 
temperature is unobservable. Here, to capture capability, Robeyns’s (2004b) input 
measurement method is complemented with Kabeer’s (1999) definition of resources and 
processes as capability inputs. These intermediate frameworks are therefore employed to
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bridge the gap between the abstract definitions of the components and the indicators selection 
process.
The output components of the model are achieved functionings. The term achieved is 
used to distinguish them from the potential functionings of the capability set. Functionings 
are valuable individual beings and doings and include here questions on two subjective well­
being indicators—happiness and life satisfaction (see Chapter 4). Although correlated, in the 
subjective well-being literature, these two measures are not perceived as substitutes and it is 
recommended they should be evaluated separately (Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith, 
1999:277). Thus, life satisfaction captures the more evaluative and reflective dimensions of 
subjective well-being and differs from happiness (Deci and Ryan, 2008:2; Phillips, 2009:19­
20). Happiness, however, is more focused on given sensual feelings (i.e., positive affect). 
Both measures, at any rate, have robust psychometric properties, good internal consistency, 
moderate stability, and appropriate sensitivity to changing life circumstances (Diener and 
Diener, 2005; Diener et. al., 1999; Layard, 2005).
Still, happiness and life satisfaction indicators are criticized for being overly sensitive 
to ad hoc life circumstances and events as well as to adaptive preferences (Samman, 
2007:476-80). With these caveats in mind, it is also important to recall that the subjective 
well-being indicators are consistently correlated with objective indicators including earnings 
and good health across countries and time (see Chapter 4). These correlations signal that 
subjective well-being indicators have at least instrumental usefulness. The same applies to the 
cross-sectional relationships that follow.
A new dataset
A different Ethiopian dataset, the EHRS (Ethiopian Household Rural Survey), is used here to 
test a model very similar to the one in Chapter 6 . The EHRS is as recent as the DHS— data 
for this round was collected in 2004. In this round of the EHRS, new indicators were added 
on subjective well-being and the perception of empowerment. The EHRS, as already noted, 
differs in various ways from the DHS including in its focus on rural agricultural 
communities. Thus, the EHRS is not a representative survey even though it reflects the 
country’s diverse agricultural systems. Nevertheless, to the extent that Ethiopia is 
predominately a rural country, the EHRS captures important population characteristics.
The new indicators introduced in this chapter—wife earnings (in Birr), subjective 
well-being, and the perception of empowerment— are added to further contribute to the 
operationalization of the capability approach. These indicators are also integrated to test the
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relationships between the perception of empowerment and women’s subjective well-being 
(Diener and Diener, 2005). In addition, the relationship between various sources of women’s 
earnings and functioning is explored. Although the bargaining power literature appears to be 
more concerned about the impact of relative earnings (Doss, 2003), a comparison is here 
attempted between the two. The model therefore tests whether there are differences in the 
effects of absolute and relative earnings on the perception of empowerment and subjective 
well-being functionings indicators.
In sum, a measurement exercise of capability and functionings is once more attempted 
with a different dataset that opens new possibilities. The same theoretical insights are 
employed, including the inputs method to measure capability in terms of resources (education 
and earnings) and processes (empowerment).
The estimated empirical relationships should be interpreted within the time frame of 
the survey and the villages’ geographic coverage. The estimation exercise involves two steps. 
The first step is the measurement exercise which maps theoretical definitions into empirical 
ones. The mapping cannot be done unless some indicators were selected at an earlier stage. 
The second step involves estimating relationships between these measured concepts. The 
second step is contingent on the first which mapped abstract theoretical concepts into 
empirical ones. If the theoretical components are adequately mapped, something may be said 
on the actual relationships between theoretical concepts. The mapping exercise, alongside the 
estimation of relationships between concepts, is similar to the earlier chapters.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the anthropological studies 
which were undertaken in earlier rounds of the survey (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). In 
Section 3, the dataset is described in further detail and relationships of interest between 
indicators are tested. Section 4 estimates the empirical model and interprets the results. 
Section 5 concludes.
II. Women’s life in four Ethiopian villages.
Village studies
Anthropological field studies can offer precious insights into village Ethiopian life. A series 
of village studies were conducted in the 1990s from the villages where EHRS data is being 
collected (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). A report for each village was written describing,
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among other things, the village social structure, its main economic activities, its institutional 
characteristics, and political history.
The objective of this section is therefore to offer insights into what village life is for 
the women being studied. It aims to imbed the reader in the environment in which women’s 
lives unfold. To the extent it reflects the fine grain of village life which statistical analysis is 
unlikely to capture, such qualitative methods are both valuable on their own and useful to 
contextualize the statistical model to be estimated and its patterns of statistical significance. 
To achieve this, four villages—Adado, Adele Keke, Harresaw, and Turufe Ketchema—were 
randomly selected and analyzed.
Adado
Adado is situated in the cluster of villages furthest south in the Gedeo. The Gedeo refers both 
to the distinct and homogeneous ethnic group and to the Gedeo region itself. Traditional 
Gedeo institutions are hierarchical exogamous and patrilineal.90 The “voices of men, mainly 
elders, are generally decisive in allocating household labor and in making other household 
decisions” (Adado, p.17), giving the father final authority in the household where the 
prevailing norms are of respect and domination. The main economic activities are 
accordingly managed by men and they include coffee and enset production. Men in Adado 
plant, take care of, and sell both coffee and unprocessed enset. Women in Adado are involved 
in brewing tella, distilling araqi, processing and preparing enset for consumption, and selling 
food. Men’s increased specialization in coffee production is also freeing women to grow and 
maintain enset.91 Although the proceeds from the sale of processed enset are usually not 
handed over to men, they are mostly spent on household commodities (including meat). To 
support their families, women also sell green coffee, cabbage, and small amounts of (retail) 
coffee.
The birth of daughters and sons is equally valued in Adado. Gender norms of good 
behavior include shyness, respectfulness, skill in women's duties such as scraping and 
processing enset and the proper handling of her husband's wealth and resources. Women’s 
ability to peacefully solve family disputes is also valued. Socially reprimanded behaviors by 
girls include going out of the family compound without permission and entertaining too close 
friendships with boys.
90 When marrying from a different area, it is usually the bride who leaves her area to live with her husband.
91 Enset is a banana like local staple food crop.
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Family planning and services have a limited influence in the village because the 
Gedeo attach great importance to fertility. An interviewed health assistant observed “even the 
small number of women who start receiving family planning services immediately stop using 
them and continue to have babies” (Adado, p.13). In the case of infertility, the husband calls 
upon a traditional ceremony in which elders say Kayo. The outcome of Kayo is invariably to 
allow men to marry another woman. Although the report suggests polygamy is decreasing, it 
remains prevalent. Men in fact are allowed to take another wife by giving a dowry to the new 
bride whereas widows loose children and property if they decide to remarry. Although 
divorce is easy, women have no right to property, children, and land inheritance.
Adele Keke
Adele Keke has a patrilineal marriage system. Most of its inhabitants are Oromo Muslims 
“governed by Islamic rule and tradition” (Adele Keke, p.1). The others are Amhara 
assimilated to the Oromo way of life. Excluding marriages, peaceful cohabitation, friendship, 
and cooperation between the two communities prevails. Activities requiring muscular 
strength are conducted by men whereas cooking and child caring are female activities. In 
addition, women are responsible for cleaning, fetching water, and collecting wood. Women, 
however, started helping their husbands with light farm work about twenty years ago. The 
movement has helped change the perception of women’s role. In the farm women mostly 
weed fields and milk animals as the husband takes major decisions over farm management. 
Still, every family member has use rights (for land, equipment, and livestock) and wives may 
express their opinion over all these matters. In fact, all income and assets are commonly 
owned even if the husband has the upper hand. Unexpectedly, chat leafs, which are a good 
source of income and a big high quality orchard is considered a luxury, are sold mainly by 
women. Wives are also allowed to spend as much as 20 Birr (or 1.1 euros) without consulting 
their husbands.
Both sons and daughters do shepherding work in Adele Keke. Unlike Adado, 
infertility in men in Adele Keke can be detected in government hospitals. It is generally 
accepted therefore that a wife abandons or divorces an infertile husband. In case of divorce, 
women are given money, livestock, and any children under age of six. Women in Adele 
Keke, in addition, have access to family planning services which offer food, childcare, 
breastfeeding, advice on birth-spacing, intake of contraceptive capsules, and housing. The 
report, however, notes for lineage continuation, sons are somewhat preferred to daughters. 
Women and wife desirable qualities include good hospitality, hard work, kindness,
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cleverness, dexterity, living economically, and participating in farm work (in addition to 
housework). Telling lies and quarrelling are undesirable qualities. Although some in the 
community argue reading, writing, and doing sums are very important, few children go to 
school. The general perception towards modern education is ambiguous with some arguing 
that it disturbs identity and the traditional way of life.
Harresaw
Harresaw is located in northern Ethiopia where about 80% of the population speaks Tigrigna 
and follows the Orthodox Christian church. The main ethnic groups are Agewo (Harresaw) 
and Tigrayans. Like elsewhere in Ethiopia, women in Harresaw undertake traditional 
activities such as cooking, fetching water, and wood, as well as buying and selling goods in 
the market. Though women rarely participate in harvesting they increasingly partake in all 
sort of agricultural activities including weeding, gathering grain from the fields, and 
threshing. Some of these activities used to be forbidden for women because it was thought 
their participation decreases productivity. In recent years, however, women started owing 
land and ploughing it themselves. Stoves in Harresaw are gradually being replaced because 
they burn wood inefficiently causing health problems for the cook.
In Harresaw women earn income from various activities including hairdressing, 
basketry, and pottery. Earned income is either kept for themselves with the prior agreement 
of their husband or is spent on household goods such as coffee and fuel for lighting. Women 
in Harresaw often cooperate with their husbands in both household and productive activities 
and husbands are in fact expected to wash their own clothes even as the wife helps him build 
“his house, strengthening his fence and the like” (Harresaw, p.14). When there are no guests, 
all the family eats from the same plate at the same time. Furthermore, women in Harresaw 
have good access to family planning services and—if infertile— are taken to hospital for 
diagnosis and treatment. There is a general son preference for economic reasons since they do 
not leave upon marriage. Sons may also be sent to school instead of girls when a choice has 
to be made between the two. Pregnancy here is tough on women as they are given little rest, 
care, and have to resume work shortly after birth.
Women in the village reported desirable qualities in women include good leadership 
skills and willingness to work hard whereas a successful farmer's wife is an obedient good 
home manager. Women view education important to be a better farmer wife. Authority in 
Harresaw remains enshrined in the figure of the father although wife decision making over 
income and affairs of the household is increasing. In case of divorce, household property,
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including land, is divided equally between spouses and the distribution of children is made on 
the preferences of children themselves who tend to prefer the mother. Apparently, beating is 
decreasing and gender equality gaining acceptance, because husbands know their wife can 
leave with her share of the farm.
Turufe Ketchema
With 2674 households and a fertility rate of 6  to 7 children, compared to other villages, 
Turufe Ketchema has average wealth, an orderly community where people mix in small 
circles and a primarily subsistence agricultural existence. The ethnic structure of the village is 
as follows: Oromo 80 %, Tigrayans 10%, Amhara 4%, and Wolayitta 6 %. The Oromo are 
mostly Muslim and the original inhabitants of the land. The other, mostly Christian, 
ethnicities are viewed as late comers. Few customs are shared among the different ethnicities 
in the village, although the Amhara and Tigrayans acknowledge being close to each other. In 
general the community is open to both modern and traditional beliefs.
The four shops of the Turufe Ketchema peasant association (PA) sell coffee, sugar, 
edible oil, kerosene, soap, salt, matches, blades, pens, pencils, exercise books, and cigarettes. 
After 1974 all individuals are considered equal yet there are still wealth and gender 
inequalities. Females are expected to respect males as every junior respects his senior. 
Furthermore, “the relation between men and women and parent and child, however, has not 
changed to the degree that it has affected their social structure” (Turufe Ketchema, p.41).
Fetching water, collecting wood, and buying necessary food materials to be cooked 
for the household are women's responsibility. Women also participate in weeding, harvesting, 
enset scraping, cooking, and going to the market to buy food items and cloth. Other women 
activities include making basket products from straw and traditional hair dressing. Women 
who earn money off-farm in Turufe Ketchema can spend it on themselves. The Amhara and 
Tigrayans introduced to the area women activities such as beer-brewing. Spinning was also 
introduced by migrants. Women are still responsible for food preparation and keeping 
children at home. The house management activities require, on average, 15 minutes for 
cleaning, 30 minutes for fetching water, collecting and preparing wood 2 hours, and eating 25 
minutes.
In Turufe Ketchema divorce is rare but husbands do take on other wives. It was also 
observed that some women use contraceptive secretly which creates tension with men who 
suspect infidelity. There is also a noted preference for male children in the village. After 
birth, women are not expected to work even if they perform simple tasks such as cooking and
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cleaning. A group of women listed the following as desirable traits for females: intelligence, 
being good with their hands and a hard worker, courtesy, obedience, humility, cleverness, 
dexterity, kindness, and honesty. Women also observed schooling facilitates off farm earning 
activities. A group of women listed the following undesirable characteristics in a female: 
adultery, not respecting their husbands, and not doing what he commands, not having good 
households, not finishing domestic work on time (e.g., food preparation), playing or joking 
with men (which might lead to sexual behavior), and giving birth before marriage (for girls). 
Furthermore, a farmer's wife should respect her husband, be brave and lovable, and volunteer 
to help on the farm if she has time.
In summary, these studies offer rich insights on village life suggesting for instance 
that though most rural Ethiopian women value education and autonomy, their identity and 
self-confidence are contingent on both male authority and the gender norms upheld by 
women themselves in the village (see also Pankhurst, 1992). Such effects have deep 
implications for empowerment which cannot be understood in terms of absolute and 
individualistic autonomy in the Ethiopian context.
III.The 2004 EHRS dataset.
D ata overview
Rural life in Ethiopia is organized around peasant associations (PAs). Although the DERG 
(the now defunct military dictatorship that held power over the period 1974-1990) introduced 
PAs, they continue to play an important function. PAs, for instance, are used to distribute 
land and services by a significant proportion of peasants. Thus, in Turufe Kechema,
the PA has two divisions. The first is administrative: it has the responsibility for 
implementing government regulations, for example tax collection, implementation of 
political decisions, and organization of farmers for group work like terracing, 
afforestation, etc. The second division ... implements laws. The members are elected 
by the farmers in the PA and are not more than 3 in number. They are responsible for 
dealing with crimes and can arrest a criminal for up to 3 months and decide penalties 
up to 300 birr. People bring disputes to the executive committee of the PA (p.29)
148
The EHRS is a panel dataset covering 20 peasant PAs spread over Ethiopia. The PAs 
were selected by survey designers to reflect the various Ethiopian agricultural systems. The 
sample of households is a panel (expanded in 1994) following households since 1989. The 
attrition rate is rather small, less than 7% according to Dercon and Hoddinott (2004:6). That 
is one of the reasons why there may be discrepancies in statistics between a nationally 
representative survey such as the DHS and this one.
The choice of explanatory covariates in this chapter is also based on the literatures 
reviewed earlier. Additional factors are considered here related to subjective-well being and 
the perception of empowerment. In this chapter, at the individual level, age, disability, and 
pregnancy are the chosen conversion factors. The explanatory variables at the household 
level are husband in polygamous relationship, age difference between partners, partners of 
different ethnicities, assets, and perception of household wealth to the village, are included. 
At the institutional level, religious and village level dummies are included.
Table 7.1 lists all the variables included in the model. Most independent-explanatory 
covariates are from the psychological literature on subjective well-being (Diener et. al., 1999;
92Layard, 2005). Female headed households are excluded. Approximately half the women are 
born in the village they currently live in. The mean age is relatively high at 41.6 years. The 
mean is likely to be high because the EHRS is a 20 years old panel (with very little attrition). 
5% of women are engaged to husbands from a different ethnicity while 45% still live in the 
village they were born in. The educational attainment of most women is rather small and on 
average less than a year. About 30% of the sampled women are pregnant or breastfeeding. 
About 30% of sampled women have some sort of disability restricting their mobility or
93ability to carry heavy loads, including demanding agricultural work .93
There is a large variance in the value of women’s earnings which range from zero to 
6180 Birr over a four month period (mean 230 Birr, or 13 euros for the 25/01/2010 exchange 
rate). The mean is quite high compared to the median (60 Birr) because of the few extreme 
earners. The earnings include income from own activities as well as income from the farm 
plot, live stock, off-farm income, and as hired labor.94 The ratio of wife earnings to total 
household earnings is also computed.95 Since the earnings indicator displays large
92 The subjective well-being and perception of empowerment questions were asked in a separate women’s only 
questionnaire which excludes household heads.
93 The disabilities accounted for include hearing, sight, speaking, carrying heavy loads, using a cane, paralysis of 
any body parts.
94 Earnings from own activities include sales of charcoal, firewood and dungcakes, handicraft pottery etc. 
Earnings from off-farm income and from hired labour are computed over the last four month.
95 About 15% of the sample reported no earnings. These households had the mean value in terms of assets but
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discrepancies in variance that can lead to model convergence problems it is transformed 
using the square root function (Muthen and Muthen, 2008b:382). A similar treatment is 
applied to other variables such as age, earnings, and education. Age, however, is simply 
divided by 10 to deflate the variance. For education, the square root transformation is 
justified because only very few women have more than a year of education and it is quite 
likely the impact of education will taper off in a rural environment.
Table 7.1. Sample descriptive statistics.
N Mean Median Std.Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Code
Age 586 41.61 40 11.78 0.78 0.48 18 85 Years
Education 571 0.77 0 1.73 3.24 13.36 0 15 Schooling years com pleted (ages>15)
Pregnant or breastfeeding 586 0.33 0 0.47 0.73 -1.47 0 1 1=Yes
Polygamy 586 0.06 0 0.23 3.86 12.94 0 1 1=Yes
Disability 586 0.31 0 0.46 0.84 -1.30 0 1 1=Yes
Partners age difference 566 -9.73 -9 9.44 0.55 5.75 -42 46 Years
Partners of different 
ethnicities 586 0.05 0 0.22 4.08 14.72 0 1 1=Yes
Total earnings by wife 586 234.47 60 518.44 6.03 50.58 0 6180 In  Birr (over last 4 month)
Earning ratio (relative to 
total household income) 586 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.48 -1.36 0 1
In  %  (over last 4 
month)
Earnings decision-making 586 0.04 0 0.20 4.54 18.65 0 1 1=Yes
Household assets 586 327.44 160.7 514.89 4.77 32.49 0 5236
In  Birr (tools, large 
household goods, 
other valuables)
Household poverty 
(relative to village) 582 2.94 3 1.08 0.15 -0.55 1 6
The richest in the 
village =1; the poorest 
in the village=7
My life is determined by 
my own actions 583 4.80 5 1.51 -0.69 -0.54 1 7
Strongly disagree =1; 
strongly agree =7
I have the power to make 
important decisions that 
change the course of my 
life
582 4.49 5 1.62 -0.48 -0.97 1 7 Strongly disagree =1; strongly agree =7
I am usually able to 
protect my personal 
interests
583 4.42 5 1.58 -0.39 -1.14 1 7 Strongly disagree =1; strongly agree =7
Taken all together, how 
would you say things are 
for you these days: would 582 1.85 2 0.63 0.13 -0.57 1 3
N ot too happy =1; 
Very happy=3
you say
I am satisfied with my life 586 4.16 5 1.66 -0.32 -1.18 1 7 Strongly disagree =1; strongly agree =7
In most ways my life is 
close to my ideal 
(husband)
582 3.62 3 1.70 0.16 -1.38 1 7 Strongly disagree =1; strongly agree =7
Source: EHRS (2004).
In the 2004 EHRS round, approximately 27%, or 1/3 of women who earn income, 
have some control over the way they want to spend it. However, control over earnings is
were substantially older in age. It is therefore quite plausible that they are retired and no longer producing 
income.
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problematic because the proportion of women who control their earnings is small (around 5% 
of the sample). Given the number of explanatory variables this gives too few degrees of 
freedom for reliable estimation. Thus, although decisions concerning earnings are an 
important capability input, they will be only included as an explanatory variable in the 
perception of empowerment and subjective well-being regressions.
Household wealth is measured both objectively using total value of household assets 
owned and subjectively i.e., relative to other households in the village. Self-assessed financial 
situation is acknowledged to be highly responsive to actual income (Zaidi and Burchardt, 
2005:98-99) and quite stable over time, at least in most developing countries (Doss, 2003).
Approximately half the sample is Christian orthodox. In the multivariate model 
estimated below, Christian orthodox women are dummy coded one96 to achieve some control 
over the various capability inputs and functioning achievements. Religion is thus theorized as 
an institutional conversion factor. The other institutional conversion factors are the village 
dummies. In this chapter, to avoid excluding any specific village from the analysis, usage is 
made of the reference dummy coding method (Hardy, 1993:64-71). By this method, it is 
possible to compare each village dummy coefficient to the average effects of all dummies on 
the dependent variable thus avoiding an arbitrary village choice.
Next, basic descriptive statistical estimates—including means and correlations— are 
employed to explore what kind of relationships can be expected from the dataset. In Table 
7.2, the distributions of answers per categories for the perception of empowerment indicators 
are given. These questions code one for “Strongly disagree”, seven for “Strongly agree” and 
four for “Neither agree nor disagree”. For each of the empowerment questions the maximal 
and minimal frequencies are the same categories namely “Agree” and “Strongly disagree” for 
maximum and minimum respectively. The distributions for the other categories are quite 
similar as can be seen in Figure 7.1. To further explore how the empowerment questions are 
related to each other their correlations are estimated and compared to the correlations of the 
subjective well-being indicators in Table 7.3.
96 More specifically, 75% of the sample is Christian and 22% are Muslim.
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T a b le  7 .2 . P e rc e p t io n  o f  e m p o w e rm e n t  f r e q u e n c y  d is tr ib u t io n s .
My life is determined I have the power to make important I am usually able to protect
by my own actions decisions that change the course of my life. my personal interests
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 7 Min 0.96 16 Min 2.20 8 Min 1.10
Disagree 66 9.08 93 12.79 99 13.62
Slightly disagree 57 7.84 67 9.22 85 11.69
Neither agree nor disagree 60 8.25 63 8.67 57 7.84
Slightly agree 155 21.32 146 20.08 147 20.22
Agree 202 Max 27.79 173 Max 23.80 173 Max 23.80
Strongly agree 41 5.64 29 3.99 19 2.61
Source: EHRS (2004).
The Pearson correlations between the perception of empowerment indicators are 
larger than their respective correlations with the subjective well-being indicators. A similar 
pattern of correlations supports the hypothesis that the perception of empowerment indicators 
are related to each other and capture a phenomenon distinct from subjective well-being 
(Diener and Diener, 2005). The correlation between life satisfaction and happiness is 0.42 
and within the literature bounds (Samman, 2007:466).
Table 7.3. Correlation between perception of empowerment and subjective well-being indicators.
I have the power to I am usually
My life is make important able to protectdetermined by , . . ^rA , r , Satisfaction Happinessdecisions that change my personalmy own actions the course of my life interests
My life is determined by my own actions 1
I have the power to make important
decisions that change the course of my 0.59** 1
life
I am usually able to protect my personal 0.45** 0.56** 1interests
Satisfaction 0.24** 0 .20** 0.32** 1
Happiness 0.18** 0 .22** 0.26** 0.42** 1
Notes: ** Statistically significant at the 5%. 
Source: EHRS (2004).
Table 7.4 and 7.5 report the frequencies of the happiness and life satisfaction 
variables respectively. Life satisfaction is measured using the same scale as the 
empowerment variables with seven for “Strongly agree”, one for “Strongly disagree”, and 
four for “Neither agree not disagree”. The happiness variable is, however, ordered differently 
since respondents are asked “Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these 
days: would you say” with the following possible answers “Not too happy”, “Pretty happy”, 
and “Very happy”. The answers are respectively coded from one to three. Table 7.4 shows 
that almost 60% of the sample is pretty to very happy. Still, around a fourth of the sample is 
not too happy. The result is consistent with Diener et. al. (1999) finding most people consider 
themselves happy.
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T a b le  7 .4 . H a p p in e s s .
Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say
Frequency Percent
Not too happy 169 23.25
Pretty happy 339 Max 46.63
Very happy 79 10.87
Total 587 100
Source: EHRS (2004).
Table 7.5 displays the life satisfaction frequencies. The number of categories is 
reduced to ease comparability with happiness. The maximal proportion obtains for the 
category “Agree” (56%) whereas the category with the least frequencies is “Neither” (6 %). 
Again, this is consistent with Diener et. al. (1999) finding that most individuals report their 
life satisfaction between slightly satisfied to very satisfied. However, in what follows, given 
the small number of cases in “Neither” and to facilitate categorical variable estimation, this 
variable is transformed into a binary indicator where the category “Agree” is coded 1 and the 
remainder zero.
Table 7.5. Life satisfaction.
I am satisfied with my life
Frequency Percent
Disagree 221 37.71
Neither 36 6.14
Agree 329 56.14
Total 586 100
Source: EHRS (2004).
Interrelationship between capability inputs
The correlations in Table 7.6 explore the relationships between the capability inputs— 
perception of empowerment, earnings, control over earnings, and education— and other 
indicators. The estimations are necessary to assess which potential relationships may later 
turn out to be statistically significant in multivariate regressions.
Since the perception of empowerment questions have seven categories the 
empowerment index can be estimated using a linear data reduction technique, principal
97components analysis (see below). As Layard (2005:45) points out, there is evidence that a 
negative correlation between spouse earning and partner life satisfaction exists. The 
hypothesis can be tested here. The variable “husband life being close to ideal” is therefore 
also included as a subjective indicator of another member’s well-being functioning.
97 Principal component analysis is a data reduction technique which computes a new variable from the common 
correlation between a group of indicators.
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Focusing on the age correlations first, older women feel more empowered supporting 
the evidence found in earlier chapters that a positive association between age and decision­
making obtains. However, older women are also less educated, earn less, take fewer decisions 
over earnings, and live with husbands whose life is far from ideal. It is necessary here to 
further discuss the negative correlation between age and control over earnings especially 
because earlier chapters showed older women take more decisions in the household. Still, in 
Chapter 6 , the age coefficient was not statistically significant in the control over earnings 
regressions. It should be noted, first, that the correlations between all empowerment 
indicators in this chapter (including, decision over earnings, and the perception of 
empowerment) are positive and statistically significant. Second, the most plausible 
explanation for the negative association between age and control over earnings is the fact that 
older women generate much less earnings than younger women and thus have fewer earnings 
decisions to take. Indeed, as noted in Chapters 5 and 6 , earnings is a robust predictor of 
decision-making in the household as women who earn less or nothing take fewer decisions. 
Furthermore, as earlier chapters also suggested, empowerment is multidimensional and has a 
variety of determinants. Thus, although ageing may enhance women’s feeling of 
empowerment, it is not possible to rule out a simultaneous negative relationship between age 
and household economic decision-making. In other words, there is no a priori reason for 
women who take more decisions to feel more disempowered at the same time.
Table 7.6. Correlations between capability inputs and other indicators.
Age Perception o f 
em powerm ent
Education Total
earnings
Earnings
ratio
Earnings
decision
~ c TT H usband Satisfaction Happiness
ideal life
Age 1
Perception of 0.08* 1empowerment
Education -0.27* 0.02 1
Total earnings -0.08* 0.07* 0 .12*** 1
Earnings ratio -0.04 -0.05 0.08* 0.44*** 1
Earnings
decision -0.07* 0.07* -0.01 0.18*** 0.19*** 1
Satisfaction 0.05 0.30*** 0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.050 1
Happiness -0.04 0.26*** 0.09** 0.17*** 0.03 -0.03 0.44*** 1
Husband ideal 
life -0.07* 0.24*** 0.00 0.00 -0.09** -0.12*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 1
Notes: Statistical significance 1% ***; 5% **; 10%*.
Source: EHRS (2004).
In the second column, one can see that the perception of empowerment index is 
positively correlated with total earnings, earnings decision-making, and the happiness and life 
satisfaction indicators. A woman who feels more empowered also lives with a husband whose 
life is close to his ideals. In the third column, the education indicator is positively correlated
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with total earnings and happiness. Total earnings, in the next column, are positively 
correlated with the earnings ratio, earnings decision-making, and happiness. The earnings 
ratio, in turn, is positively correlated with earnings decision-making but negatively with 
husband life close to ideals. Similarly, earnings decisions are also negatively correlated with 
husband life close to ideals.
The striking finding in the above correlations table is the negative relationship 
between the indicator “men feel their life is close from ideal” and women’s relative 
household earning and earnings decision-making. The possibility that this correlation is 
driven by households where both partners earn zero can be ruled out because decision over 
earnings by wife also produces the same negative correlation. However, men in households 
were earnings are zero also tend to claim their “life is closer to their ideal” which means that 
their exclusion from the dataset will attenuate the negative correlation. Nevertheless, it is a 
note worthy relationship because no such negative association between men “feeling of life is 
close to ideal” and women’s absolute earning exists. A negative correlation between men’s 
“life close to ideal” and women’s absolute earnings from labour income outside the 
household was also obtained (results not shown). Working outside the households is a visible 
activity which openly breaches a gender norm. These correlations are corroborated because 
men feel their “life is close to their ideal” even when the household is poor: The correlation 
between women’s earnings, men’s earnings, household assets, and the perception of 
household wealth relative to the village are all positive. Thus, the more women earn, the more 
assets the household could own, and the richer household members will feel with respect to 
other households in the village. Accordingly, women do not necessarily earn more in 
households which are doing badly economically. It is plausible to argue consequently that 
men’s identity is questioned— and a prevalent gender norm of the male as the sole or main 
household provider challenged—when women earn relatively more and take more earnings 
decisions (Ferree, 1990:874; West and Zimmerman, 1987; see also Chapters 4-5). The 
anthropological studies accompanying the dataset, in fact, offer some support to the norm of 
man as a provider (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). The threat to man’s identity then leads to a 
general decrease in the extent to which he considers his life is close to his ideals (Cheston and 
Kuhn, 2001:20-1).
These correlations offered many insights into what kind of relationships one can 
expect from the data. Next, an effort to build a coherent overall picture for this complex set of 
relationships via structural equation estimation is attempted.
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IV. Estimation.
In Figure 7.1 the relationships estimated in the model are provided. As before, capability and 
functionings are regressed on the conversion factors (effect 1 in Figure 7.1). The results of 
the latter regressions are displayed in the first four columns of Tables 7.7 and 7.8. Thus, after 
the indicators list, the first column from the left is the (linear) education regression on the 
conversion factors. Further to the right, the (linear) total earnings regression. Finally, in the 
last column, the subjective well-being functioning achievement regressions (happiness and 
life satisfaction). The direct effects of the conversion factors on functioning are labeled (3) in 
Figure 7.1. The indirect conversion factors effects mediated by capability inputs on 
functioning underlay the dotted line (effect (4)). Total direct capability effects on functioning, 
(which include the indirect effect of the conversion factors) are in (2). The negative 
correlations obtained earlier between earnings decision-making and relative wife earnings are 
accounted as household functioning interdependence effects and numbered (5). Thus, unlike 
earlier models, this one emphasizes functioning interdependence because (i) there is 
preliminary evidence that it is present; (ii) Layard (2005:63) lists them among the big seven 
factors affecting happiness (see below); and (iii) the dataset offers us the possibility to do
Figure 7.1. Estimated capability model with subjective well-being functionings.
Other
members’
functionings
The perception o f  empowerment index
The model results for happiness and life satisfaction are in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 respectively. 
Each table contains four regressions simultaneously estimated with the weighted least square 
estimator (WLSMV) of MPLUS, the chosen structural equations software (Muthen, 2004:17­
18). For the categorical dependent variables, probit coefficients are used with WLSMV.
The top panel in the tables is the perception of empowerment index— a standard linear 
factor model. The index captures the commonality between the perception of empowerment
98 It may be reminded that the DHS did not incorporate male BMI or anemia.
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indicators and differs from the household decision-making index of Chapters 5 and 6 . It 
differs, because it captures a subjective dimension of empowerment and applies to the feeling 
of empowerment in and beyond the household. Furthermore, this perception of empowerment 
index can be estimated linearly because its indicators have more than five categories and as 
such they produce only negligible attenuation biases from categorization (Bentler, 2006:68; 
Flora and Curan, 2004:467).
Unless there are discrepancies in Tables 7.7 and 7.8, the first three regressions are 
interpreted once. Since standardized coefficients are used to gauge relative coefficients 
strength, they should be interpreted in terms of standard deviation changes. For the linear 
regressions, (  coefficients are interpreted as follows: for a standard deviation change in x (the 
independent variable), y  (the dependent variable) changes by (  standard deviations. The 
happiness and life satisfaction equations are however probit regressions and their coefficients 
should be interpreted in terms of a probit index standardized deviations (see Chapter 6 ).
Starting with the perception of empowerment factor model, note that the 
unstandardized coefficient for “My life is determined by my own actions” is fixed to 1 (a 
necessary step to estimate the variance of the empowerment index). The size of the fixed 
indicator coefficient can nevertheless be gauged when standardized. Accordingly, for a 
standard deviation increase in women’s perception of empowerment, the score of the latent 
variable for “My life is determined by my own actions” increases by 0.67 standard 
deviations. Note that all the perception of empowerment coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the index explains about half the variance of “My life is 
determined by my own actions” and “I am usually able to protect my personal interests” and 
72% of “I have the power to make important decisions that change the course of my life” . 
Other model diagnostics are discussed in the footnotes.99 Next, the regression of the 
capability inputs on the conversion factors is considered.
From conversion factors to the capability inputs
The first regression involves the education capability input as dependent and the conversion 
factors as independent variables. The regression is depicted as relationship (1) in Figure 7.1. 
Only standardized coefficients are considered here. At the individual level, age (-0.28) is
99 Because of endogeneity a few statistically significant relationships are not estimated. Since model diagnostics 
are based on the covariance-correlation matrix of all indicators, not all model diagnostics reveal good fit (p- 
value x2 =0.00; CFI =0.84; RMSEA =0.051; WRMR =0.75). The structural equation diagnostics are chi-square 
p-value > 5%. Other guidelines for overall model fit include a comparative fit index CFI>0.95, the root mean 
square error of approximation RMSEA<0.06 and the weighted root mean square residual WRMR<0.9; see 
Muthén (2004:21-24) and Kaplan (2000).
157
statistically significant. Accordingly, older women are less educated than younger women. It 
is not implausible to speculate younger cohorts have had the opportunity to receive more 
education than older cohorts across Ethiopia. Furthermore, a similar coefficient was obtained 
in Chapter 6  using a nationally representative household survey. The 2005 DHS Ethiopia 
report (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006:17) also concludes “survey results show that there has 
been a marked improvement in the educational attainment of women. For example, the 
proportion of women with no education has declined significantly from 99 percent among 
women age 65 and over to 41 percent among women age 10-14”. Since education has an 
influence on pregnancy/breastfeeding, polygamy, age differences, difference ethnic origins, 
and wife perception of wealth relative to village, simultaneity cannot be ruled out. 100 The next 
level is therefore the institutional level. Here, the religion dummy for Christian Orthodox was 
not statistically significant. The peasants associations are dummy coded and cause shifts in 
regression intercepts. The dummies should be interpreted as deviations from the mean 
dummy effects (Hardy, 1993:64-71). The only two villages with statistically significant 
deviation are Turufe Ketchema and Azr Deboa. And their deviations are positive which 
means they cause upward shifts in the regression slope. Thus, everything else equal, women 
in these villages are more educated than others. The overall education regression has an r- 
square of 0.18.
Contiguous to the education regression, in the second column from the left, women’s 
earnings regression on conversion factors and the education capability input is reported. The 
first education capability input is statistically significant and positive (0.16). Accordingly, 
more educated women earn absolutely more. Replacing absolute earnings (in Birr) with 
relative earnings will make this model more comparable to the one estimated in Chapter 6 . 
The results turn out to be consistent with Chapter 6  where education was positively correlated 
with relative earnings. The absolute earnings indicator is also responsive to household 
assets—the more assets a household has, the more a wife earns. Still, this coefficient should 
be interpreted with caution because of endogeneity—the more a wife earns, the more assets 
the household has. Three considerations may be added here. First, the exclusion of this 
variable from the covariates does not affect the other results. Second, the relative earnings 
ratio is not correlated with household assets. Thus, although there may be a positive 
relationship from total earnings of wife (in Birr) to assets, when considering relative earnings 
this effect is attenuated because relative earnings are not as likely to affect household assets.
100 Explaining the education regression is, at any rate, not the main objective of this chapter. These variables are 
therefore excluded. The effects of the exclusion are analyzed in Chapter 7.
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Third, given the stability of household assets over time in developing countries (Doss, 2003), 
the effects of endogeneity with earnings can be quite limited. In fact, from the accompanying 
anthropological literature it is plausible to conclude that most earnings by women are spent 
on household daily needs (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). Although, the relative earnings ratio 
was not related to household assets— a result consistent with Chapter 6 —it was correlated 
with age difference between partners albeit negatively (-0.04). Thus, compared to women 
whose husband’s is relatively younger, women who are relatively older than their partner 
earn relatively less. The result may appear counterintuitive since one would expect women 
who are relatively older to earn relatively more (or, at least, not less). But this coefficient 
suggests, women’s share of earning rises the younger she is compared to her husband. Since 
relatively older women are also older women in age, 101 young women are more likely to be 
engaged with young men (the age of partners is positively correlated). The negative 
correlation between age differences and women’s earning is therefore simply indicating men 
have steeper age-earnings slopes than women (Blau and Kahn, 2000; Polacheck and Xiang, 
2009; Weinberger and Kuhn, 2004). In other words, given that (relatively and absolutely) 
older women are also engaged to (absolutely) older men, the earnings gaps ratio is not to their 
advantage. Finally, at the institutional level, three village dummies are negative (Dinki, 
Shumsha, and Turufe Ketchema) and five positive (Adele Keke, KoroDegaga, Imdibir, 
Adado, and Gara Godo). The reported r-square for this regression is 0.21.
In the fourth column, the perception of empowerment index is regressed on the 
conversion factors and the capability input total earnings, control over earnings, and 
education. Among the capability inputs, only decisions over earnings (0.11) are positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, women in control over earnings achieve higher scores on the 
perception of empowerment index. The result is sensible: Women who decide how to spend 
earned money feel more empowered. Education, unexpectedly given the large of body of 
evidence on its relationship with empowerment (Samman and Santos, 2009:20), is not 
statistically significant. One reason for this is that education appears to have a real effect only 
after two years of schooling (and not less). Given that most of the sample has less than one 
year of schooling, those who have more are not sufficient for statistical significance. At the 
household level, women in households with more assets and who feel wealthier than other 
households in the village perceive themselves as more empowered (Dercon, 1999:25-7). 
Accordingly, in households where assets are abundant, women’s perception of empowerment
101 The correlation between age difference and age is positive and statistically significant.
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index rises by 0 .1 1  standard deviations for a standard deviation rise in the value of assets held 
by the household. In addition, a standard deviation rise in the perception of poverty by wife 
reduces the empowerment index -0.1 standard deviations. The r-square for the perception of 
empowerment regression is 0.27.
The preceding analysis reviewed the first three regressions which parameterize the 
capability inputs. The results are to a large extent consistent with those obtained earlier in 
Chapters 5 and 6 . The next section analyses the happiness and life satisfaction regressions, 
introducing all capability inputs simultaneously.
From capability and  conversion factors to subjective functioning
The literature on the determinants of subjective well-being identified the big seven happiness 
factors (Layard, 2005:62-3), namely, family relationships, financial situation, work, 
community and friends, health, personal freedom, and personal values. Diener at. al. (1999) 
argued, in addition, a significant proportion of variance in subjective well-being is genetically
explained because the latter is an important determinant of personality traits which in turn
102explain differences in subjective well-being between individuals. Since these indicators are 
not available in the EHRS they cannot be added to the model as individual conversion 
factors. Diener et. al. (1999), further suggest, demographic factors (including age, sex, 
income, race, education, and marital status) should explain relatively little variance in 
subjective well-being scores. Layard (2005) disagrees somewhat and argues financial and 
family situation matter for happiness. With this EHRS dataset it is possible to account for 
some of these variables including age, education, village location, earnings, perception of 
empowerment, and other members’ subjective functionings. Since Diener et. al. (1999) also 
observe satisfaction is related to perceived discrepancies and social comparisons with 
proximate others, an important variable is going to be “Compared to other households in this 
village, would you describe your household” .
The last column of Table 7.7 reports the happiness ordered probit regression. Here, 
focus is on relationships (2), (3), (4), and (5) (in Figure 7.1). At the individual level, the age 
conversion factor (-0.12) is negative and statistically significant. Though age is not included 
among the “big seven” factors that influence happiness (Layard, 2005:63), Phillips (2006:23) 
reports that there tends to be a dip in subjective well-being around the age of 40. At the 
household level, only wife perception of relative poverty with respect to village (-0.41) is
102 The most studied personality traits in the subjective well-being literature are extraversion and neuroticism.
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statistically significant. Women who view their household as relatively poorer than others are 
less happy. The perception of poverty coefficient is consistent with Layard’s (2005) emphasis 
on financial situation being one of the big seven happiness determinants. But the extent to 
which the absolute financial situation of the household matter is more debatable because the 
absolute value of household assets was not correlated with happiness. In other words, even in 
Ethiopian villages where not all basic needs are necessarily being met, what seems to matter 
for happiness scores is relative household not absolute household wealth. At the institutional 
level, Christian Orthodox women are happier than women from other religious groups. Could 
this relationship be explained by their status as dominant majority in Ethiopia? Two villages 
have above averages scores on happiness (Dinki and Adele Keke) and two below average 
(Sumsha and Imbidir). I will discuss below the implications of the overall dummy sign 
patterns across regressions.
With respect to the capability inputs, two indicators are positive and statistically 
significant: the perception of empowerment index (0.19) and total earnings (0.20). Both 
inputs are among Layard’s (2005) big seven major happiness determinants. The positive 
relationship between earnings and subjective well-being should have been expected, 
especially because these correlations tend to be larger in poorer countries (Diener and Diener, 
2005:130) Thus, since the perception of empowerment is positively correlated with happiness 
(and life satisfaction), which, in turn, is also positively correlated with a variety of objective 
health indicators as argued earlier, then the subjective perception of empowerment is not an 
illusion. The absolute earnings indicator was also substituted with the relative earnings 
indicators but the latter was not statistically significant. Thus, happiness in this model is 
correlated with women’s absolute not relative earnings. Thus, contrary to wealth where the 
relative to other household variable matters, in terms of individual earnings, it is the absolute 
individual earnings indicators which matters. Accordingly, wives are happier if  their absolute 
earnings are absolutely larger only. Though there is a large body of evidence that indicates 
otherwise (Samman, 2007:475), the lack of statistical significance between education and 
happiness gets support from Layard’s contention that education is not consistently correlated 
with happiness. In rural Ethiopia, furthermore, this result is plausible because very few 
women have more than one year of education (the sample’s mean is 0.77 years) and some 
further testing on this data has shown the effect of education has an impact only for those 
with two or more years of education. Finally, husbands’ life ideal was coded 1 to indicate a 
life close to his ideals and it shows a positive statistically significant correlation with wife 
happiness. Thus, the closer the partner’s life is to his ideals, the happier the wife (0.11). In
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other words, controlling for all other factors, a husband whose life is far from ideal, reduces 
the happiness of his wife. The r-square for the happiness regression is 0.42.
Table 7.7. Perception of empowerment index (MIMIC) and happiness functioning.
Perception of empowerment index
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficients
My life is determined by my own actions 0.67 1 a
I have the power to make important decisions that 0.85 1.35 ***change the course of my life
I am usually able to protect my personal interests 0.68 1.04 ***
Education Earnings Perception of Happinessempowerment index Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients
Individual
Age -0.28 *** -0.02 0.01 -0.12 ***
Disability -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.08
Pregnant or breastfeeding -0.03 -0.06 0.03
Household
Polygamy 0.01 -0.05 0.07
Age difference -0.03 0.03 0.03
Partners different ethnic origin 0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Household poverty (relative to village) -0.06 -0.10 ** -0.41 ***
Household assets 0.09 *** 0.11 ** 0.00
Institutions and environment
Orthodox Christian -0.02 0.11 0.09 0.15 **
PA2_Geblen -0.09 -0.18 0.04 0.06
PA3_Dinki -0.08 -0.15 * 0.11 0.12 **
PA5 Yetmen 0.02 -0.04 -0.19 *** 0.04
PA6 Shumsha -0.03 -0.12 * 0.07 -0.26 ***
PA8_Adele Keke -0.07 0.39 *** -0.01 0.11 **
PA9 KoroDegaga -0.02 0.15 ** -0.24 *** -0.06
PA10 TurufeKetchema 0.24 *** -0.17 *** -0.04 -0.02
PA12_Imdibir 0.02 0.16 *** 0.20 *** -0.12 **
PA13 Azr Deboa 0.25 *** -0.03 0.02 0.08
PA14_Adado -0.06 0.11 * -0.30 *** -0.05
PA15_Gara Godo -0.05 0.13 ** 0.07 -0.05
PA16 Debre Birhan -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02
Capability inputs
Education 0.16 *** 0.04 -0.01
Earnings (in Birr) 0.01 0.19 ***
Decision earnings 0.11 * 0.00
Perception of empowerment index 0.20 ***
Other member functioning
Husband life close to ideal 0.11 **
R-square 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.42
Notes: N  = 560. PA = Peasant association. Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% ***; 5% **; 10%*. The village left out is PA1 
Harrersaw. a Fixed to one to identify variance of metric. Source: EHRS (2004).
As expected, the life satisfaction regression (Table 7.8) differs from the happiness 
regression. First, women with disability (0.13) and/or pregnant-breastfeeding (0.09) are more 
satisfied with their lives. Though in some communities women are ostracized during 
pregnancy and after birth and could have to start work shortly after birth in certain villages 
(eg., Harrersaw, Shumsheha, Geblen), for most, birth is a defining moment in their identities 
as women. There is substantial evidence in the anthropological village studies to support this
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hypothesis (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). In fact, in some villages, pregnant and breastfeeding 
women are given the best foods and allowed to rest over various periods, both before and 
after birth (eg., Dooma, Debre-Birhan, Aze-Deboa, Korodegaga, Yetmen, Turufe, Sirba, or 
Adado). As a corollary, infertility is a heavy burden and only in few villages women are not 
automatically blamed for the outcome. The positive coefficient for pregnancy is therefore not 
surprising. The positive sign for disability, however, is unexpected. Health is listed among 
the big factors affecting happiness by Layard (2005:63). One possible explanation is that 
disabled women have adapted to their disability but may also be given fewer and lighter 
workloads instead of very strenuous activities such as water fetching.
Table 7.8. Perception of empowerment index (MIMIC) and life satisfaction functioning.
Perception of empowerment index
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficients
My life is determined by my own actions 0.68 1 a
I have the power to make important decisions 0.83 1.30 ***that change the course of my life
I am usually able to protect my personal interests 0.70 1.08 ***
Education Earnings Perception of empowerment index
Life satisfaction Binary 
probit
Standardized coefficients
Individual
Age -0.28 *** -0.02 0.01 -0.01
Disability -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.13 **
Pregnant or breastfeeding -0.03 -0.06 0.09 *
Household
Polygamy 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
Age difference -0.03 0.03 0.01
Partners different ethnic origin 0.03 -0.03 0.05
Household poverty (relative to village) -0.06 -0.10 ** -0.26 ***
Household assets 0.09 *** 0.11 ** 0.04
Institutions and environment
Orthodox Christian -0.02 0.11 0.09 -0.03
PA2_Geblen -0.09 -0.18 0.04 0.01
PA3_Dinki -0.08 -0.15 * 0.11 0.26 ***
PA5 Yetmen 0.02 -0.04 -0.19 *** 0.04
PA6 Shumsha -0.03 -0.12 * 0.07 -0.01
PA8_Adele Keke -0.07 0.39 *** -0.01 -0.03
PA9 KoroDegaga -0.02 0.15 *** -0.24 *** -0.13 *
PA10 TurufeKetchema 0.24 *** -0.17 *** -0.04 0.11 *
PA12_Imdibir 0.02 0.16 *** 0.21 *** -0.05
PA13 Azr Deboa 0.25 *** -0.03 0.03 -0.05
PA14_Adado -0.06 0.11 * -0.30 *** -0.01
PA15_Gara Godo -0.06 0.14 *** 0.08 -0.11 *
PA16 Debre Birhan -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Capability inputs
Education 0.16 *** 0.04 -0.04
Earnings (in Birr) 0.01 0.11 **
Decision earnings 0.11 * 0.00
Perception of empowerment index 0.24 ***
Other member functioning
Husband life close to ideal 0.36 ***
R-square 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.46
Notes: N  = 560. PA = Peasant association. Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% ***; 5% **; 10%*. The village left out is PA1 
Harrersaw. a Fixed to one to identify variance of metric. Source: EHRS (2004).
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At the household level, the perception of relative poverty indicators has the expected 
sign (-0.26) and is similar to the happiness regression—it is negative and thus the poorer the 
wife considers her household to be compared to other households in the village, the less 
satisfied she is. At the institutional level, two villages have a positive dummy (Geblen and 
KoroDegaga) and two negative dummies (Adele Keke and Gara Godo).
As for the capability inputs, the perception of empowerment and absolute earnings are 
again positive and statistically significant. The relationship with other member’s functionings 
is similar to the happiness regression, namely, positive and statistically significant. The r- 
square is 0.46.
The models in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 are also estimated with instrumental variables for 
earnings following the method of Chapters 5 and 6  (see Appendix Tables A6  and A7). The 
exogenous instrument is village average earnings (Kambhampati, 2009). The instrumented 
earnings variable is introduced as an explanatory variable in the perception of empowerment 
regression because more empowered women are also more likely to earn more. The model
103with bootstrap adjusted standard errors is discussed here. However, the results turned out 
unchanged and remain consistent with those where the unadjusted earnings variable is used.
Village dummies
Studying the village dummy signs reveals the following patterns (Table 7.9). First, villages 
with a positive dummy for happiness are not necessarily the same as villages with a negative 
dummy for life satisfaction. Second, in some villages women can earn above average and still 
feel less empowered. Third, earnings and life satisfaction appear to be perfectly negatively 
correlated. Thus, in villages where earnings are positive and statistically significant, women 
tend to be less satisfied in life than the average. For happiness, there is a mix of cases. For 
instance, in Adele Keke, women earn more than the mean of other villages and are at the 
same time happier. However, in Imbidir, although women also earn more than the mean, they 
are less happy.
103 2SLS may produce biased standard errors which bootstrapped samples allegedly correct (communication 
with Antonakis on SEMNET, 12/14/2009; see also Foster and McLanahan (1996)).
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T a b le  7 .9 . S ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  v i l la g e  d u m m ie s .
Education Earnings
Perception of 
empowerment 
index
Happiness
Ordered
probit
Life
satisfaction
Binary
probit
Total
positive
Total
negative
PA2_Geblen
PA3_Dinki - + + 2 1
PA5 Yetmen - 1
PA6 Shumsha - - 2
PA8_Adele Keke + + 2
PA9 KoroDegaga + - - 1 2
PA10 TurufeKetchema + - + 2 1
PA12_Imdibir + + - 2 1
PA13 Azr Deboa + 1
PA14_Adado + - 1 1
PA15_Gara Godo + - 1 1
PA16 Debre Birhan
Source: EHRS (2004).
Indirect effects
Indirect effects are estimated for the happiness and life satisfaction regressions (Table 7.10). 
Except for a few differences, happiness and life satisfaction have quite similar indirect 
effects. Relative perception of poverty reduces subjective well-being via the perception of 
empowerment. Similarly, actual household assets are correlated with subjective well-being 
via earnings and the perception of empowerment. Thus, assets contribute to wife subjective 
well-being only if mediated by wife earnings and the perception of empowerment. In other 
words, a household can be quite wealthy in assets but its woman experiencing low subjective 
well-being if she earns little or has low perception of empowerment. Additionally, it is 
possible to observe, that village level effects interact with earnings in a complex way. For 
instance, women from Dinki and TurufeKetchema who earn more are less happy than those 
from Adele Keke, Koro Degaga, Imbidir, and Gara Godo. The same can be said for 
satisfaction with life. Furthermore, the relationship between village level effects and the 
perception of empowerment on subjective well-being is not consistently positive. In Yetmen, 
for example, more empowered women feel less subjective well-being. Finally, the indirect 
effects support Layard’s (2005:62) hypothesis that education raises happiness via earnings.
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T a b le  7 .1 0 . In d i r e c t  e f fe c ts .
Indicator Mediating variable Outcome variable Sign
Relative poverty Perception of empowerment index Happiness -
Relative poverty Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction -
Assets Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction +
Assets Earnings Satisfaction +
Assets Perception of empowerment index Happiness +
Assets Earnings Happiness +
Christian Orthodox Total indirect effect Happiness +
Christian Orthodox Total indirect effect Satisfaction +
PA3 Earnings Happiness -
PA5 Perception of empowerment index Happiness -
PA5 Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction -
PA8 Education Happiness +
PA8 Earnings Satisfaction +
PA9 Perception of empowerment index Happiness -
PA9 Earnings Happiness +
PA9 Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction -
PA9 Earnings Satisfaction +
PA10 Earnings Happiness -
PA10 Earnings Satisfaction -
PA12 Perception of empowerment index Happiness +
PA12 Earnings Happiness +
PA12 Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction +
PA12 Earnings Satisfaction +
PA14 Perception of empowerment index Happiness -
PA14 Perception of empowerment index Satisfaction -
PA15 Earnings Happiness +
PPPA15 Earnings Satisfaction +
Education Earnings Satisfaction +
Education Earnings Happiness +
Source: EHRS (2004).
Summing up, the most robust capability inputs effects on subjective well-being were 
earnings and the perception of empowerment. However, the computation of indirect effects 
reveals other capability inputs such as education are also related to functioning. Finally, both 
happiness and life satisfaction are, furthermore, highly correlated with social conversion 
factors such as household perception of wealth and other family member’s functionings.
V. Conclusion.
The EHRS dataset was used to further contextualize the capability model of earlier chapters. 
The dataset allowed the integration of subjective well-being functioning and perception of 
empowerment indicators. Furthermore, the impact of relative earnings and absolute earnings 
on subjective well-being was tested. To a large extent the results obtained are consistent with 
those of Chapter 5 and 6 .
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The choice of subjective indicators as achieved functioning raises some caveats. First, 
both indicators are censored—for instance, respondents are bounded to choose a score 
between 1 (less happy) and 3 (more happy). One could argue that these scores are too rough 
and that these boundaries may restrain the expression of differences in happiness between 
respondents. Second, a high score on the index does not necessarily imply a respondent has 
attained a high level of well-being. For example, the coefficients estimated indicate that 
women with disability are more satisfied in life than those without. Reciprocally, indicators 
uncorrelated with subjective well-being can also be highly correlated with other valuable 
functioning such as health.
Furthermore, while there may also be additional unexplained functioning inter­
dependence here, this requires further conceptual scrutiny. On the one hand, the model 
estimated gauged between individuals functioning inter-dependence for a class of subjective 
well-being indicators. But functioning inter-dependence can also obtain at the intra-individual 
level. Thus, one person’s functionings can depend on her other functionings. W olff and De­
Shalit (2007:10) describe the later type of functionings as fertile functionings. On the other 
hand, functioning inter-dependence can be subjective-subjective, objective-objective, or 
objective-subjective. Accordingly, it is conceivable that some subjective functionings can 
explain objective functionings. It is important to note here that when a functioning depends 
on another, the conceptually prior one is not automatically a capability input or conversion 
factors. Still, even if the components were previously defined, their empirical mapping allows 
for some interpretation as elaborated below. Consequently, given that distinct models can be 
derived from the same definitions and datasets, there is some under-determination.
It should also be noted here, the suggested definitions of the components and the 
information contained in the datasets will not be sufficient to specify their function and 
position in the model to be estimated (more on this in the final chapter). Whether a variable 
will therefore be a functioning indicator or a conversion factor cannot be extracted using the 
core component definitions and data only. Nevertheless, why is the anemia variable 
interpreted as an objective functioning but not disability? Why, in other words, was disability 
considered in this chapter a conversion factor? The answer to this question is not simple and 
requires the weighing of various considerations, including the idea of a nomological network. 
The concept of nomological network was described in Chapter 3 and it is essential to 
understand why two health variables are differently interpreted across chapters. The principle 
idea here is that care should be taken not to interpret indicators on a standalone basis. Thus, 
the context in which any indicator is used— and the kind of relationship in which it is
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imbedded—is as important as the information the indicators itself contains. Since an 
important feature of conversion factors is their exogeneity, in the model of this chapter it is 
more plausible to argue that disability is exogenous with respect to happiness rather than vice 
versa. Furthermore, while disability could have been integrated as an objective functioning 
capable of explaining another, namely, subjective well-being, the implications of the model 
would not have changed. But this would complicate the model significantly because an 
additional equation is now necessary to explain disability functioning, which goes some way 
showing that there is some flexibility in mapping the theoretical framework into an empirical 
one. There is no automated algorithm which states which variable goes where or how it 
should be interpreted. The choices made involve a variety of considerations, including that of 
a nomological network and of the previous literatures reviewed to develop the model.
In general, the results indicate which capability inputs—the perception of 
empowerment and earnings— correlate most robustly with subjective well-being. Which 
capability inputs are correlated with which achieved functionings is in part an empirical 
problem. Other substantive findings include the positive correlations between control over 
earnings and the feeling of empowerment. Thus, even though autonomy in decisions over 
earnings has no statistically significant effect on subjective well-being, it is strongly 
correlated with its strongest determinants, the perception of empowerment. The absence of a 
direct relationship between education and subjective well-being does not mean that education 
is inconsequential or that it should be disregarded as a policy variable. Education is foremost 
of all an end in itself. Indeed, most queried women in the villages reported education as 
highly valuable (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). In addition, education has an indirect positive 
effect on subjective well-being mediated by earnings.
Other results obtained are also consistent with the literature on subjective well-being. 
For example, happiness and life satisfaction indicators turned out robustly correlated with 
social and affective conversion factors and functionings, including perception of household 
relative wealth and the subjective functionings of other members in the household.
The chapter finally emphasizes the importance of gender norms for subjective well­
being. Both quantitative and qualitative work point out that gender roles influence economic 
and social activities. The descriptions given of a good woman in most villages depends on 
men’s well-being. Accordingly, a good woman is a good housewife and effective household 
manager. The behavioral gender mould is ubiquitous even though its content is slowly 
changing as women and men undertake different activities. Thus, in deed, women are 
increasingly involved in decisions previously considered as men’s activities. Economic
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motives, including the need for additional income to purchase household necessities, may be 
one of the drivers behind these changes in activity patterns. In some villages, for instance, 
men’s specialization in commercial crops has led women to engage new activities and 
overtake those men abandoned for more profitable ones. Surprisingly, men in at least one 
village did women’s work— even if only to satisfy their needs. To conclude, as women 
engage new activities or increase their earnings males are not indifferent. Tables 7.6 
illustrates potential male dissatisfaction as husbands whose life is furthest from their ideal are 
engaged women who earn the most, who control their earnings, and who earn from outside 
the home.
169
CHAPTER 8
Discussion and conclusion
I. Introduction.
The first two chapters of this thesis described what broad ethical foundations for the 
capability approach might be like. The broad foundations combined ethical inquiry and 
positional objectivity to support ethical individualism and the core components. The 
subsequent empirical chapters empirically operationalized the core components. While the 
introductory chapters of the thesis also highlighted the extent to which ethics and science are 
interdependent, this chapter argues that thick ethical terms such as the core components can 
also evolve, be enriched, and refined with empirical research. The final chapter thus offers a 
reflection on the theoretical, ethical, and policy implications of the introductory (conceptual) 
and subsequent (empirical) chapters. One of its objectives is, accordingly, to explore the 
relationship between the empirical results and the ethical foundations.
Up to now, the thesis has moved in one direction—from agreement on the broad 
ethical foundations to a specific empirical operationalization of components. But is there a 
feedback effect from operationalization back to the core components and broad foundations? 
Chapter 8  discusses this hypothesis. To recap, consider again Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. In this 
figure, the relationship between empirical operationalization and the foundations is mediated 
by the ethical thickness of the core components. The figure entails whether an empirical 
hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed by the data in the empirical chapters is not the end 
but part of a larger process in which the entangled concepts are gradually specified and 
refined as new research, datasets, and methods are used. Yet, as argued below, this feedback 
effect is not an idiosyncrasy of the capability approach.
Robeyns (2005:94), in fact, reflected on this issue and suggested the capability 
approach is not a descriptive or explanatory scientific theory but a framework. She explains, a
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framework such as the capability approach offers a normative space for (conducting) 
evaluations; it cannot be used therefore to predict or explain social phenomena such as 
poverty and inequality. The capability approach, consequently, cannot be directly empirically 
tested. More recently, however, Robeyns stated the capability approach offers concepts which 
in turn can be used to explain poverty, inequality, and well-being (Croker and Robeyns, 
2010:61). Two remarks can be made concerning these claims.
First, the empirical content of the capability approach is an issue of degree. Thus, as 
the capability approach is empirically operationalized and contextualized, it integrates more 
and more potentially testable content. Second, the distinction between the capability approach 
and descriptive-predictive scientific theories is also one of degree, not kind, if  all theories 
entangle values and facts. In similar words, limitations to empirical testing are far from being 
a distinct feature of the capability approach. The same point of view was expressed many 
years ago by Kuhn (1962) in The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions. In economics, Lakatos 
(1972) distinguished between the “hardcore” which is immunized from empirical testing and 
its “protective belts” which are not. Harding (1995:12), Hirsch, Michaels, and Friedman 
(1987:331-2), Starmer (2005), and Fine and Milonakis (2009:51), more recently, made 
parallel arguments. Starmer (2005), for instance, points out implicit pre-theoretical 
commitments by economists’ shielded the monotonicity and transitivity axioms in decision 
theory from empirical testing. Furthermore, according to Starmer (2005:278), a theory’s 
normative appeal is often informally used as evidence to support it by “many economists” . 
Sen (1991) does not disagree as he points out economics has areas that cannot be directly 
tested.
In what follows it is suggested that the inability to empirically test certain issues 
(including, axioms and assumptions) does not mean they cannot be questioned and 
challenged. A corollary of the above is that this class of issues (which can be informally held) 
needs to be brought to the open— as Coase (1937) and Streeten (1950) argued long ago. To 
engage this, however, it is necessary to believe in the effectiveness of deliberations over 
values and that there is more to science than measurement and hypothesis testing 
(McCloskey, 1994).104 For instance, to study thick and complex concepts such as “poverty” 
and “scarcity” ideas such as Schumpeter’s pre-analytic visions (Tabb, 1999:23) or Weber’s
104 As John Stuart Mill explained, there is also “a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as 
amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the 
rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be 
presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is 
equivalent to proof’ (Utilitarianism, pp. 134-5).
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ideal types (Hodgson, 2001) may be used. Furthermore, qualitative deliberative and 
interpretive methods relegated to history, literature, and anthropology can further enrich the 
methods of economics (Caldwell, 1993:57-8; Lavoie, 1990; McCloskey, 1994; Taylor, 1980).
The thesis in general— and this chapter in particular— suggest, therefore, that theories 
can be developed in various ways, not all of which are statistically empirical. For instance, if 
two theories explain empirical facts equally well, one of them may be justifiably preferred on 
the grounds that it is the most simple or elegant. There is just one additional requirement, 
namely, that the criteria are acknowledged and made public—that the social scientist is aware 
and transparent about the rhetorics.
The final chapter therefore suggests the capability approach can help formulate 
theoretical hypotheses for empirical testing notwithstanding its thick terms. One of these 
thick terms is ethical individualism and it requires different methods of investigation. Ethical 
individualism, for instance, cannot be refuted statistically. Yet, this does not mean it cannot 
be challenged; other methods are indeed available, including moral reasoning, to question the 
adequacy (or inadequacy) of ethical individualism. To be sure, these concerns will be further 
discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
The outline is as follows. The next section discusses four empirical caveats to be kept 
in mind while interpreting the results. Section 3 and 4 discuss the measurement, policy, and 
ethical implications respectively. Section 5 elaborates on how empirical research enriches the 
capability approach. The sixth and final section concludes.
II. Measurement and estimation caveats.
Measurement is a concern born with the capability approach (Sen, 1985a; 1992; 1993a; 
1999). In this thesis quantitative statistical methods— structural equations modeling—were 
used to map the abstract definitions of capability, functionings, and conversion factors into 
measurable and testable models. 105 But the capability approach measurement literature is not 
limited to statistical estimation and encompasses qualitative and multi-disciplinary research 
(Robeyns, 2006). The thesis has, nevertheless, attempted to contribute to the measurement
105 See also Alkire (2005a), Anand and Hees (2006), Brandolini and D ’Allesio (1998), Chiapperò-Martinetti 
(1996; 2005), Di Tommaso (2007), Krishnakumar (2007), Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008), Kuklis (2005), 
Lelli (2001), Narayan, (2005), Robeyns (2003), Rura, Camfield, and Donaldson (2007), Schokkaert (2007), 
Schokkaert van Ootegem (1990), UNDP (1990-2010), among others.
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literature by searching and testing for simple, measurable, reliable, substantively meaningful 
capability inputs, conversion factors, and functioning indicators. Accordingly, it sought easily 
accessible sources of data which have open access. These data surveys, furthermore, permit 
the estimation of population level characteristics that smaller scale surveys and qualitative 
research do not allow.
Nevertheless, four econometric challenges require further scrutiny and discussion. 
They may— or may not—undermine the principle findings. The estimation attempted to 
eliminate or isolate these biases though in the end pragmatic choices had to be made. 
Nevertheless, the identification of a problem is hopefully the first stage in its resolution. It 
should also be kept in mind that this work integrates new techniques and innovative 
indicators to measure conversion factors, capability, and functionings relationships. It is 
accordingly far from being the final word on the topic.
The first empirical statistical issue concerns clustering effects on standard errors and 
coefficients. As Heck (2001:91) and Heck and Thomas (2008:64) argue, unless one controls 
for group homogeneity using group dummies and multilevel models, estimates will be biased. 
The bias may not be restricted to coefficients and can also affect standard errors (Stapelton, 
2002). The models estimated in this thesis attempted to control for such biases using 
dummies and multilevel modeling. Chapter 5, for instance, employs urban, ethnic dummies 
and multilevel modeling; Chapter 6  includes urban and regional dummies; Chapter 7 includes 
village dummies. While some of these specifications control for clustering biases, not all 
adjust standard errors. To adjust standard errors, a clustering variable is needed to control for 
group level homogeneity.
It should be noted, first, that clustering has substantive implications and clustering 
effects differ across chapters (in Chapter 5 it is ethnicity, in Chapter 6  regions; and in Chapter 
7 villages). Still, if  each individual in the population has the same probability of being 
selected, standard errors may need no adjustments (Muthén, 2008). Furthermore, it is not 
clear what the impact of adjusting for clustering is when the number of individuals in a group 
is small— especially in Chapters 6  and 7 where 3 of 11 regions had less than 15 cases and half 
the villages had less than 50 cases, respectively. Thus, in Chapter 7, the adjusted standard 
errors could not be computed because the number of cases in some villages is too small. 
Chapter 6  and 7, moreover, use a weighted least square estimator (WLSMV) which modifies 
coefficients as it adjusts standard errors in misspecified models (Muthén, 2010) . 106
106 The model is mis-specified partly because various statistically significant covariates were excluded from the
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The source of discrepancies in standard errors (and coefficients if WLSMV is used) is 
homogeneity within groups. To illustrate, consider two homogenizing sources, namely, 
geography and ethnicity. Religion, a third source, is not considered because the number of 
groups is small and statistically impractical. Even if both geography and ethnicity 
homogenize individuals via different pathways, they may be hard to disentangle statistically 
when they overlap. Overlaps occur when ethnic groups are also geographically clustered. 
Two distinct ethnic groups living side by side, for example, could be more similar to each 
other than the same ethnic groups geographically separated from each other. Anthropological 
work conducted in various Ethiopian villages noted that distinct ethnic groups in the same 
locality share traits, co-participate and co-operate in market and political activities, especially 
if the ethnic groups are of the same religious denomination. However, most traditional 
practices, including marriage, birth, and death remain entrenched and intra-ethnic (Bevan and 
Pankhurst, 1996).
Thus, except for the multilevel model in Chapter 5, all aggregate models do not adjust 
standard errors for village, regional, or ethnic level clustering (Stapeleton, 2002). To test the 
implication of this choice, the aggregate model of Chapter 5 is estimated with adjusted 
standard errors and unadjusted standard errors. In Table 8.1 the two regressions are reported, 
one without clustering and the other with ethnic clustering.
First, it should be noted, the r-squares are unchanged. Second, the following 
covariates are still statistically significant age, age difference, difference in wife beating 
justification, polygamy, urban, index for wife beating justification responded by wife, wife 
relative earnings, and the following ethnic dummies Amhara, Hadiya, Keffa, Sidama, 
Somalie, Tigraway, Welaita, and Gamo. Accordingly, the findings ought to be quite robust. 
For other covariates, however, more research is needed to understand the discrepancies. In 
short, although most of the findings reported in the thesis are sustained, more work is needed 
on the relationship between clustering and standard errors in cross sectional analysis.
model. See below the discussion on omitted variable bias.
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T a b le  8 .1 . C h a p te r  5 m o d e l  e s t im a te d  w i th  a d ju s te d  c lu s te r in g  e f fec ts .
NO CLUSTERING ETHNIC CLUSTERING
Decision-making index Decision-making index
Regression Regression
Standardized coefficients Significance levela Standardized coefficients Signifi
Age 0.06 * 0.06 *
Pregnant / breastfeeding -0.03 -0.03
Age difference 0.07 ** 0.07 ***
Poorer -0.01 -0.01
Middle 0.06 0.06
Richer 0.07 0.07
Richest 0.03 0.03
Difference in wife beating 0.11 ** 0.11 ***
jPuosltyifgiacamtiyon -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
Should FGM be continued? -0.01 -0.01
Urban 0.11 *** 0.11 **
Christian 0.07 * 0.07
Husband: husband rights index -0.06 * -0.06
Wife: wife beating index -0.22 *** -0.22 ***
Amhara 0.08 * 0.08 ***
Southern minorities -0.02 -0.02 ***
Gedeo -0.04 -0.04 ***
Gurarie -0.02 -0.02
Hadiya -0.12 *** -0.12 ***
Keffa 0.05 * 0.05 ***
Sidama -0.11 *** -0.11 ***
Somalie -0.18 *** -0.18 ***
Tigraway -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
Welaita -0.11 *** -0.11 ***
Gamo -0.07 ** -0.07 ***
Education 0.04 0.04
Wife relative earning 0.13 ** 0.13 **
Control over earnings -0.06 -0.06
R-square 0.26 0.26
“Significance level of unstandardized coefficients. 
Source: DHS (2005).
The other three econometric issues are selection bias, endogeneity (or simultaneity 
bias), and omitted variable bias. These caveats are inter-related and sometimes tackling one 
can cause another. Explanations and illustrations for each are respectively elaborated on.
Selection bias can lead to biases in estimation when non-randomness in the sample (of 
educated or women earning income) is not accounted for. If, say, only poor women work and 
household wealth is not included as an explanatory variable, a bias is likely to arise. In both 
the DHS and EHRS a considerable proportion of women are not educated and do not work 
for earnings. However, the effect of selection bias cannot be tested unless variables 
influencing the selection process (education: yes/no; earnings: yes/no) but not levels 
(education: years; earnings: share or amount tin Birr) are identified. As long as no such 
variables are identified the full extent of selection bias cannot be gauged. Still, the inclusion 
of all selection variables in the regression model can offer some control over selection bias. 
In a way, the selection bias problem is similar to the omitted variable bias problem to be
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discussed below. Ideally, a tobit model should be estimated for earnings and education 
(Verbeek, 2000:197-200). A tobit model is, however, not available in most structural 
equation modeling software.
The second concern is related to endogeneity, also known as simultaneity bias. On 
several occasions this problem was encountered. Focus here is on two variables— earnings 
and education respectively. Although the use of instrumental variables is relatively 
unexplored in structural equation modeling, an attempt was made to integrate them in the 
models. For earnings, an instrumental variable was estimated to replace the problematic 
earnings variables in explaining empowerment and functioning indicators. Several caveats 
arise, however. First, endogeneity cannot be proved unless proper instruments are found. A 
good instrument correlates with the problematic endogenous variables but not the 
empowerment or functioning indicators. Furthermore, because earnings is used as an 
explanatory variable in two regressions, namely for empowerment and functioning, two 
different types of instruments are needed for the same endogenous variable. Nevertheless, for 
practical reasons, a single instrumental variable from the empowerment literature was 
selected, namely, women’s regional relative (or in Chapter 7, absolute) earning share in the 
household. The choice of instrument was based on similar models estimated in the literature 
and on the expectation that the instruments correlate with earnings not decision-making or 
functioning achievements. To avoid using two different earnings indicators in the same 
model, either instrumented earnings or the original cases were used. For both the EHRS and 
DHS models, 2SLS did not lead to a revision of the most important empirical findings. While 
use of instruments for earnings has not modified the empirical conclusions, it modified the 
coefficients and significance levels of other exogenous variables included in the first stage of 
the 2SLS.
Education is less problematic, in a way, than earnings because education tends to be 
acquired at a young age, especially in Ethiopia where very few have more than a year of 
education. Education, however, is more problematic when the model attempts to explain it as 
a dependent variable because institutional norms indicators (such as wife beating 
justification) and bargaining power indicators (such as age difference between partners) are 
included in the model at the individual level. The problem arises because, at the individual 
level, such indicators are most likely endogenous i.e., responsive to whether the individual is 
educated or not. In other words, the causal relationship is likely to be bi-directional when 
institutions are measured at the individual level. Measuring norms indicators at the group
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level also failed in most models as convergence problems arose when the aggregation of 
institutional indicators at the regional or ethnic levels was attempted.
Jejeebhoy (1995:60) illustrates how, for education, a two way agency-structure 
relationship operates at the same time. Based on previous empirical work, she argues that 
education delays age at first marriage (and reduces the age gap) because un-educated women 
in some developing countries are preferred by men and their families, because educated 
women are more selective, have greater access to and control over resources obtained from 
pre-marital employment, and experience a declining pool of eligible men. However, in some 
countries and ethnic groups, women are married at a very young age, constraining their 
chances of accessing education (eg., Amhara in Ethiopia). The causal relationship between 
age at first marriage and education is therefore genuinely bi-directional and two simultaneous 
effects are at work. On the one hand, at the social level, age at first marriage captures an 
institutional norm (the structural effect). On the other hand, at the individual level, women 
who manage to acquire some education marry at an older age (the agency effect). Figure 8.1 
illustrates this simultaneous relationship.
Figure 8.1. Education and age at first marriage.
Young age at first marriage-------------► Low educational achievement
(Social norm effect)
Older age at first marriage <-------------High educational achievement
(Individual effect)
In Figure 8.1, as women acquire more and more education, the direction of the arrows 
reverses from more education to delayed age at first marriage. Nevertheless, the model in 
Figure 8.1 is under-identified because there are only two variables (equivalent to two degrees
107of freedom) to estimate two regression coefficients and two error residuals variances. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to estimate a relationship such as the one depicted in Figure 
8.1. One possible solution is to use multilevel modeling by aggregating variables and 
verifying what kind of relationship obtains between variables. A similar aggregation was 
attempted in Chapter 5 though not to (explicitly) overcome endogeneity. In Chapters 6  and 7 
alternative strategies were explored to deal with the education endogeneity problems. It 
should be noted here that multilevel modeling was not attempted in the simultaneous
107 The degrees of freedom are computed as follows s = ^*s(s+1) where s is the total number of endogenous and 
exogenous variables (Kaplan, 2000:21).
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equations environment o f Chapter 6  and 7 because these models would become far too 
complex and their basic intuition lost. An alternative is to instrument education. However, the 
models already attempted to instrument earnings which led to further complications. A third 
strategy is to exogenize education and interpret it as a conversion factor. The weakness o f this 
choice is that it would have led to unnecessary loss o f information because education is 
related to age and regional dummies at the very least. Furthermore, this choice would have 
undermined the intuition that capability inputs are parameterized by conversion factors. The 
strategy adopted was to keep education as an endogenous capability input mediating between 
conversion factors and functioning. The biasing effects o f simultaneity are eliminated by the 
deletion o f explanatory endogenous variables such as age gap, difference in wife beating 
justification, husband rights, etc., even if  this creates a new weakness in the model— omitted 
variable bias.
Omitted variable bias is the fourth econometric challenge. In the education regression, 
exogenous controls (age, region) were maintained ensuring a basic minimum of explanatory 
covariates. Since a covariate suspected o f endogeneity is excluded from the regression, the 
omission may bias coefficients. To test the consequences o f bias, the education regressions in 
Chapters 6  for BMI and Chapter 7 for happiness are estimated with all covariates and 
compared to the one which excluded exogenous indicators (Table 8.2 and 8.3).
Both tables (but more so the happiness regression) indicate very few differences 
between regressions. A t the very least, there are no statistical significance and sign 
discrepancies. The evidence therefore appears to support the strategy adopted.
In this section, I attempted to explicate some statistical limits to empirical estimation. 
W ith these caveats in mind, the next section discusses the theory, measurement, and policy 
implications o f the results.
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Table 8.2. BMI regression all covariates and exogenous only covariates.
Education (BMI, Chapter 6)
Only exogenous All covariates
Age -0.12 *** -0.11 ***
Age difference 0.05 **
Poorer 0.01
Middle 0.05
Richer 0.15 ***
Richest 0.25 ***
Difference in wife beating justification 0.03
Polygamy -0.03
Urban 0.39 *** 0.35 ***
Christian 0.06 ** 0.05 **
Husband: husband rights index -0.01
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.12 ***
Tigray -0.01 -0.01
Afar -0.02 * -0.02 *
Amhara -0.11 *** -0.10 ***
Somali -0.06 ** -0.05 **
Ben-Gmuz -0.02 ** -0.02 ***
SNNP 0.02 0.01
Gambela 0.00 0.00
Harari -0.01 -0.01
Addis Ababa 0.06 *** 0.05 ***
Dire Dawa -0.01 -0.01
R-square 0.22 0.38
Source: DHS (2005).
Table 8.3. Education regressions: all covariates vs. exogenous only covariates.
Education (Happiness, Chapter 7)
Only exogenous All covariates
Age -0.28 *** -0.27 ***
Disability -0.05 -0.05
Pregnant or breastfeeding 0.02
Polygamy 0.04
Age difference 0.06
Partners different ethnic origin 0.05 *
Household poverty (relative to village) -0.04
Household assets 0.09 ***
Orthodox Christian -0.02 -0.02
PA2_Geblen -0.09 -0.08
PA3_Dinki -0.08 -0.08
PA5 Yetmen 0.02 0.02
PA6 Shumsha -0.03 -0.03
PA8_Adele Keke -0.07 -0.07
PA9 KoroDegaga -0.02 -0.02
PA10 TurufeKetchema 0.24 *** 0.23 ***
PA12_Imdibir 0.02 0.02
PA13 Azr Deboa 0.25 *** 0.24 ***
PA14_Adado -0.06 -0.06
PA15_Gara Godo -0.05 -0.05
PA16 Debre Birhan -0.01 -0.01
R-square 0.18 0.23
Source: EHRS (2004).
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III. Theory, measurement, and policy implications.
The empirical work conducted for this thesis is motivated by an explicit ethical framework. 
O f course, one might have been able to conduct a similar empirical exercise without 
acknowledging its ethical motivation. However, the latter case does not mean that the 
empirical work was free from ethics. An empirical work which does not acknowledge its 
ethical roots has left them inchoate. The thesis attempted to make this step explicit by 
articulating these inchoate ethical concerns. The estimated models are therefore partly guided 
by the ethical frameworks in Chapters 1 and 2.
The three empirical chapters test the extent to which ethically thick yet abstract 
concepts can be statistically contextualized. W ith operationalization, capability and 
functioning are understood as capabilities and functionings o f individuals over a point in time 
and in a particular socio-cultural setting. As the core components are contextualized, 
empirical content is injected and generalizations are attempted.
Intermediate (meso-frameworks) were also useful for operationalization. Here, 
Robeyns’s (2004b) suggestion to measure capability from inputs and K abeer’s (1999) 
specification o f capability as emerging from resources (broadly defined to include education 
and earnings) and agency (empowerment) were used. W ith these two bridging frameworks in 
the background, each chapter subsequently matched concepts to indicators adding substantive 
empirical content to conversion factors, capability, and functioning.
Every estimated regression involves a generalization o f a sort. An example o f the 
power o f generalization is Chapter 5’s estimation o f the interdependence between ethnic 
group norms and decision-making power in the household. Thus, aggregate ethnic group 
level information covaries with a substantial proportion o f decision-making variance in the 
household. Even though multilevel analysis was constrained by a relatively small number of 
groups, the model gauged the interdependence o f group norms and decision-making by 
estimating shifts in regression intercepts. But what are the implications o f these models?
For a start, it should be noted, empowerment presupposes institutional change that is 
“fundamental changes in legal, political, economic, and religious structures that have been in 
place for centuries” (Aslanbeigui, Oakes, and Uddin, 2010:196). It is important, therefore, to 
be realistic about the sort o f changes that can be realized in the short to medium term and on 
a large scale. Second, the estimated models suggest, policies supporting gender equality and 
w om en’s empowerment need to become more context-specific, in particular in relation to
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gendered institutions. One-size-fits-all policies are not likely to be very effective, simply 
because the binding constraint for w om en’s bargaining may not always be at the individual 
level but may be located at the institutional level. Third, the findings suggest, that for women 
living in a context o f very unequal gendered institutions, policies may be advised to prioritize 
social change at the group level, rather than prioritize w om en’s individual level. Here, policy 
measures are likely to be most effective at the middle aggregate level which is “the 
community level where institutional and normative structures such as family system, 
infrastructure, gender ideologies, regional or local market processes etc. are most likely to 
affect w om en’s empowerment. It is often precisely at these intermediary levels that 
normative changes occur and where programmatic policy interventions often operate” 
(Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:15).
All models across chapters, furthermore, show that, unless institutional constraints are 
accounted for, one or two years o f education have very little impact on potential 
empowerment indicators. The education result is supported by cross-country research 
signaling a modest exposure to education by women has little impact on fertility where macro 
education aggregates are low (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Accordingly, aggregate societal educational 
indicators may be as powerful an influence on reproductive patterns as individuals’ own 
educational achievements (ibid.:3). W hich is why education in the least developed and most 
gender stratified countries can be ineffective. Indeed, at higher levels o f development, a few 
years o f education delay marriage, changes fertility preferences, and increase contraception 
use. An increase in education from a very low basis may in fact have the opposite effect by 
raising fertility since educated women are healthier, better fed, and (therefore) more fertile. 
Thus, for primary education to have any tangible effect, it may be necessary to change “the 
rules o f the game” to enable women to use their resources— including education— more 
effectively and achieve well-being (W olff and De-Shalit, 2007:173). The W orld Bank, for 
instance, is already arguing for policies that change the rules o f the game— or the opportunity 
structure, as they call them— including “information, education, and communication activities 
that enhance gender awareness” (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005:18; see also Malhotra, Schuler 
and Boender, 2002:4-5). Although such policies are pitched at the institutional level, they 
lead to social engineering— and possibly “intensive qualitative investments in changing 
m en’s perception o f w om en’s worth [and] penetrating the household to tackle gender power 
relations”, as Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996:56) put it.
Such policy recommendations gain support from recent successes in sub-Sahara 
Africa where community-based empowerment approaches to eradicate gendered institutions
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have been applied. In one case, community-based empowerment approach led village women 
in Senegal to themselves address the negative impacts o f FGM  and get support from local 
religious leaders and eventually whole villages (UNICEF, 2005). Such a group-level 
approach has led to whole villages in Senegal and other countries to publicly announce that 
they will end FGM  in their communities (Mhordha, 2007). Moreover, this approach has also
shown success in undermining other gendered institutions such as early marriage and keeping
108girls from school (UNICEF, 2005). Other group-level policies may be useful as well, 
including the imposition o f formal marriage contracts. Quisumbing and M aluccio (2000), for 
example, argue for Ethiopia “that having a written marriage contract, which is typical of 
some ethnic groups but not others, increases the share [of assets] going to the woman” 
(ibid.:56) and that “legal reforms ... might have a larger potential impact on intra-household 
allocation than redistributing resources among men and women within the group” (ibid.:55). 
Focus group interviews with women in Yemen also indicate marriage contract is an 
institution that strengthens w om en’s position by including the right for the wife to continue 
her education, work for an income outside the house, or to decide on other issues (Van 
Staveren, 2001).
A move away from an exclusive focus on w om en’s individual bargaining power 
indicators towards including the institutional level where group gender norms are very 
unequal is therefore recommended. An expansion such as this is also likely to alleviate the 
resources paradox (which, as noted in earlier chapters, entails resources sometimes fail to 
contribute to empowerment) and enhancing the effectiveness o f gender policies in supporting 
w om en’s capabilities and functionings.
Subsequent chapters shift the focus towards the relationship between capability inputs 
and functionings and, more specifically, the relationship between capability inputs and 
functioning achievements. The conclusions o f these chapters reinforce the idea o f a 
nomological network (Kabeer, 1999) in which the interpretation o f indicators “will always 
depend on its interrelationships with other variables” (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 
2 0 0 2 :1 0 ).
Establishing a relationship between capability inputs and functionings tests (i) the 
non-cooperative household bargaining model (Doss, 2003) and (ii) the validity o f the 
empowerment indicators. Chapter 6 , accordingly, tests each hypothesis by plugging the 
decision-making index as a mediating capability input between conversion factors and
108 The community-based empowerment approach to ban FGM is also applied in Ethiopia, but only recently at a 
large scale (Shetty, 2007).
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(objective) functioning indicators. It should be noted that opting for physiological functioning 
indicators such as the body mass index and anemia is a choice partly based on a non­
utilitarian ethics that values states distinct from feelings and emotions. Since a positive 
relationship was found between the decision-making index and the body mass index (BMI), 
the non-cooperative household bargaining model receives some support from the data. In 
addition, this correlation partially validates the empowerment index. Anemia health 
functioning was also related to the decision-making index, albeit non-linearly; thus, women 
who shared decisions, not those who took them alone, had the healthiest functioning 
achievements. Anemia health functioning was, in fact, more sensitive than BM I to conversion 
factor bargaining power indicators including age difference and wife rejection o f beating 
justification. The evidence obtained is consistent with the view that empowerment is 
multidimensional and that health functionings can be realized following a variety o f paths. 
Another statistically significant capability input was education which turned out to be 
robustly positively correlated with BMI. The earnings ratio for women also appeared to 
reduce the probability o f women falling below the critical 18.5 BM I threshold.
Still, the results o f Chapter 6  also point out more decision-making in the household is 
correlated with the BM I o f women in non-polygamous relationships only. A similar finding 
for earnings obtains and therefore decisions taken by women who earn the most are more 
strongly correlated with health outcomes. In other words, the results o f the estimated model 
caution that relationships between decision-making and functioning are conditional on other 
factors and that the effectiveness o f the decision-making index is contextual and relational, 
even if  a few general patterns have been identified (as already argued in Chapter 5).
In summary, the model tested the extent to which decision-making in the household is 
a good indicator o f empowerment. But the results should be interpreted with caution. For 
example, even though women who join micro-credit initiatives in Ghana took more decisions 
regarding the purchase o f household assets, men have not changed their beliefs about gender 
roles (Cheston and Kuhn, 2001:38). It is also quite likely that more time is needed before 
such intervention can reveal deep changes in beliefs about gender norms and institutions 
(Aslanbeigui, Oakes, and Uddin, 2010). The findings o f Chapter 6 , finally, highlight that 
policy assessments and interventions may consider household decision-making patterns when 
targeting individuals’ health functioning. They also raise a moral issue concerning the extent 
to which the state has the responsibility for developing individual capabilities for 
participation and deliberation in household decision-making (Ruger, 2010:49).
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Chapter 7 estimates a model structurally similar to the one in Chapter 6  but employs a 
different dataset with different capability, conversion factor, and functioning indicators. Its 
distinctive feature is the use o f subjective functionings and perception o f empowerment 
indicators. Thus, instead o f household decision-making, Chapter 7 integrates w om en’s 
perception o f empowerment as a capability input and relates it to subjective well-being 
functioning. The model o f Chapter 7 has two additional sui generis characteristics, namely, it 
has a utilitarian flavor and it is not restricted to empowerment in the household since the 
perception o f empowerment indicators are applicable to all domains o f life. Another 
distinctive feature o f this chapter’s model is the use o f both absolute and relative earnings as 
capability inputs. The model o f Chapter 7 thus allows us to compare which o f absolute or 
relative earnings have the strongest relationship with the perception o f empowerment and 
subjective well-being indicators in rural Ethiopia. Once more, the results highlight a robust 
positive relationship between empowerment and functioning— the more empowered women 
feel, the happier and more satisfied they are. And whereas earnings and education are not 
correlated with the perception o f empowerment, control over earnings is. Furthermore, total 
earnings are shown to be consistently positively correlated with subjective well-being but not 
control over earnings and wife earnings share. The model also reveals that education is 
indirectly correlated with subjective well-being via earnings. In addition, the perception of 
relative poverty was one o f the most robust explanatory conversion factors for happiness and 
life satisfaction. Given that the individual subjective well-being o f women was also 
correlated with that o f other members in the household, education about the interdependence 
o f happiness in the household can raise m em bers’ awareness and induce them to take steps 
mitigating contagious negative spillovers. Happiness interdependence, finally, has a virtue 
ethics theoretical interpretation because it highlights the social effects o f variables emerges 
from relationships within the household.
Still, the estimates in Chapter 7 indicate the sampled villages can be hundreds of 
kilometers apart yet few geographical level effects on happiness and life satisfaction are 
obtained. In other words, even though some villages had strong conditioning effects, the 
village in which one lives explained little variance in subjective well-being. Variations in 
subjective well-being are therefore quite similar across villages. Individual subjective w ell­
being is, accordingly, a valued functioning whose variance is mostly explained by the same 
household and individual conversion factors and capability inputs across villages.
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In this section the principle empirical findings and their implications were discussed. 
The next section further elaborates on three important ethical issues the operationalization 
raises.
IV. Ethical considerations.
The empirical findings o f this thesis raise at least three ethical issues that need to be discussed 
in further detail. First, in light o f the empirical evidence on the substantial number o f 
households— and women within households— presently undernourished and anemic, who is 
responsible for their inadequate basic health functioning achievements? As a question, 
however, it is misleading because it could be interpreted as suggesting no one is responsible 
because the causal factors are unrelated to individual agents or specific formal institutions. 
Yet the individuals living in these very poor households are in a morally unacceptable 
situation— and they are owed support— independently o f the identification o f perfect duty 
holders (Sen, 2004). In other words, even if  no duty holder is identified, these moral claims 
cannot be discharged. Still, the empirical evidence suggests, the reported health problems are 
in part correlated with group level conversion factors and therefore beyond individual choice 
(Anand, 2004:19-20; Daniels, Kennedy and Kawachi, 2004:73; W olff and De-Shalit, 
2007:10,27). If  individuals cannot be held responsible for their health achievements it is 
unlikely they can, on their own, do something about them. These individuals are, accordingly, 
owed support by whoever can provide it to guarantee minimum health achievements and 
insure at the very least the elimination o f group level correlations . 109
Second, when is it wrong to interfere with social norms o f a community to achieve 
well-being and empowerment policy goals? Various models in this thesis point at variables 
such as education and earnings, variables which are “appealing, simple concrete, universal 
and politically acceptable . . .  [variables] at the forefront o f international plans o f action 
because they are easily translatable in policy terms . as opposed to the more complex and 
less well understood systemic and cultural factors defining gender inequality” (Malhotra and 
Mather, 1997:600-1). The more complex kind o f variables and policies may seek to empower 
women by influencing norms and enhancing “opportunities without changing or providing 
persons with a larger bundle o f individualized resources ... [avoiding] stigma and
109 Whether individuals are still owed support due to their own option luck is debatable. For contrasting 
arguments see Pogge (1989:193) and Anderson (1999:303).
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humiliation” (W olff and De-Shalit, 2007:177). Still, such policy recommendations may be 
criticized as ideological in interfering with individual agency by challenging private beliefs 
and worldviews. Nevertheless, as argued in Chapter 1 and 2, (a) well-being may have moral 
priority over agency (as autonomy) and (b) the kind o f agency which is being challenged is, 
in fact, not autonomous in the sense that it has not been reasonably scrutinized by the 
individual. Furthermore, according to Ruger (2010:xix), unless social norms are changed, “it 
is not enough to provide adequate health care without efforts to influence health norms.” 
Ruger (2010:206-7), in fact, suggests health care reform is most likely to fail without prior 
social agreement on the ethical commitment to health . 110 Policy makers, health providers, 
patients, as well as voters need to internalize ethical health norms for just and effective health 
institutional arrangements and outcomes to sustainably arise.
If  Ruger’s argument is applicable to liberal democratic countries such as the U.S.A., 
is it relevant to Ethiopia where people are still likely deeply attached to, and polarized 
around, their own ethnic norms and values? If, say, the central government in Addis Ababa 
decrees a specific ethnic norm as harmful for well-being, targeted ethnicities can feel 
attacked. Indeed, after years o f war and selective policy interventions, Ethiopians may be 
justifiably suspicious o f central government interventions, policies, and agents (Kapuscinski, 
2006; Levine, 1965:88; Pankhurst, 1992). In sum, therefore, while in developed liberal 
countries the state has the necessary legitimacy, authority, and power to question group 
norms, the same does not apply in different settings where ethnicity, religion, or one’s class 
may still provide powerful identitarian and behavioral norms. State interventions are at any 
rate necessary, even in Ethiopia. In fact, even though (in the short term at least) bottom-up 
approaches involving civil society and local grass roots movements can be more effective, 
they lack the scale and institutional continuity state policy can provide.
Third, is subjective well-being a valuable functioning worthwhile to promote as a 
policy goal? And is not happiness an individual private issue? In part, this question cannot be 
answered in the abstract and depends on the following considerations. To begin with, it may 
be observed, happiness (or life satisfaction) is both an important end and has a long list of 
health and other beneficial social correlates (Layard, 2005; Samman, 2007). The subjective 
well-being literature reviewed in Chapter 4 and 7 also suggests happiness and its health 
correlates are bi-directionally correlated and therefore mutually reinforcing— happier people 
tend to be healthier and healthier people happier. Happiness, in addition, has an established
110 She argues this is in part why President Clinton failed to reform the health sector in the U.S.A while in 
power. Have norms changed since then allowing President Obama to pass the new health reforms?
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relationship with agency and empowerment (Diener and Diener, 2005; Ryan and Deci, 2001). 
For these reasons, happiness can be considered one functioning well-being policy indicator. 
Finally, with the advances made in subjective well-being measurement research over the last 
couple o f years, much more is known on what makes us happy and satisfied in life (Diener et. 
al., 1999; Layard, 2005; Samman, 2007). For instance, if  happiness is adopted as a social 
policy target it may lead to a reduction in wealth and income inequalities, both o f which are 
negatively correlated with happiness. Nevertheless, happiness is far from being a sufficient 
well-being functioning indicator because (i) it captures only a partial dimension o f w ell­
being; (ii) it may be an unreliable well-being indicator subject to adaptation, biases, and 
distortions; (iii) it reveals little variation across Ethiopian villages with very different 
characteristics (see Chapter 7). Consequently, well-being evaluations based on happiness 
should always be complemented by additional objective indicators and/or qualitative 
individualized assessment o f peoples’ well-being.
In this section three additional ethical implications from the empirical chapters were 
discussed. The next one considers the relationship between the results and the core capability 
approach components, asking whether they taught us something new about the capability 
approach.
V. Implications for the capability approach.
Ethical concerns over the adequacy o f metrics in theories o f justice led Sen (1980) to 
articulate the core components o f the capability approach. Once defined, gaps persisted on 
both ends o f the core components, namely, at the foundations and further specifications 
levels. W ith this double gap in sight, on the foundations ends, the thesis suggested a structure 
with ethical individualism as its basic value; on the further specification ends, the thesis 
empirically operationalized the core components using Ethiopian data. To achieve this, 
ethical and social scientific inquiry interacted and complemented each other.
To illustrate the interdependence o f ethical inquiry and social science research 
consider the debate on happiness as well-being. If  according to subjective utilitarians w ell­
being is equivalent to individual happiness, then one is doing well when one is happy (eg., 
Layard, 2005). Yet this hypothesis was criticized because there are discrepancies between 
subjective well-being and well-being (Gasper, 2004; forthcoming; Kahneman, 1999; Philips,
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2006; Schooler, Ariely, and Loewenstein, 2004; Sen, 1987a; 1992; 1999). Nevertheless, 
using only factual evidence against happiness as well-being is useless if  there is no prior 
agreement what well-being is. Accordingly, qualitative methods currently in use in ethics are 
necessary to argue why well-being as a sensation, desire satisfaction, or feeling happy is an 
inadequate, reductionist, interpretation o f well-being. It is here that qualitative inquiry 
becomes necessary as it attempts to articulate an answer to the question what well-being is.
Chapter 2 suggested ethical inquiry and positional objectivity are necessary and 
complementary for deliberation over how to structure and which values to integrate in the 
capability approach. Ethical individualism was considered the most adequate basic value to 
support the core components o f the capability approach. Thus, in the capability approach, the 
core components are thick terms (Putnam, 2002) and cannot be adequately dealt with unless 
ethical inquiry is explicitly engaged. Furthermore, although ethical inquiry requires autonomy 
from social values, norms, and preferences to achieve impartiality, it is not necessarily an 
abstract armchair exercise disconnected from practical humanity. It is quintessential, in fact, 
to integrate democratic principles and individual agency in evaluation to sensitize the 
capability approach to what individuals want, prefer, and reflectively value. In this sense, the 
foundations suggested here are part o f a larger conversation they seek to participate in and 
enrich.
In addition, if  the integration o f distinct ethical theories and moral facts is necessary 
for the capability approach to have more bite and gain relevance, attempts to be neutral with 
respect to values are bound to fail— and lead to an infinite regress (Sen, 2002a)— if  no 
explicit ethical standpoint is adopted. W hile more specific ethical perspectives extend the 
initial moral motivation behind the capability approach, as one adopts more specific ethical 
theories compatibility and comparability is reduced. Ethical inquiry, at any rate, ranges from 
the general to the more specific and perfectionist, and from the most practical to the most 
theoretical (Putnam, 2004). The adoption o f various ethical perspectives can indeed span 
various schools o f thought, including virtue ethics, Thomist naturalist philosophy, and 
deontological (Kantian -  Rawlsian) approaches, among others.
As suggested in earlier chapters then, the core components o f the capability approach 
are broad enough not to be constrained by a single moral (or descriptive) theory. 
Accordingly, to be further specified, the capability approach needs a framework to structure 
the variety o f ethical and empirical content it may integrate and which may not all be 
comparable. Still, this does not entail anything goes and the broad foundations and open 
moral-empirical structure o f the capability approach are not compatible with every existing
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point o f view. The basic values and core components underlying the capability approach are, 
for instance, in tension with pure utilitarian ethics that restrain well-being to nothing but 
pleasure or preference satisfaction. Similarly, they will exclude holistic communitarian 
frameworks that systematically prioritize the social over the individual. Nevertheless, the 
suggested foundations for the capability approach have features compatible with both 
utilitarianism— in adopting consequentialism— and communitarians— in the explicit 
integration o f social conversion factors among the ethically thick core components.
Furthermore, the need for empirical operationalization is shared with other 
frameworks. Powers and Faden (2006:84), for instance, suggest their six well-being 
dimensions need “empirical enquiry ... to identify both how well people are doing and what 
elements o f the social structure are having the most profound effects on the different 
dimensions o f well-being” . Likewise, the core components o f the capability approach—  
functioning, capability, and conversion factors— need to be empirically contextualized. The 
empirical mapping o f abstract but ethically thick components is necessary to determine their 
contextual and historical specificity. W ithout this they remain interesting thick components 
with some (but not enough) empirical relevance. The capability approach thus risks limited 
practical and policy relevance if  the components are not further empirically contextualized 
and made applicable to the actual world. Subsequently, the usage o f indicators such as 
empowerment, resources, and well-being helps bridge the gap between the abstract 
definitions o f the core components and the actual world. The three operationalization 
chapters aimed therefore to contribute to empirical contextualization. Empirical 
operationalization, like ethical specification, also reduces comparability. The attempt, 
therefore, to contextualize the capability approach to the capabilities o f Ethiopian women 
implies reduced comparability with respect to the capabilities o f European women.
W ith regards to the empirical patterns identified across chapters, a complex web of 
relationships emerges from the various models estimated. For instance, the relationship 
between conversion factors, capability inputs, and functionings is sensitive to choice of 
dataset, method o f operationalization, and choice o f indicators, etc. In addition, two chapters 
use different functioning indicators restricting their comparability.
Still, ethics is also empirical (see Brink, 1989). The model estimated in Chapter 5 is, 
in fact, grounded in virtue ethics because it operates from the pre-analytic vision that 
institutions such as gender norms have real effects on behaviors in general and empowerment 
in particular. Furthermore, Chapter 7 begins with a utilitarian inspired framework which ends 
up emphasizing the importance o f virtue ethics as it highlight the importance o f relationships
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within and outside the family for subjective well-being. Chapter 6 , in turn, signaled that 
married Ethiopian women may be willing to sacrifice their own health via empowerment in 
decision-making to improve the health o f others. If  this display o f altruism is confirmed by 
additional research, it entails care ethics predominate as household members are willing to 
sacrifice their own health to insure others members’ health functionings are achieved. The 
skeptic can, o f course, counter-argue there is no evidence the alleged sacrifice was not 
instrumental in the sense that it was done in the long term interest o f the mother (a sort of 
insurance). But this skepticism is ungrounded from various perspectives. First, the altruism 
argument is not undermined for being a plausible hypothesis that needs further research and 
testing. Second, as McCloskey (2006) points out, prudence (or self-interest) is a moral virtue 
as long as it does not crowd out all other virtues, especially in the household sphere (Van 
Staveren, 2001). Thus, even if  empowered redistributive behavior is self-regarding, it can still 
be moral. Third, the concept o f prudence can be expanded non-individualistically to include 
the interest o f the household as a unit. Thus, individual behaviors which appear to be self- 
harming could well be enhancing the survival chances o f the household as a whole. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to test whether in households where the wife sacrifices 
own nutrient intake, the husband was doing the same. And even if  the husband was not 
scarifying, he might be conserving energy to be able to undertake the most energy intensive 
activities. Still, it remains unexplored to what extent altruistic behavior is explainable via an 
“unquestioned” gender norm. For example, a gender norm could state that when there are 
food shortages, women should be the first to make sacrifices no matter what (Hando, 2009). 
Thus, though women appear empowered in terms o f the decision-making index, the 
underlying forces patterning wife decisions are gender norms which cannot be reduced to, or 
be explained by, individual and household level causes.
Given this state o f affairs, what are the implications for the capability approach? How 
can these results change our understanding o f functionings as valuable beings and doings or 
capability as the space o f all achievable functionings? The short answer is that they cannot. 
Thus, whether the definitions o f the core thick terms in the capability approach can be 
changed with statistical empirical modeling and testing alone is no. Statistical empirical 
modeling and testing (by itself) is insufficient to falsify or disprove either the ethical 
foundations or the core components. There are three reasons for this negative answer: (i) 
value free empirical facts are improbable given the pervasive entanglement o f facts and 
values; (ii) the question itself does not reflect the aims and purposes o f empirical
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operationalization; and (iii) qualitative, dialectic, interpretive methods are needed to engage 
the definitions and foundations behind the core components.
Accordingly, the estimated models have direct implications for our knowledge o f the 
way the world works and contribute to the various sources they tap from yet their essence is 
to help contextualize abstract concepts and enrich them with empirical content. In short, the 
capability approach components are not fixed and insulated from change but their 
modification requires engaging the qualitative methods o f ethical inquiry.
A related concern is the status o f the meso-frameworks— including Robeyns’s input 
and K abeer’s capability definition. W hat is their relationship with statistical empirical 
modeling testing? If any evaluative exercise is more fruitfully assessed when prior objectives 
are set, the question here should be what was expected from these intermediate empirical 
mapping stages? Robeyns’s input measurement and Kabeer’s capability two components 
framework initiated the empirical mapping exercise. They helped bridge the gap between 
contextualization and abstract conceptualizations. Compared to the core components and the 
basic values in the foundations, the bridging frameworks should be more open to direct 
empirical statistical testing. On their own, such intermediate frameworks are, however, 
insufficient to achieve full fledged operationalization— they require additional specifications 
(what kinds o f inputs or empowerment indicators?). The empirical researcher, thus, still has 
substantive choices to make. Furthermore, even though a choice o f indicators may be 
consistent with Robeyns’s or K abeer’s suggestions, it may remain inadequate because having 
the capability to be healthy (say) does not explain other functionings (such as professional 
success).
VI. Conclusion.
In this chapter a synthesis and reflection on the ethical, empirical, and policy implications of 
the thesis was attempted. It started with a discussion o f empirical caveats followed by a 
summary o f the empirical results, and their potential policy relevance. The final sections 
returned to the concerns o f the first chapters engaging the relationship between thick 
concepts, ethics, and empirical research.
The chapter concludes that the core components o f the capability approach are thick 
and— to be modified— in need o f further qualitative, dialectic, and interpretational research.
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There is an asymmetry here because statistical modeling is not the most adequate method to 
(re)formulate new thick complex concepts. W ith this in mind, the ethical motivation behind 
the capability approach is not a launch pad useful only to take-off and which can be forgotten 
subsequently or as soon as statistical empirical testing begins. Even though they need to be 
continuously scrutinized, discussed, and questioned to evolve, the suggested ethical 
foundations are able to withhold a much larger structure. The strength, resilience, and design 
o f the structure are, thus, a function o f the foundations. It is then the task o f theorists, 
empirical researchers, and advocates, in consultation with others stakeholders, to deliberate 
on which structure to erect— and when to tear it down.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Aggregate decision-making MIMIC with instrumental variables.
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Wife final say health 0.66 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.60 0.89 ***
Wife final say visits family relatives 0.68 1.04 ***
Decision-making index
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age 0.06 0.05 *
Pregnant / breastfeeding -0.02 -0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.07 0.09 **
Poorer -0.01 -0.02
Middle 0.06 0.11
Richer 0.08 0.13 *
Richest 0.02 0.04
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.11 0.06 ***
Polygamy -0.09 -0.25 ***
Institutional level
Should FGM be continued? 0.00 0.00
Urban 0.07 0.16
Christian 0.07 0.10 **
Husband: husband rights index -0.06 -0.04 *
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.23 -0.16 ***
Amhara 0.08 0.12 **
Southern minorities -0.03 -0.11
Gedeo -0.06 -0.33 **
Gurarie -0.01 -0.05
Hadiya -0.12 -0.50 ***
Keffa 0.04 0.21
Sidama -0.11 -0.31 ***
Somalie -0.16 -0.57 ***
Tigraway -0.13 -0.40 ***
Welaita -0.10 -0.41 ***
Gamo -0.07 -0.36 **
Capability inputs
Education 0.01 0.01
Wife relative earning (instrumented) 0.09 0.40
Control over earnings 0.05 0.12 *
R-square 0.24
Notes: aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  = 2059. The ethnic base category is Oromo.
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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Table A2. Random intercepts MIMIC with instrumental variables.
Multilevel decision-making index 
______Ordered probit______
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Wife final say health 0.62 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.57 0.89 ***
Wife final say visits family relatives 0.64 1.05 ***
Decision-making index (Individual\Household level)
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age 0.06 0.11 *
Pregnant / breastfeeding 0.03 0.08
Household level
Age difference 0.06 0.18 ***
Poorer -0.01 -0.04
Middle 0.03 0.12
Richer 0.09 0.32 *
Richest 0.05 0.19 **
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.02 0.02
Polygamy -0.10 -0.58 **
Capability inputs
Education 0.03 0.05
Wife relative earning (instrumented) 0.20 1.84 ***
Control over earnings 0.07 0.35 **
R-square 0.11
Decision-making index (Institutional)
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Ethnic mean “should FGM be continued?” -0.7 -3 ***
R-square 0.47
Notes: aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  =2428. Sample size is larger because some institutional level variables excluded.
Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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Table A3. Aggregate decision-making MIMIC with interactions and instrumental variables.
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Wife final say health
Wife final say large household purchases
Wife final say visits family relatives
Standardized coefficients 
0.67 
0.59 
0.68
Coefficients
1
0.88
1.02
Significance levelb
a
***
***
Decision-making index 
Regression
Standardized coefficients Coefficients Significance levelb
Individual level
Age 0.06 0.05
Interaction age -0.03 -0.01
Pregnant / breastfeeding -0.02 -0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.06 0.09 **
Poorer -0.01 -0.02
Middle 0.06 0.10
Richer 0.08 0.14 *
Richest 0.02 0.04
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.10 0.05 *
Interaction difference in wife beating justification index -0.04 -0.03
Polygamy -0.09 -0.24 ***
Institutional level
Should FGM be continued? 0.00 0.00
Urban 0.08 0.20
Christian 0.07 0.11 **
Husband: husband rights index -0.04 -0.03
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.17 -0.12 ***
Amhara 0.08 0.13 **
Southern minorities -0.03 -0.11
Gedeo -0.06 -0.35 **
Gurarie -0.01 -0.05
Hadiya -0.12 -0.54 ***
Keffa 0.04 0.23
Sidama -0.11 -0.33 ***
Somalie -0.16 -0.57 ***
Tigraway -0.13 -0.40 ***
Welaita -0.10 -0.41 ***
Gamo -0.07 -0.36 **
Capability inputs
Education -0. 02 -0.02
Interaction education 0.05 0.04
Wife relative earning (instrumented) 0.18 0.82 *
Interaction wife relative earnings -0.13 -0.57
Control over earnings 0.08 0.20
Interaction control over earnings -0.05 -0.15
Ethnic dummy
Dummy for ethnicities with worse gender institutions 
R-square
tl t . 1 , , -1 , • r' r' , , • bo - 1 •
0.12 0.17
0.25
Notes: aFixed to one to identify factor metric. bStatistical significance o f unstandardized coefficients at 1% marked ***; 5% **; 10%*. 
U n-weighted sample size N  = 2059. The dummy base category is Oromo.
Source: Demographic H ealth Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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Table A4. Decision-making index and BMI and instrumental variables.
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficients1
Wife final say health 0.61 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.58 0.92 ** *
Wife final say visits to family & relatives 0.68 1.18 ***
Standardized coefficients Education
Earnings
Ordered
probit
(instrumented)
Control
over
earnings
Binary
probit
Decision­
making
index
BMI
Individual level
Age -0.12 *** 0 15 *** 0.06 * 0.08 ** 0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.01 *** 0.03 0.06 ** -0.02
Poorer -0.05 *** -0.04 -0.03 0.02
Middle -0.01 *** -0.07 0.02 0.02
Richer -0.06 *** -0.10 0.06 * 0.02
Richest 0.20 *** 0.04 -0.02 0.03
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.16 *** 0.02
Polygamy -0.10 *** -0.05 -0.09 ** -0.02
Institutional level
Urban 0.39 *** 0.50 *** 0.19 *** 0.09 ** 0.17 ***
Christian 0.06 ** 0.04 *** 0.04 0.06 ** -0.02
Husband: husband rights index -0.05 * 0.02
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.27 *** 0.01
Tigray -0.01 0.12 *** 0.02 -0.13 *** -0.09 ***
Afar -0.02 -0.06 *** -0.09 0.06 -0.02
Amhara -0.11 *** -0.22 *** -0.13 *** 0.04 -0.07 ***
Somali -0.06 *** 0.02 *** -0.02 -0.18 *** -0.01
Ben-Gmuz -0.02 -0.03 *** -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
SNNP 0.02 0 07 *** 0.11 *** -0.17 *** -0.06 ***
Gambela 0.00 0.03 *** 0.02 -0.01 -0.02
Harari -0.01 0 09 *** 0.03 0.02 -0.02
Addis Ababa 0.06 0.14 *** 0.02 0.05 * 0.03
Dire Dawa -0.01 0.13 *** 0.03 0.01 -0.01
Capability inputs
Education 0.22 *** 0.09 ** 0.01 0.09 ***
Wife relative earning (instrumented) 0.03 0.02
Control over earnings 0.10 * 0.03
Decision-making index 0.09 ***
R-square 0.22 0.97 0.17 0.23 0.11
Notes: U n-weighted sample size N=2365. Dummy is Oromiya. Standardised coefficients unless otherwise specified.3 Coefficient fixed to one 
Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% m arked ***; 5% **; 10%*. Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
to identify metric.b
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Table A5. Decision-making index (MIMIC) and anemia with instrumental variables.
Decision-making index 
Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficientsb
Wife final say health 0.61 1 a
Wife final say large household purchases 0.58 0.91 ***
Wife final say visits to family and relatives 0.68 1.19 ***
Earnings Control over Decision- Anemia
Standardized coefficients Education Ordered probit earningsBinary
probit
making Ordered
(instrumented) index probit
Individual level
Age -0.12 *** 0.18 *** 0.06 * 0.08 ** -0.03
Household level
Age difference 0.02 *** 0.03 0.06 ** 0.07 ***
Poorer -0.06 *** -0.04 -0.03 0.05
Middle -0.02 *** -0.07 0.02 0.06
Richer -0.07 *** -0.10 0.06 * 0.07 *
Richest 0.24 *** 0.04 -0.01 0.15 ***
Difference in wife beating justification index 0.16 *** 0.05
Polygamy -0.12 *** -0.05 -0.09 ** 0.01
Institutional level
Urban 0 39 *** 0.61 *** 0.19 *** 0.09 0.07
Christian 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 0.06 ** -0.01
Husband: husband rights index -0.05 * 0.02
Wife: wife beating justification index -0.27 *** -0.10 **
Tigray -0.01 0.15 *** 0.02 -0.12 *** 0.02
Afar -0.02 -0.07 *** -0.09 0.06 -0.03
Amhara -0.11 *** -0.26 *** -0.13 *** 0.04 0.03
Somali -0.06 *** 0.03 *** -0.02 -0.18 *** -0.07 **
Ben-Gmuz -0.02 -0.04 *** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
SNNP 0.02 0.09 *** 0.11 *** -0.17 *** 0.12 ***
Gambela 0.00 0.03 *** 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Harari -0.01 0.11 *** 0.03 0.02 0.00
Addis Ababa 0.06 * 0.17 *** 0.02 0.05 0.04
Dire Dawa -0.01 0.16 *** 0.03 0.02 0.00
Capability inputs
Education 0.28 0.08 ** 0.01 0.01
Wife relative earning (instrumented) 0.02 0.00
Control over earnings 0.10 * -0.06
Decision-making index -0.06
R-square 0.22 1 0.17 0.23 0.07
Notes: U n-weighted sample size N=2365. Dummy is Oromiya. Standardised coefficients unless otherwise specified.8 Coefficient fixed to one to identify metric.b 
Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% m arked ***; 5% **; 10%*. Source: Demographic Health Surveys Ethiopia 2005.
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Table A6. Perception of empowerment index (MIMIC) and happiness functioning with instrumental
variables.
Perception of empowerment index
Standardized coefficients Unstandardized coefficients
My life is determined by my own actions 0.66 1 a
I have the power to make important decisions that 0.88 1.42 ***change the course of my life
I am usually able to protect my personal interests 0.66 1.02 ***
Education Earnings
Perception of 
empowerment 
index
Happiness 
Ordered probit
Standardized coefficients
Individual
Age -0.12 * -0.04 -0.01 -0.06
Disability 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.13
Pregnant or breastfeeding -0.03 -0.06 0.06
Household
Polygamy 0.01 -0.06 0.09 *
Age difference -0.03 0.03 0.06
Partners different ethnic origin 0.03 -0.03 -0.05
Household poverty (relative to village) -0.06 -0.12 -0.33 ***
Household assets 0.09 0.10 ** 0.01
Institutions and environment
Orthodox Christian -0.06 0.12 * 0.09 0.12 *
PA2_Geblen 0.12 -0.15 0.01 0.16
PA3_Dinki 0.11 -0.21 ** 0.07 0.22 *
PA5 Yetmen 0.08 -0.06 -0.20 ** 0.07
PA6 Shumsha 0.16 -0.17 0.03 -0.14
PA8_Adele Keke -0.69 * 0.13 0.13 -0.20
PA9 KoroDegaga -0.16 0.18 * -0.20 -0.15
PA10 TurufeKetchema 0.33 * -0.19 ** -0.08 0.06
PA12_Imdibir -0.21 * 0.22 * 0.25 -0.25
PA13 Azr Deboa 0.25 *** -0.03 0.01 0.11 *
PA14_Adado -0.02 0.11 *** -0.30 *** -0.03
PA15_Gara Godo -0.18 ** 0.16 * 0.10 -0.12
PA16 Debre Birhan 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.03
Capability inputs
Education 0.21 *** 0.05 -0.02
Earnings (in Birr) (instrumented) -0.06 0.18 ***
Decision earnings 0.11 *** -0.01
Perception of empowerment index 0.20 ***
Other member functioning
Husband life close to ideal 0.11 **
R-square 0.48 0 .14 0.26 0.45
Notes: N  = 560. PA = Peasant association. Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% ***; 5% **; 10%*. The village left out is PA1 
Harrersaw. a Fixed to one to identify variance of metric.
Source: EHRS (2004).
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Table A7. Perception of empowerment index (MIMIC) and
instrumental variables.
life satisfaction functioning with
Perception of empowerment index
My life is determined by my own actions 
I have the power to make important decisions 
that change the course of my life 
I am usually able to protect my personal interests
Standardized coefficients 
0.67
0.85
0.69
Unstandardized coefficients 
1 a
1 34 ***
***
Education Earnings Perception of empowerment index
Life satisfaction 
Binary probit
Standardized coefficients
Individual
Age -0.12 * -0.04 -0.01 0.03
Disability 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.15 *
Pregnant or breastfeeding -0.03 -0.06 0.10
Household
Polygamy 0.01 -0.06 0.01
Age difference -0.03 0.03 0.03
Partners different ethnic origin 0.03 -0.03 0.04
Household poverty (relative to village) -0.07 -0.12 -0.21
Household assets 0.09 0.11 ** 0.04
Institutions and environment
Orthodox Christian -0.06 0.12 ** 0.09 -0.04
PA2_Geblen 0.13 -0.23 ** 0.01 0.09
PA3_Dinki 0.11 -0.20 ** 0.07 0.31 *
PA5 Yetmen 0.08 -0.04 -0.20 ** 0.06
PA6 Shumsha 0.16 -0.14 0.04 0.06
PA8_Adele Keke -0.69 * 0.24 0.11 -0.24
PA9 KoroDegaga -0.16 0.18 * -0.21 -0.18
PA10 TurufeKetchema 0.33 *** -0.21 ** -0.08 0.16
PA12_Imdibir -0.21 * 0.23 * 0.24 -0.13
PA13 Azr Deboa 0.25 *** -0.04 0.02 -0.03
PA14_Adado -0.02 0.11 *** -0.30 *** 0.00
PA15_Gara Godo -0.18 ** 0.17 * 0.10 -0.16
PA16 Debre Birhan 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.02
Capability inputs 0.05
Education 0.21 *** -0.06 -0.05
Earnings (in Birr) (instrumented) 0.11 0.10 **
Decision earnings *** 0.00
Perception of empowerment index 0.23 ***
Other member functioning
Husband life close to ideal 0.35 ***
R-square 0.48 0.14 0.26 0.49
Notes: N  = 560. PA = Peasant association. Statistical significance o f  unstandardized coefficients at 1% ***; 5% **; 10%*. The village left out is PA1_ 
Harrersaw. a Fixed to one to identify variance of metric.
Source: EHRS (2004).
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Summary (in Dutch)
Economie als een sociale en ethische wetenschap is de primaire motivatie voor deze 
verhandeling dat verscheidene onderwerpen incorporeert waaronder morele, theoretische en 
empirische kwesties. H et streefdoel is om de capability- o f mogelijkhedenbenadering , 111 het 
raamwerk dat welvaarts- en ontwikkelingseconomie kan verrijken, verder te verkennen en uit 
te breiden. Hoewel de capability benadering teruggaat tot de tijd van Aristoteles, werd het 
voor het eerst ontwikkeld door Amartya Sen. In deze welzijnsbenadering werd getracht om 
een morele kloof op te vullen in ethiek, politieke filosofie, welvaart en 
ontwikkelingseconomie.
De verhandeling vat aan met de basis componenten van de capability benadering en 
suggereert fundamenten die zijn toepassingsgebieden zouden kunnen verenigen. Vervolgens 
wordt getracht om de ethische raamwerken te verbinden met empirische operationalisering en 
aan te tonen hoe deze nauw verwikkeld zijn. In de eerste plaats wordt getracht om de 
algemene ethische raamwerken van de capability benadering te beschrijven en te 
rechtvaardigen. Deze algemene raamwerken brengen met zich mee dat de capability 
benadering een open ethische en empirische structuur heeft. M et andere woorden, het kan 
consistent zijn met verscheidene, mogelijk inconsistente, ethische en empirische theoriën 
(hoewel niet alle). Theoretische onvolledigheid wordt hier als strategisch beschouwd en niet 
als een beperking.
M eer specifiek, de algemene ethische raamwerken ondersteunen de capability benadering als 
een model dat nuttig is om het menselijke welzijn te conceptualiseren aan de hand van 
functionings (als mensen en handelingen); capability (als de verschillende functioning- 
bundels die een persoon kan realiseren); en ‘conversiefactoren' (als individuele-, sociaal- en 
omgevingsfactoren dat de capability en functioning realisatie kan beïnvloeden en bepalen). 
Vervolgens zijn deze ethisch gemotiveerde componenten empirisch geoperationaliseerd. 
Daarbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van intermediaire raamwerken, gebaseerd op het werk van 
Ingrid Robeyns en N aila Kabeer, met als doel een overeenstemming te verkrijgen in
111 Capability en functioning zijn termen die geen correcte vertaling in het Nederlands hebben. Capability kan 
mogelijk vertaald worden door ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden of persoonlijke relisatiemogelijkheden. 
Functioning kan mogelijk vertaald worden door menselijke realisaties of prestaties. Hier werd gekozen om de 
termen capability en functioning te behouden en ze daarom in het vervolg niet steeds te cursiveren.
200
indicatoren en componenten. Empirische hoofdstukken maken gebruik van recente datasets 
van Ethiopische huishoudens en structurele vergelijkingsmodellen om adequate indicatoren 
op te sporen en ze vervolgens te testen. Dit heeft als doel de componenten van de capability 
benadering te contextualiseren; de effecten van etnische en gender normen op funcioning te 
evalueren; besluitvormingspatronen van huishoudens te verklaren; en gezondheid en welzijn 
functioning te verklaren.
Operationalizering brengt als dusdanig een contextualisering van de abstract ethische 
componenten met zich mee. Capability wordt gemeten uit inputs waaronder voorwaarden 
(onderwijs en inkomen) en processen (zelfverwezenlijking).
Het eerste empirische hoofdstuk maakt gebruik van multi-level regressie en besluit dat
• Een significant gedeelte van de beslissingskracht van huishoudens wordt uitgelegd op 
het institutionele, ethische en gender niveau in Ethiopië.
• Individuele hulpbronnen (inkomen en onderwijs) de besluitvormingspatronen bij 
huishoudens niet volledig uitleggen.
Het tweede empirische hoofdstuk maakt gebruik van structurele vergelijkingen (SEM) en 
stelt vast dat
• Resultaten van de gezondheid van het individu gecorreleerd zijn met 
besluitvormingspatronen in het huishouden en met onderwijs maar dat deze variëren 
met de functioning indicatoren van gezondheid.
• Het individuele inkomen vrouwen kan beschermen tegen ondervoeding.
• Vrouwen onzelfzuchtig zouden kunnen handelen en hun besluitvormingskracht 
zouden kunnen gebruiken om andere leden te voeden.
Het derde empirische hoofdstuk maakt evenals gebruik van structurele vergelijkingsmodellen 
maar met een andere dataset om aan te tonen dat
• De controle over het inkomen vermoedelijk een hoofdfactor is van het gevoel van 
zelfverwezenlijking van Ethiopische landelijke vrouwen.
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• Het gevoel van zelfverwezenlijking en het individuele inkomen aannemelijk 
belangrijke variabelen zijn die het geluk kunnen verklaren.
• De levensvoldoening van de echtgenoot negatief gecorreleerd is met het aandeel in 
inkomen van de vrouw en besluitvorming omtrent inkomen (conflict met gender 
normen).
Tenslotte suggereert de verhandeling dat statistisch werk vooral nuttig was om de abstracte 
concepten te contextualiseren, alsook om de relaties tussen indicatoren die gekozen werden 
voor hun belang van het individuele welzijn, helpen te begrijpen en trachten te verklaren.
Desalniettemin, ondanks de statistische oefening, wordt er geconcludeerd dat de sociale 
wereld, en aldus ook de sociale wetenschappen, kwalitatieve niet-algoritmische herleidbare 
eigenschappen hebben. De sociale wereld heeft als het ware kwalitatieve eigenschappen die 
niet herleidbaar zijn tot vragen over statistiek en het testen van hypothesen. Deze kwalitatieve 
eigenschappen vergen methoden die zich onderscheiden van de klassieke logica, waaronder 
dialectiek, retorica en hermeneutiek. De verhandeling concludeert met een ander eigenschap 
van de sociale wetenschappen, namelijk dat ze deel zijn van de maatschappij en aldus 
onderhevig zijn aan sociale normen en waarden, die op hun beurt ook worden beïnvloed door 
de sociale wetenschappen. Dit dualisme werd geïdentificeerd door Michel Callon als de 
performativity' van de sociale wetenschappen.
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Summary (in English)
Economics as an ethical and social science is the primary motivation for this thesis which 
engages a range o f topics, including moral, theoretical and empirical concerns. The objective 
is to further explore and expand a framework that can enrich welfare and development 
economics, namely, the capability approach. The capability approach originated with 
Amartya Sen, although it has a pedigree dating back to Aristotle. It was articulated as a w ell­
being framework to fill a moral gap in ethics, political philosophy, welfare, and development 
economics.
The thesis starts from the basic components o f the capability approach and suggests 
foundations which could unite its expanding areas o f application. It then aims to connect the 
ethical foundations to empirical operationalization and show how the two are closely 
entangled. The thesis, accordingly, aims initially to justify and describe broad ethical 
foundations for the capability approach. These broad foundations entail the capability 
approach has an open moral and empirical structure. In other words, it can be consistent with 
various, possibly inconsistent, ethical and empirical theories (though not all). Here, 
incompleteness is perceived as strategic and not a limitation.
More specifically, the broad ethical foundations support the capability approach as 
framework useful to conceptualize human well-being and agency with functionings (as 
valuable human beings and doings); capability (as the different bundles o f functionings 
individuals can achieve); and conversion factors (as individual, social, and environmental 
factors that influence and shape capability and functioning achievement).
These ethically motivated components are subsequently empirically operationalized using 
intermediate frameworks based on the work o f Ingrid Robeyns and Naila Kabeer to match 
indicators and components. Empirical chapters use recent Ethiopian household datasets and 
structural equations regressions to search and test adequate indicators to contextualize the 
capability approach components; to evaluate the effects o f ethnic and gender norms on 
functioning; to explain household decision-making patterns and health and subjective w ell­
being functionings.
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Operationalization as such entails contextualizing the abstract ethical components. Capability 
is, accordingly, measured from its inputs which include pre-conditions (education and 
earnings) and processes (empowerment). The first empirical chapter uses multi-level 
regression and concludes
• A significant proportion o f household decision-making power is explained at the 
institutional gender ethnic norms level in Ethiopia.
• Individual resources (earnings and education) do not fully explain decision-making 
power patterns in the household.
The second empirical chapter employs structural equations (SEM) and establishes
• Individual health outcomes are correlated with decision-making patterns in the 
household and education but the patterns vary with health functioning indicators.
• Individual earnings can protect women from being under-nourished.
• Evidence that women could behave altruistically and may use their decision-making 
power to feed other members.
The third empirical chapter also employs structural equations (SEM) but a different dataset to 
show that
• Control over earnings is a likely key determinant o f Ethiopian rural w om en’s feeling 
o f empowerment.
• The feeling o f empowerment and individual earnings are important happiness 
explanatory variables.
• Husband (male partner) life satisfaction is negatively correlated with wife earnings 
share and earnings decision-making, most likely because o f a conflict with gender 
norms.
In conclusion, the thesis suggests, statistical work has been mostly useful to further 
contextualize abstract concepts as well as help understand and attempt to explain— not 
refute— relationships between indicators chosen for their importance for individual w ell­
being.
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Nevertheless, notwithstanding the statistical exercise, it is most likely that the social world, 
and therefore the social sciences as well, have qualitative non-algorithmically reducible 
properties. In other words, the social world has qualitative features which are not computable 
or reducible to statistical estimation and hypothesis testing. These qualitative properties 
require methods distinct from classical logic, and they include qualitative approaches such as 
abduction, dialectics, rhetoric, and hermeneutics. The thesis concludes by noting another 
feature o f social sciences, namely, that they are part and parcel o f society and are subject to 
social norms and values which influences them but which they in turn also influence. The 
duality was well described by Michel Callon, among others, who labeled it the performativity 
o f social sciences.
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